My plan is to examine Nietzsche's view of (what is I think) the most characteristically Kantian kind of argument, what's now often called 'transcendental argument'. I understand this as an argument in which a concept or principle or value is justified as a 'condition of the possibility' of something indisputable (or indispensable). I will look at Nietzsche's critique of this pattern of argument in Kant, but also at the ways he still uses such arguments himself, in all three of the (...) sectors of Kant's critique: theoretical, practical, aesthetic. Planejo examinar a visão de Nietzsche sobre o que creio seja o tipo de argumento mais kantiano, o que é atualmente chamado de 'argumento transcendental'. Eu o entendo como um argumento no qual um conceito, ou princípio, ou valor seja justificado como uma 'condição da possibilidade' de algo indisputável (ou indispensável). Aprofundar-me-ei na crítica que Nietzsche estabelece sobre esse padrão de argumento em Kant, mas também nas formas em que ele mesmo se utiliza de tais argumentos, em todos os três setores da crítica de Kant: a teórica, a prática e a estética. (shrink)

Consider the following proposition: It is possible that all of our perceptual experiences are ‘delusive.’ According to Gilbert Ryle, is demonstrably absurd. In this paper I address four questions: What is Ryle’s argument against?; How persuasive is it?; What positions are ruled out if is absurd?; and How does Ryle’s position compare with contemporary work on skepticism?

Transcendental arguments offer a particularlypowerful strategy for combating skepticism. Such arguments, after all, attempt to show thata particular skepticism is not simply mistakenbut inconsistent or self-refuting. Whilethus tempting to philosophers struggling withskepticism of various sorts, the boldconclusions of these arguments have longrendered them suspicious in the eyes of many. In fact, in a famous paper from 1968 BarryStroud develops what is often taken to be adecisive case against transcendental argumentsin general.Recent work in the area of practical reason,however, suggests that such (...) arguments stillhave their defenders. Theorists such as JamesDreier and Christine Korsgaard have reliedexplicitly on transcendental arguments tojustify certain principles of practical reason. Can such arguments overcome Stroud's objection? In what follows, I argue that they can. However effective Stroud's general criticismmay be in other areas, it does not apply in therealm of practical reason. Nevertheless, thereare strict limits on how far transcendentalarguments can take us. In particular, despiteKorsgaard's efforts, they cannot succeed inestablishing a rational foundation formorality. (shrink)

This paper examines Laurence BonJour''s defense of internalism inThe Structure of Empirical Knowledge with an eye toward better understanding the issues which separate internalists from externalists. It is argued that BonJour''s Doxastic Presumption cannot play the role which is required of it to make his internalism work. It is further argued that BonJour''s internalism, and, indeed, all other internalisms, are motivated by a Cartesian view of an agent''s access to her own mental states. This Caretsian view is argued to be (...) untenable, and, accordingly, so is internalism. (shrink)

Resumen: En este artículo reviso la interpretación de Eduardo Nicol de la teoría de la propiedad de Francisco Suárez. Para ello, presento la posición de Suárez acerca de la propiedad y la propiedad privada atendiendo dos cuestiones fundamentales. La primera es si la propiedad y la propiedad privada son derechos; la segunda es si ambos pertenecen a la naturaleza humana o no. Al final, argumento que la lectura de Nicol es insostenible, pues difícilmente puede admitirse que Suárez defendió algún tipo (...) de comunismo.: In this paper I revisit Eduardo Nicol’s interpretation of Suarez’s theory of property. To this purpose, I present Suárez’s account of property and private property focusing on two main aspects. The first is whether property and private property are rights; the second is whether they belong to the human nature or not. Finally, I argue that Nicol’s reading of Suárez is untenable for it can hardly be accepted that Suárez defended some kind of communism. (shrink)

