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  1. Saving psychological solipsism.J. Christopher Maloney - 1991 - Philosophical Studies 61 (March):267-83.
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  • Sensuous content.J. Christopher Maloney - 1986 - Philosophical Papers 15 (November):131-54.
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  • Social Construction and Achieving Reference.Ron Mallon - 2017 - Noûs 51 (1):113-131.
    One influential view is that at least some putatively natural human kinds are actually social constructions, understood as some real kind of thing that is produced or sustained by our social and conceptual practices. Category constructionists share two commitments: they hold that human category terms like “race” and “sex” and “homosexuality” and “perversion” actually refer to constructed categories, and they hold that these categories are widely but mistakenly taken to be natural kinds. But it is far from clear that these (...)
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  • Content: Covariation, control, and contingency.J. Christopher Maloney - 1994 - Synthese 100 (2):241-90.
    The Representational Theory of the Mind allows for psychological explanations couched in terms of the contents of propositional attitudes. Propositional attitudes themselves are taken to be relations to mental representations. These representations (partially) determine the contents of the attitudes in which they figure. Thus, Representationalism owes an explanation of the contents of mental representations. This essay constitutes an atomistic theory of the content of formally or syntactically simple mental representation, proposing that the content of such a representation is determined by (...)
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  • Arguments from reference and the worry about dependence.Ron Mallon - 2007 - In Peter A. French & Howard K. Wettstein (eds.), Philosophy and the Empirical. Blackwell. pp. 160-183.
    This paper raises concern with the use of theories of reference in philosophical discourse and then to consider the possibility of empirically validating this concern by reference to a novel sort of “quantitative” empirical approach suggested recently by Shaun Nichols (forthcoming). The concern is whether the particular theories of reference or reference relations employed in particular philosophical discussions are actually chosen with a view to entailing or accommodating a desired philosophical outcome. I argue that such dependent selections of assumptions about (...)
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  • Against Arguments from Reference.Ron Mallon, Edouard Machery, Shaun Nichols & Stephen Stich - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (2):332 - 356.
    It is common in various quarters of philosophy to derive philosophically significant conclusions from theories of reference. In this paper, we argue that philosophers should give up on such 'arguments from reference.' Intuitions play a central role in establishing theories of reference, and recent cross-cultural work suggests that intuitions about reference vary across cultures and between individuals within a culture (Machery et al. 2004). We argue that accommodating this variation within a theory of reference undermines arguments from reference.
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  • Uncertainty about quantum mechanics.Mark S. Madsen - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):674-675.
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  • Thought experiments and philosophical knowledge.Edouard Machery - 2011 - Metaphilosophy 42 (3):191-214.
    : While thought experiments play an important role in contemporary analytic philosophy, much remains unclear about thought experiments. In particular, it is still unclear whether the judgments elicited by thought experiments can provide evidence for the premises of philosophical arguments. This article argues that, if an influential and promising view about the nature of the judgments elicited by thought experiments is correct, then many thought experiments in philosophy fail to provide any evidence for the premises of philosophical arguments.
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  • The discomforts of dualism.Bruce MacLennan - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):673-674.
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  • The development of moral reasoning and the foundations of geometry.John Macnamara - 1991 - Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 21 (2):125–150.
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  • Précis of Doing without Concepts.Edouard Machery - 2010 - Mind and Language 25 (5):602-611.
    In this précis, I review the main points and arguments developed at greater length in Doing without Concepts, and I explain why eliminating the notion of concept would contribute to the progress of the psychology of higher cognition.
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  • Précis of doing without concepts.Edouard Machery - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 149 (3):602-611.
    Although cognitive scientists have learned a lot about concepts, their findings have yet to be organized in a coherent theoretical framework. In addition, after twenty years of controversy, there is little sign that philosophers and psychologists are converging toward an agreement about the very nature of concepts. Doing without Concepts (Machery 2009) attempts to remedy this state of affairs. In this article, I review the main points and arguments developed at greater length in Doing without Concepts.
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  • Précis of Doing without Concepts.Edouard Machery - 2010 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33 (2-3):195-206.
