There has been considerable debate over regulated organ markets. Especially current markets, where people sell one of their kidneys while still alive, have received increased attention. Futures markets remain an interesting and under-discussed alternative specification of a market-based solution to the organ shortage. Futures markets pertain to the sale of the right to procure people’s organs after they die. There is a wide range of possible specifications of the futures market. There are, however, some major unaddressed efficiency concerns. This article (...) presents this class of concerns and discusses the implication for organ futures markets. It identifies a number of inefficiency sources pertaining to crowding out, bad organs, costs and missed opportunities, family refusals, moral hazard and strength of the provided incentive. However, a complete assessment of futures market requires better knowledge regarding the potential reaction from donors, families and health professionals. (shrink)

Organ procurement presents several ethical concerns (from what constitutes acceptable criteria for death to issues involved in specifically designating to whom an organ can be given), but none is more central than the concern for what are appropriate means for acquiring organs. The following discussion attempts a different perspective on the issue of organ procurement by arguing that, rather than appealing to our charitable consciences or our pocketbooks, relinquishing our organs after death in this day and age is, in fact, (...) obligatory for most people. Each of us is pressed by the growing demand for our organs should we die ?rightly,? and that desperate need has risen to such a level that not to release our organs for transplantation would constitute a serious moral wrong. (shrink)

It has often been proposed to restrict access to postmortal organs to registered donors, or at least to give them priority on the waiting list. Such proposals are motivated by considerations of fairness: everyone benefits from the existence of a pool of available organs and of an organised system of distributing them and it is unfair that people who are prepared to contribute to this public good are duped by people who are not. This paper spells out this rationale and (...) goes on to discuss the main principled objections that have been brought forward to such proposals. The most fundamental objection is that healthcare resources should be allocated in accordance with need, not with merit. The reply to this objection is that the principle of allocation according to need only holds in cases in which the provision of such resources and the fair distribution of the burdens of contribution are independently secured, as they are in an obligatory insurance system. (shrink)

The State may require an autopsy when foul play is suspected in the death of one of its citizens.[1] This is so regardless of any objections to such invasive procedures expressed by the deceased before their deaths or afterward by their families. There is not even a religious exemption. The most obvious explanation for why consent is not needed is that apprehending a murderer with information obtained from the autopsy can save lives. However, taking organs without consent from the deceased (...) for transplantation into those suffering vital organ failures can also save lives. But doing so is considered beyond the pale. The question then becomes why are mandatory autopsies permitted but organ conscription prohibited? Our aim is to explore whether such divergent attitudes can be justified. (shrink)

This article responds to David Steinberg's proposal in favor of an organ donation system that gives allocation preference to people who agree to donate after they die. This article challenges the notion that organ taking is morally impermissible and questions Steinberg’s program on the grounds that it would unfairly discriminate against these people by deprioritizing their claims to the kidney supply. Relatedly, the article suggests that Steinberg’s proposal effectively coerces people to opt in, thus calling into question the legitimacy of (...) the consent on which their decisions were predicated. (shrink)

Figuring out what pushes individuals to become organ donors has become the holy grail of social scientists interested in transplantations. In this paper I concentrate on solidarity as a determinant of organ donation and examine it through the history of organ donation in Israel. By following the history of transplantation policies since 1968 and examining them in relation to different types of solidarities, this paper leads to a nuanced understanding of the ties between solidarity and health policy. Attempts to foster (...) an all-encompassing consensus on the definition of brain death yielded the Transplantation and the Brain-Respiratory Death Laws of 2008. It was hoped that a wide “civic solidarity” would render Israel self-sufficient in its organ economy. However, the failure of the law led to the breakdown of civic solidarity in organ donation. As a result, initiatives such as the priority policy and non-directed living organ donations, developed out of a narrower conception of solidarity. Juxtaposing these initiatives sheds light on macro level processes for policy makers and suggests solidarity as a key bioethical concept to understand organ donation policies. (shrink)

Given the dramatic shortage of transplantable organs, demand cannot be met by established and envisioned organ procurement policies targeting postmortem donation. Live organ donation (LOD) is a medically attractive option, and ethically permissible if informed consent is given and donor beneficence balances recipient non-maleficence. Only a few legal and regulatory frameworks incentivise LOD, with the key exception of Israel’s Organ Transplant Law, which has produced significant improvements in organ donation rates. Therefore, I propose an organ procurement system that incentivises LOD (...) by allocating additional priority points to the living donor on any transplant waiting list. I outline benefits and challenges for potential recipients, donors and society at large, and suggest measures to ensure medical protection of marginalised patient groups. (shrink)

In the absence of kidney markets, alternative institutions for exchanging kidneys have arisen to give donors incentives to donate. I examine thirteen such institutions, and ask whether moral arguments against markets, such as commodification, apply to them or not. I find that most arguments against kidney arguments also argue against these alternative institutions, meaning those arguments are not strong enough to prevent society from using institutions to exchange kidneys. Two arguments that do explain which kidney exchange institutions are socially accepted (...) and which are not are that institutions should not be want-regarding and should not be exploitative.Screening donors to eliminate those with socially unacceptable motives for donation and those who are in a position of being exploited could make kidney markets acceptable, since they would then only be vulnerable to arguments which have not prevented alternative exchange institutions from functioning. (shrink)