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  1. Solving Frege's puzzle.Richard Heck - 2012 - Journal of Philosophy 109 (1-2):728-732.
    So-called 'Frege cases' pose a challenge for anyone who would hope to treat the contents of beliefs (and similar mental states) as Russellian propositions: It is then impossible to explain people's behavior in Frege cases without invoking non-intentional features of their mental states, and doing that seems to undermine the intentionality of psychological explanation. In the present paper, I develop this sort of objection in what seems to me to be its strongest form, but then offer a response to it. (...)
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  • What is the intentional stance?Gilbert Harman - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (3):515.
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  • Indicator semantics and Dretske's function.Valerie Gray Hardcastle - 1994 - Philosophical Psychology 7 (3):367-82.
    In his Explaining Behavior, Fred Dretske uses a reliabilist theory of representation to try to vindicate the use of intentional explanation for behaviour against latter-day elitninativism. Although Dretske's indicator semantics turns on the notion of function, he himself never explicitly defines what function means. Dretske's reticence in discussing function may ultimately be an error, for, as I argue, his implicit understanding of what a function amounts to does not fit with data from op rant conditioning. Still, this need not be (...)
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  • From Desire to Subjective Value: On the Neural Mechanisms of Moral Motivation.Daniel F. Hartner - 2014 - Erasmus Journal for Philosophy and Economics 7 (1):1-26.
    Increasingly, empirically minded moral philosophers are using data from cognitive science and neuroscience to resolve some longstanding philosophical questions about moral motivation, such as whether moral beliefs require the presence of a desire to motivate. These empirical approaches are implicitly committed to the existence of folk psychological mental states like beliefs and desires. However, data from the neuroscience of decision-making, particularly cellular-level work in neuroeconomics, is now converging with data from cognitive and social neuroscience to explain the processes through which (...)
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  • First-person current.Paul L. Harris - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):48-49.
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  • Epiphenomenalism and the reduction of experience.Valerie Gray Hardcastle - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):680-680.
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  • Computationalism.Valerie Gray Hardcastle - 1995 - Synthese 105 (3):303-17.
    What counts as a computation and how it relates to cognitive function are important questions for scientists interested in understanding how the mind thinks. This paper argues that pragmatic aspects of explanation ultimately determine how we answer those questions by examining what is needed to make rigorous the notion of computation used in the (cognitive) sciences. It (1) outlines the connection between the Church-Turing Thesis and computational theories of physical systems, (2) differentiates merely satisfying a computational function from true computation, (...)
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  • On the obvious treatment of connectionism.Stephen José Hanson - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (1):38-39.
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  • Representational redescription, memory, and connectionism.P. J. Hampson - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (4):721-721.
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  • Belief in Naturalism: an Epistemologist’s Philosophy of Mind.Susan Haack - 2010 - Logos and Episteme 1 (1):67-83.
    My title, “Belief in Naturalism,” signals, not that I adopt naturalism as an article of faith, but that my purpose in this paper is to shed some light on what belief is, on why the concept of belief is needed in epistemology, and how all this relates to debates about epistemological naturalism. After clarifying the many varieties of naturalism, philosophical and other (section 1), and then the various forms of epistemological naturalism specifically (section 2), I offer a theory of belief (...)
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  • Eighteen months on the planet and already a psychological theorist.Don Gustafson - 1995 - Philosophical Psychology 8 (2):125 – 137.
    A critical review essay of The Child's Theory of Mind, Henry M. Wellman, 1992, Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, xiii + 358 pp, $16.95; and Young Children's Understanding of Pretense, Paul L. Harris, Robert D. Kavanaugh, 1993, with Commentary by Henry M. Wellman, Anne K. Hickling and a Reply by the authors. Monographs of the Society for Research in Child Development, Serial No. 231, Vol. 58, No. 1. Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, v + 110 pp.
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  • Know my own mind? I should be so lucky!Jennifer M. Gurd & John C. Marshall - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):47-48.
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  • On behalf of phenomenological parity for the attitudes.Keith Gunderson - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):46-47.
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  • Consciousness may still have a processing role to play.Robert Van Gulick - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):699-700.