    Although cognitive scientists have learned a lot about concepts, their findings have yet to be organized in a coherent theoretical framework. In addition, after twenty years of controversy, there is little sign that philosophers and psychologists are converging toward an agreement about the very nature of concepts.Doing without Concepts(Machery 2009) attempts to remedy this state of affairs. In this article, I review the main points and arguments developed at greater length inDoing without Concepts.
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  • Précis of Doing without Concepts.Edouard Machery - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 149 (3):401-410.
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  • Précis de Doing without Concepts.Édouard Machery - 2011 - Dialogue 50 (1):141-152.
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  • Consciousness is king of the neuronal processors.William A. MacKay - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):687-688.
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  • Causes and intentions.Bruce J. MacLennan - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (3):519-520.
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  • Symbols, subsymbols, neurons.William G. Lycan - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (1):43-44.
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  • Dennett's instrumentalism.William G. Lycan - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (3):518.
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  • Quantum AI.Rudi Lutz - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):672-673.
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  • The fallibility of first-person knowledge of intentionality.Peter Ludlow & Norah Martin - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):60-60.
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  • Indefinite descriptions: In defense of Russell. [REVIEW]Peter Ludlow & Stephen Neale - 1991 - Linguistics and Philosophy 14 (2):171 - 202.
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  • Emdedded systems vs. individualism.Michael Losonsky - 1995 - Minds and Machines 5 (3):357-71.
    The dispute between individualism and anti-individualism is about the individuation of psychological states, and individualism, on some accounts, is committed to the claim that psychological subjects together with their environments do not constitute integrated computational systems. Hence on this view the computational states that explain psychological states in computational accounts of mind will not involve the subject''s natural and social environment. Moreover, the explanation of a system''s interaction with the environment is, on this view, not the primary goal of computational (...)
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  • Beyond methodological solipsism?Michael Losonsky - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (4):723-724.
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  • Belief ascriptions and social externalism.Ronald Loeffler - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 168 (1):211-239.
    I outline Brandom’s theory of de re and de dicto belief ascriptions, which plays a central role in Brandom’s overall theory of linguistic communication, and show that this theory offers a surprising, new response to Burge’s (Midwest Stud 6:73–121, 1979) argument for social externalism. However, while this response is in principle available from the perspective of Brandom’s theory of belief ascription in abstraction from his wider theoretical enterprise, it ceases to be available from this perspective in the wider context of (...)
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  • Functionalism can explain self-ascription.Brian Loar - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):58-60.
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  • Names in thought.Brian Loar - 1987 - Philosophical Studies 51 (2):169 - 185.
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  • Connectionism in the golden age of cognitive science.Dan Lloyd - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (1):42-43.
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  • Consciousness: Only introspective hindsight?Dan Lloyd - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):686-687.
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  • Can this treatment raise the dead?Robert K. Lindsay - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (1):41-42.
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  • Time-delays in conscious processes.Benjamin Libet - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):672-672.
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  • Conscious functions and brain processes.Benjamin Libet - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):685-686.
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  • Commitment engineering: conceptual engineering without representations.Guido Löhr - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):13035-13052.
    It is largely assumed that conceptual engineering is essentially about revising, introducing, or eliminating representational devices, in particular the intension and extension of words and concepts. However, tying conceptual engineering too closely to representations is risky. Not everyone endorses the notion of representation as theoretically helpful or even real. Not everyone thinks that concepts or meanings should be understood in terms of the notion of representation. Does this mean that conceptual engineering is not interesting or relevant for these skeptics? In (...)
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  • Three inferential temptations.Alexander Levine & Georg Schwarz - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):57-58.
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  • Even a theory-theory needs information processing: ToMM, an alternative theory-theory of the child's theory of mind.Alan M. Leslie, Tim P. German & Francesca G. Happé - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):56-57.
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  • Subjectivism and environmentalism.Ernest LePore - 1990 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 33 (2):197-214.
