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  1. Carbon Offsetting.Dan Baras - forthcoming - Ethics, Policy and Environment.
    Do carbon-offsetting schemes morally offset emissions? The moral equivalence thesis is the claim that the combination of emitting greenhouse gasses and offsetting those emissions is morally equivalent to not emitting at all. This thesis implies that in response to climate change, we need not make any lifestyle changes to reduce our emissions as long as we offset them. An influential argument in favor of this thesis is premised on two claims, one empirical and the other normative: (1) When you emit (...)
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  • The moral inefficacy of carbon offsetting.Tyler M. John, Amanda Askell & Hayden Wilkinson - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy.
    Many real-world agents recognise that they impose harms by choosing to emit carbon, e.g., by flying. Yet many do so anyway, and then attempt to make things right by offsetting those harms. Such offsetters typically believe that, by offsetting, they change the deontic status of their behaviour, making an otherwise impermissible action permissible. Do they succeed in practice? Some philosophers have argued that they do, since their offsets appear to reverse the adverse effects of their emissions. But we show that (...)
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  • Offsetting Risks to the Unjustly Advantaged: Why Doing More Good Sometimes Takes Priority Over Offsetting Risks We’ve Unjustly Imposed.Brian Berkey - 2022 - Ethics, Policy and Environment 25 (3):261-263.
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  • Do We Impose Undue Risk When We Emit and Offset? A Reply to Stefansson.Christian Barry & Garrett Cullity - 2022 - Ethics, Policy and Environment 25 (3):242-248.
    ABSTRACT We have previously argued that there are forms of greenhouse gas offsetting for which, when one emits and offsets, one imposes no risk. Orri Stefansson objects that our argument fails to distinguish properly between the people who stand to be harmed by one’s emissions and the people who stand to be benefited by one’s offsetting. We reply by emphasizing the difference between acting with a probability of making a difference to the distribution of harm and acting in a way (...)
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  • Another Shake of the Bag: Stefansson and Willners on Offsetting and Risk Imposition.Christian Barry & Garrett Cullity - forthcoming - Ethics, Policy and Environment.
    There is a difference between acting with a probability of making a difference to who is harmed, and worsening someone’s prospect. This difference is relevant to debates about the ethics of offsetting, since it means that showing that emitting-and-offsetting has the first feature is not a way of showing that it has the second feature. In an earlier paper, we illustrate this difference with an example of a lottery in which you shake the bag from which a ball will be (...)
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  • Carbon Offsetting and Justice: A Kantian Response.Zachary Vereb - 2022 - Ethics, Policy and Environment 25 (3):253-257.
    ABSTRACT In ‘Should I offset or should I do more good?’, H. Orri Stefansson defends an argument that calls into question the belief that we can discharge our duties to prevent harm by carbon offsetting. Stefansson suggests that other actions, such as donations, should be preferred. This paper questions aspects of that analysis by evaluating the normative assumptions underlying it. It does so from a broadly Kantian perspective. I begin by highlighting assumptions that could benefit from elaboration and defense. These (...)
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  • Why Fly? Prudential Value, Climate Change, and the Ethics of Long-distance Leisure Travel.Dick Timmer & Willem van der Deijl - 2023 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 26 (5):689-707.
    We argue that the prudential benefits of long-distance leisure travel can justify such trips even though there are strong and important reasons against long-distance flying. This is because prudential benefits can render otherwise impermissible actions permissible, and because, according to dominant theories about wellbeing, long-distance leisure travel provides significant prudential benefits. However, this ‘wellbeing argument’ for long-distance leisure travel must be qualified in two ways. First, because travellers are epistemically privileged with respect to knowledge about what is good for them, (...)
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  • Why Offsetting is Not Like Shaking a Bag: A Reply to Barry & Cullity.H. Orri Stefánsson & Mac Willners - 2023 - Ethics, Policy and Environment 26 (1):144-148.
    1. Barry and Cullity (2022b) argue that when morally assessing a person’s climate actions,1 we should ask how these actions affect other people’s prospects.2 For the present purposes, we can unders...
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  • Why I Should Still Offset Rather Than Do More Good.Kritika Maheshwari - 2022 - Ethics, Policy and Environment 25 (3):249-252.
    ABSTRACT Stefansson (forthcoming) argues that by emitting and offsetting, we fail to fulfil our justice-based duty to avoid harm owed to specific individuals. In this paper, I explore a case where offsetting fails to prevent some but not all risks of harms that our emissions impose on them. By drawing on a distinction between general and specific duties not to (risk) harm, I argue that if by emitting and offsetting, we satisfy some (if not all) of our specific duties we (...)
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