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  • Beyond connectionist versus classical Al: A control theoretic perspective on development and cognitive science.Rick Grush - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (4):720-720.
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  • Commonsense psychology, dual visual streams, and the individuation of action.Thor Grünbaum - 2012 - Philosophical Psychology 25 (1):25 - 47.
    Psychologists and philosophers are often tempted to make general claims about the importance of certain experimental results for our commonsense notions of intentional agency, moral responsibility, and free will. It is a strong intuition that if the agent does not intentionally control her own behavior, her behavior will not be an expression of agency, she will not be morally responsible for its consequences, and she will not be acting as a free agent. It therefore seems natural that the interest centers (...)
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  • Real intentions?Donald R. Griffin - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (3):514.
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  • Author’s response.Paul Griffiths - 1999 - Metascience 8 (1):49-62.
    The air of consensus in these reviews is, as McNaughton notes, methodological. The future of philosophical emotion theory is in synthesising what a wide range of science has to tell us and using this to reflect on the nature of mind in general. In this respect the philosophy of emotion has been seriously out of step with the rest of a very exciting contemporary scene in the philosophy of mind. Whatever the shortcomings of my own attempt to bring the philosophy (...)
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  • Unnatural epistemology.John D. Greenwood - 2007 - Mind and Language 22 (2):132-149.
    ‘Naturalized’ philosophers of mind regularly appeal to the empirical psychological literature in support of the ‘theory-theory’ account of the natural epistemology of mental state ascription (to self and others). It is argued that such appeals are not philosophically neutral, but in fact presuppose the theory-theory account of mental state ascription. It is suggested that a possible explanation of the popularity of the theory-theory account is that it is generally assumed that alternative accounts in terms of introspection (and simulation) presuppose a (...)
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  • Has consciousness a sharp edge?Robert A. M. Gregson - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):679-680.
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  • What is the relation between language and consciousness?Jeffrey A. Gray - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):679-679.
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  • The origins of folk psychology.George Graham - 1987 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 30 (December):357-79.
    Folk psychology is the psychology deployed by ordinary folk and by scientists in ordinary life. At its most basic level, it consists of deploying the concept of mind to explain and predict behavior. This article (i) considers how folk psychology may have begun, by considering an imaginary race of primitive folk deploying the rudimentary nucleus of the psychology, or a rudimentary concept of mind, and (ii) examines one argument for the evolutionary emergence and adaptivity of folk psychology. The crucial issue (...)
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  • How to be realistic about folk psychology.George Graham & Terence Horgan - 1988 - Philosophical Psychology 1 (1):69-81.
    Folk psychological realism is the view that folk psychology is true and that people really do have propositional attitudes, whereas anti-realism is the view that folk psychology is false and people really do not have propositional attitudes. We argue that anti-realism is not worthy of acceptance and that realism is eminently worthy of acceptance. However, it is plainly epistemically possible to favor either of two forms of folk realism: scientific or non-scientific. We argue that non-scientific realism, while perhaps unpopular among (...)
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  • Dissociation, self-attribution, and redescription.George Graham - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (4):719-719.
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  • Beyond Burrhus and behaviorism: Dennett defused.Thomas Gray - 1985 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 8 (4):762-763.
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  • Self-ascription of belief and desire.Robert M. Gordon - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):45-46.
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  • Folk psychology as simulation.Robert M. Gordon - 1986 - Mind and Language 1 (2):158-71.
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  • Theories and illusions.Alison Gopnik - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):90-100.
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  • Theories and qualities.Alison Gopnik - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):44-45.
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  • Why the Child’s Theory of Mind Really Is a Theory.Alison Gopnik & Henry M. Wellman - 1992 - Mind and Language 7 (1-2):145-71.
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  • How we know our minds: The illusion of first-person knowledge of intentionality.Alison Gopnik - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):1-14.
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  • What desires are, and are not.Alan H. Goldman - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (2):333-352.
