- Intentionality, mind and folk psychology.Winand H. Dittrich & Stephen E. G. Lea - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):39-41.details
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Culture and Cognitive Science.Andreas De Block & Daniel Kelly - 2022 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Explaining learning: From analysis to paralysis to hippocampus.John Clark - 2005 - Educational Philosophy and Theory 37 (5):667–687.details
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Explaining Learning: From analysis to paralysis to hippocampus.John Clark - 2005 - Educational Philosophy and Theory 37 (5):667-687.details
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Culture, biology, and human behavior.Horst D. Steklis & Alex Walter - 1991 - Human Nature 2 (2):137-169.details
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Against eliminative materialism: From folk psychology to volkerpsychologie.John D. Greenwood - 1992 - Philosophical Psychology 5 (4):349-68.details
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Still Autonomous After All.Andrew Knoll - 2018 - Minds and Machines 28 (1):7-27.details
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The neurocomputational mind meets normative epistemology.Kenneth R. Livingston - 1996 - Philosophical Psychology 9 (1):33-59.details
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Do Emotions Represent Values?Laura Schroeter, François Schroeter & Karen Jones - 2015 - Dialectica 69 (3):357-380.details
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Book reviews. [REVIEW]John Heil - 1994 - Mind 103 (412):361-428.details
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Computation, content and cause.Nenad Miščević - 1996 - Philosophical Studies 82 (2):241-63.details
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Computation, content and cause.Nenad Miščević - 1996 - Philosophical Studies 82 (2):241-263.details
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Is a unified science of the mind-brain possible?John Bishop - 1988 - Biology and Philosophy 3 (3):375-391.details
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Reasoning and rationality.K. Manktelow & David E. Over - 1987 - Mind and Language 2 (3):199-219.details
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The simulation theory: Objections and misconceptions.Robert M. Gordon - 1992 - Mind and Language 7 (1-2):11-34.details
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The limits of spectatorial folk psychology.Daniel D. Hutto - 2004 - Mind and Language 19 (5):548-73.details
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The architectural nonchalance of commonsense psychology.Radu J. Bogdan - 1993 - Mind and Language 8 (2):189-205.details
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Semantics and the computational paradigm in computational psychology.Eric Dietrich - 1989 - Synthese 79 (April):119-41.details
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Confirmation and the computational paradigm, or, why do you think they call it artificial intelligence?David J. Buller - 1993 - Minds and Machines 3 (2):155-81.details
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Confirmation and the computational paradigm (or: Why do you think they call itartificial intelligence?). [REVIEW]David J. Buller - 1993 - Minds and Machines 3 (2):155-181.details
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Do connectionist representations earn their explanatory keep?William Ramsey - 1997 - Mind and Language 12 (1):34-66.details
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Do Connectionist Representations Earn Their Explanatory Keep?William Ramsey - 1997 - Mind and Language 12 (1):34-66.details
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Perspectives on Self-Deception.Brian P. McLaughlin & Amélie Oksenberg Rorty (eds.) - 1988 - University of California Press.details
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Basic Emotions, Complex Emotions, Machiavellian Emotions.Paul E. Griffiths - 2003 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 52:39-67.details
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Semantic determinants and psychology as a science.Steven Yalowitz - 1998 - Erkenntnis 49 (1):57-91.details
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Meaning, prototypes and the future of cognitive science.J. Brakel - 1991 - Minds and Machines 1 (3):233-257.details
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Meaning, prototypes and the future of cognitive science.Jaap van Brakel - 1991 - Minds and Machines 1 (3):233-57.details
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Why Semantic Properties Won’t Earn their Keep.Peter Godfrey-Smith - 1986 - Philosophical Studies 50 (September):223-36.details
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Why semantic properties won't earn their keep.Peter Godfrey -Smith - 1986 - Philosophical Studies 50 (2):223-236.details
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Intentionality and naturalism.Stephen P. Stich & Stephen Laurence - 1994 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1):159-82.details
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Narrow content, context of thought, and asymmetric dependence.Paul Bernier - 1993 - Mind and Language 8 (3):327-42.details
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Externalism, content, and causal histories.Filip Buekens - 1994 - Dialectica 48 (3-4):267-86.details
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Belief states and narrow content.Curtis Brown - 1993 - Mind and Language 8 (3):343-67.details
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Nonautonomous psychology.Bradford Petrie - 1990 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 28 (4):539-59.details
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The Case against Stephen Stich's Syntactic Theory of Mind.Kevin Possin - 1986 - Philosophical Studies 49 (3):405 - 418.details
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Refuting eliminative materialism on the cheap?Kim Sterelny - 1993 - Mind and Language 8 (2):306-15.details
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Don't stop believing: The case against eliminative materialism.Barbara Hannan - 1993 - Mind and Language 8 (2):165-179.details
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The threat of eliminativism.Elizabeth Fricker - 1993 - Mind and Language 8 (2):253-281.details
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Patterns and descriptions.Denny E. Bradshaw - 1998 - Philosophical Papers 27 (3):181-202.details
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A Theory of Conceptual Advance: Explaining Conceptual Change in Evolutionary, Molecular, and Evolutionary Developmental Biology.Ingo Brigandt - 2006 - Dissertation, University of Pittsburghdetails
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Representational redescription and cognitive architectures.Antonella Carassa & Maurizio Tirassa - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (4):711-712.details
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Review article.[author unknown] - 1994 - Semiotica 99 (1-2):101-234.details
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Reply to Stich and Nichols.Robert M. Gordon - 1992 - Mind and Language 7 (1-2):87-97.details
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Putting together connectionism – again.Paul Smolensky - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (1):59-74.details
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Minds beyond brains and algorithms.Jan M. Zytkow - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):691-692.details
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The psychologist's fallacy.Philip David Zelazo & Douglas Frye - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):89-90.details
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From the decline of development to the ascent of consciousness.Philip David Zelazo - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (4):731-732.details
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Normativity and the Metaphysics of Mind.Nick Zangwill - 2010 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (1):1–19.details
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Intentionality, theoreticity and innateness.Deborah Zaitchik & Jerry Samet - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):87-89.details
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More qualia trouble for functionalism: The Smythies TV-Hood analogy.Edmond L. Wright - 1993 - Synthese 97 (3):365-82.details
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