    The main thesis of this paper is that the most cogent demands of subjectivity, at least with respect to questions concerning the contents of our thoughts, can be accommodated within an objectivist framework. I begin with two theses: (1) Subjectivity: I can know (the contents of) my own thoughts without appeal to any knowledge of features external to my mind; (2) Environmentalism: (The contents of) my thoughts are determined by features external to my mind, at least in this sense: without (...)
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  • Physics, cognition, and connectionism: An interdisciplinary alchemy.Wendy G. Lehnert - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (1):40-41.
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  • Les états intentionnels des créatures solitaires.Daniel Laurier - 1987 - Philosophiques 14 (2):229-359.
    Je soutiens qu'il y a deux façons d'individuer les états intentionnels de créatures qui sont dépourvues de toute compétence linguistique, à savoir par leur rôle propositionnel ou par leurs conditions de vérité, mais que cette distinction ne vaut que pour les états intentionnels singuliers. L'examine ensuite différentes façons de spécifier, tout en restant dans le cadre d'une conception représentationnaliste de l'intentionnalité, les conditions de vérité des attributions d'états intentionnels privés du langage ordinaire selon le mode d'individuation considéré. Il s'avère qu'une (...)
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  • New Ontological Foundations for Extended Minds: Causal Powers Realism.Charles Lassiter & Joseph Vukov - forthcoming - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-19.
    In this paper, we describe causal powers realism as a conjunction of four claims: causal powers are not reducible to counterfactuals; they are empirically-discoverable; they manifest effects in conjunction with partners; and their manifestations empower further manifestations. We describe four challenges to extended mind theory and for each show how an ontology of causal powers realism either avoids or dissolves the problem. We close by suggesting that causal powers realism isn’t a competitor with extended mind theory but rather a new (...)
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  • Smolensky, semantics, and the sensorimotor system.George Lakoff - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (1):39-40.
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  • Knowledge without Truth.Joseph Thomas Tolliver - 1989 - Philosophical Studies 56 (1):29-51.
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  • Two problems with “self-deception”: No “self” and no “deception”.Robert Kurzban - 2011 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 34 (1):32-33.
    While the idea that being wrong can be strategically advantageous in the context of social strategy is sound, the idea that there is a “self” to be deceived might not be. The modular view of the mind finesses this difficulty and is useful – perhaps necessary – for discussing the phenomena currently grouped under the term “self-deception.”.
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  • Ahistorical intentional content.Martin Kurthen - 1994 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 25 (2):241 - 259.
    One of the main problems of current theory of intentionality concerns the possibility of ahistorical intentional content, that is, content in the absence of any developmental history of the respective item. Biosemanticists like Millikan (1984) argue that content is essentially historical, while computationalists like Cummins (1989) hold that a system's current ahistorical state alone determines content. In the present paper, this problem is discussed in terms of some popular 'cosmic accident' thought experiments, and the conceptual framework of these experiments is (...)
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  • Making too many enemies: Hutto and Myin’s attack on computationalism.Jesse Kuokkanen & Anna-Mari Rusanen - 2018 - Philosophical Explorations 21 (2):282-294.
    We analyse Hutto & Myin's three arguments against computationalism [Hutto, D., E. Myin, A. Peeters, and F. Zahnoun. Forthcoming. “The Cognitive Basis of Computation: Putting Computation In Its Place.” In The Routledge Handbook of the Computational Mind, edited by M. Sprevak, and M. Colombo. London: Routledge.; Hutto, D., and E. Myin. 2012. Radicalizing Enactivism: Basic Minds Without Content. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press; Hutto, D., and E. Myin. 2017. Evolving Enactivism: Basic Minds Meet Content. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press]. The Hard Problem (...)
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  • The power of explicit knowing.Deanna Kuhn - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (4):722-723.
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  • Understanding awareness at the neuronal level.Christof Koch & Francis Crick - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):683-685.
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  • Self-attributions help constitute mental types.Bernard W. Kobes - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):54-56.
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  • Is consciousness information processing?Raymond Klein - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):683-683.
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  • The devil, the details, and Dr. Dennett.Patricia Kitcher & Philip Kitcher - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (3):517.
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  • Competence models are causal.David Kirsh - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (3):515.
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