    This paper criticizes the account of desire defended by Nomy Arpaly and Timothy Schroeder in their recent book, In Praise of Desire. It contrasts their account with one that I favor, a cluster analysis listing various criteria that are together sufficient for having paradigm desires, but none of which is necessary or sufficient for desiring. I argue that their account fails to state necessary or sufficient conditions, that it is explanatorily weaker than the cluster account, that it fails to provide (...)
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  • Using relations within conceptual systems to translate across conceptual systems.R. Goldstone - 2002 - Cognition 84 (3):295-320.
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  • The psychology of folk psychology.Alvin I. Goldman - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):15-28.
    The central mission of cognitive science is to reveal the real nature of the mind, however familiar or foreign that nature may be to naive preconceptions. The existence of naive conceptions is also important, however. Prescientific thought and language contain concepts of the mental, and these concepts deserve attention from cognitive science. Just as scientific psychology studies folk physics (McCloskey 1983, Hayes 1985), viz., the common understanding (or misunderstanding) of physical phenomena, so it must study folk psychology, the common understanding (...)
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  • The Import and Export of Cognitive Science.Robert L. Goldstone & Loet Leydesdorff - 2006 - Cognitive Science 30 (6):983-993.
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  • Statistical rationality.Richard M. Golden - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (1):35-35.
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  • Interpretation psychologized.Alvin I. Goldman - 1989 - Mind and Language 4 (3):161-85.
    The aim of this paper is to study interpretation, specifically, to work toward an account of interpretation that seems descriptively and explanatorily correct. No account of interpretation can be philosophically helpful, I submit, if it is incompatible with a correct account of what people actually do when they interpret others. My question, then, is: how does the (naive) interpreter arrive at his/her judgments about the mental attitudes of others? Philosophers who have addressed this question have not, in my view, been (...)
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  • Functionalism, the theory-theory and phenomenology.Alvin I. Goldman - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):101-108.
    The ordinary understanding and ascription of mental states is a multiply complex subject. Widely discussed approaches to the subject, such as functionalism and the theory-theory (TT), have many variations and interpretations. No surprise, then, that there are misunderstandings and disagreements, which place many items on the agenda. Unfortunately, the multiplicity of issues raised by the commentators and the limitations of space make it impossible to give a full reply to everyone. My response is divided into five topics: (1) Which version(s) (...)
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  • Do you have to be right to redescribe?Susan Goldin-Meadow & Martha Wagner Alibali - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (4):718-719.
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  • Derived intentionality?Alvin I. Goldman - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (3):514.
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  • Competing accounts of belief-task performance.Alvin I. Goldman - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):43-44.
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  • Triviality arguments against functionalism.Peter Godfrey-Smith - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 145 (2):273 - 295.
    “Triviality arguments” against functionalism in the philosophy of mind hold that the claim that some complex physical system exhibits a given functional organization is either trivial or has much less content than is usually supposed. I survey several earlier arguments of this kind, and present a new one that overcomes some limitations in the earlier arguments. Resisting triviality arguments is possible, but requires functionalists to revise popular views about the “autonomy” of functional description.
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  • Why you'll never know whether Roger Penrose is a computer.Clark Glymour & Kevin Kelly - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):666-667.
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  • Representational content and the explanation of behaviour.Olav Gjelsvik - 1990 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 33 (3):333 – 353.
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  • Where is the material of the emperor's mind?David L. Gilden & Joseph S. Lappin - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):665-666.
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  • Strong AI and the problem of “second-order” algorithms.Gerd Gigerenzer - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):663-664.
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  • Memory with and without recollective experience.John M. Gardiner - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):678-679.
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  • Mice in mirrored mazes and the mind.James W. Garson - 1993 - Philosophical Psychology 6 (2):123-34.
    The computational theory of cognition (CTC) holds that the mind is akin to computer software. This article aims to show that CTC is incorrect because it is not able to distinguish the ability to solve a maze from the ability to solve its mirror image. CTC cannot do so because it only individuates brain states up to isomorphism. It is shown that a finer individuation that would distinguish left-handed from right-handed abilities is not compatible with CTC. The view is explored (...)
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  • Don't ask Plato about the emperor's mind.Alan Gamham - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):664-665.
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  • Redescription of intentionality.Norman H. Freeman - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (4):717-718.
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