RESUMO O artigo pretende mostrar o sentido da noção de transcendental no interior do método reconstrutivo de Jürgen Habermas. Para isso, ele procura apresentar em primeiro lugar a diferença entre a argumentação transcendental como argumentação anticética e a prova transcendental em Kant e, em seguida, a diferença entre Habermas e Apel sobre a possibilidade de uma fundamentação última da racionalidade comunicativa. Segundo minha interpretação, há razões de ordem lógica para a recusa da fundamentação última em Habermas, mas também razões ligados (...) à historicidade da compreensão da razão. ABSTRACT The article aims to show the meaning of the notion of "transcendental" inside the reconstructive method of Jürgen Habermas. For such, first of all, it attempts to present the difference between the transcendental argumentation as anti-skeptical argumentation and the transcendental proof in Kant and, then, the difference between Habermas and Apel about the possibility of an ultimate foundation of communicative rationality. According to my interpretation, there are reasons of logical order for the refusal of the ultimate foundation in Habermas, but also reasons related to the historicity of understanding of reason. (shrink)

Can we show that our senses are reliable sources of information about the world? To show this, we need to establish that most of our perceptual judgments have been true. But we cannot determine these inductive instances without relying upon sense perception. Thus, it seems, we cannot establish the reliability of sense perception by means of an argument without falling into epistemic circularity. In this paper, I argue that this consequence is not an epistemological disaster. For this purpose, I defend (...) a normative claim that it is reasonable to accept the general reliability of our perceptual judgments, instead of a factual claim that our perceptual judgments are generally reliable. More specifically, I offer a normative practical argument which explains why it is reasonable to accept the general reliability of our perceptual judgments, even though we cannot establish the general reliability of our perceptual judgments by means of theoretical reasoning. (shrink)

Esse trabalho apresenta uma reconstruçáo das referidas Deduçáo e Refutaçáo como argumentos contra uma forma empirista de ceticismo questionando a validade de juízos empíricos acerca de objetos externos na chamada acepçáo empírica, náo-transcendental do termo.

A volume in the SUNY series in Philosophy George R. Lucas Jr., editor.

This paper makes a transcendental argument. It assumes the normative validity of the instrumental principle, and then investigates the conditions of its validity. Ultimately, it argues that there are three necessary conditions for its validity. Firstly, agents must be rationally capable of regarding themselves as having a single self that possesses the same reasons, ends, and means. Secondly, agents must be rationally capable of distinguishing themselves from other selves that possess ends. Thirdly, these two conditions must actually obtain, which means (...) that we must have a self that has the same reasons, ends, and means, and that such selves must be distinct from one another. The paper fields two arguments in support of these three conditions and then offers an interpretation of the arguments to show that they vindicate all three conditions. (shrink)

In this article, I assess Tuukka Kaidesoja’s response to my objections to his critique of transcendental arguments and respond to his criticisms of my work. I argue that his new attempt to link transcendental arguments to Kant’s transcendental idealism is just as question-begging as his previous attempt, that his problematization of Bhaskar’s use of Kantian terminology is premised upon a confusion, and that his elaboration of explanatory necessity still fails to clearly distinguish it from transcendental necessity. I also elaborate and (...) defend my conception of transcendental arguments and the relative a priority it involves against Kaidesoja’s criticisms of them. While I concede the validity of his concerns about the starting point of Bhaskar’s transcendental analysis of experimental activity, I maintain that this does not undermine naturalized transcendentalism itself. I thus conclude that Kaidesoja’s metaphilosophical naturalism is premised upon a flawed critique of transcendentalism and an insufficiently motivated alternative approach. (shrink)

According to radical scepticism, knowledge of the external world is impossible. Transcendental arguments are supposed to be anti-sceptical, but can they provide a satisfying response to radical scepticism? Especially, when radical scepticism is cast as posing a how-possible question, there is a concern that transcendental arguments are neither sufficient nor necessary for answering such question. In light of this worry, I argue that we can take a modest transcendental argument as a stepping stone for a diagnostic anti-sceptical proposal, and I (...) use a Wittgensteinian modest transcendental argument to illustrate my point. (shrink)

The problem of evil is regularly regarded as posing a serious threat to theistic belief. However, contemporary philosophers of religion have overlooked the ways in which this problem has been, or could be, handled by theists committed to the metaphysics of idealism. In seeking to redress this lacuna, I turn to the systems of the British idealists, popular in the late nineteenth century though now out of favour, and in particular the work of F.H. