Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Carbon Offsetting and Justice: A Kantian Response.Zachary Vereb - 2022 - Ethics, Policy and Environment 25 (3):253-257.
    ABSTRACT In ‘Should I offset or should I do more good?’, H. Orri Stefansson defends an argument that calls into question the belief that we can discharge our duties to prevent harm by carbon offsetting. Stefansson suggests that other actions, such as donations, should be preferred. This paper questions aspects of that analysis by evaluating the normative assumptions underlying it. It does so from a broadly Kantian perspective. I begin by highlighting assumptions that could benefit from elaboration and defense. These (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Why Offsetting is Not Like Shaking a Bag: A Reply to Barry & Cullity.H. Orri Stefánsson & Mac Willners - 2023 - Ethics, Policy and Environment 26 (1):144-148.
    Barry and Cullity argue that when morally assessing a person’s climate actions, we should ask how these actions affect other people’s prospects, understood in terms of the actor’s episemic probabilities. In this comment we argue, first, that even though Barry and Cullity are right in that we should use a person’s epistemic probabilities when assessing her climate actions, it is not clear that their conclusion follows. The reason is that important questions remain about what should be the object of these (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Why I Should Still Offset Rather Than Do More Good.Kritika Maheshwari - 2022 - Ethics, Policy and Environment 25 (3):249-252.
    ABSTRACT Stefansson (forthcoming) argues that by emitting and offsetting, we fail to fulfil our justice-based duty to avoid harm owed to specific individuals. In this paper, I explore a case where offsetting fails to prevent some but not all risks of harms that our emissions impose on them. By drawing on a distinction between general and specific duties not to (risk) harm, I argue that if by emitting and offsetting, we satisfy some (if not all) of our specific duties we (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Offsetting Risks to the Unjustly Advantaged: Why Doing More Good Sometimes Takes Priority Over Offsetting Risks We’ve Unjustly Imposed.Brian Berkey - 2022 - Ethics, Policy and Environment 25 (3):261-263.
    Stefánsson’s central claim is that we have stronger moral reasons to direct resources to charitable organizations like those recommended by GiveWell than we have to use the same resources to...
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Do We Impose Undue Risk When We Emit and Offset? A Reply to Stefansson.Christian Barry & Garrett Cullity - 2022 - Ethics, Policy and Environment 25 (3):242-248.
    ABSTRACT We have previously argued that there are forms of greenhouse gas offsetting for which, when one emits and offsets, one imposes no risk. Orri Stefansson objects that our argument fails to distinguish properly between the people who stand to be harmed by one’s emissions and the people who stand to be benefited by one’s offsetting. We reply by emphasizing the difference between acting with a probability of making a difference to the distribution of harm and acting in a way (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation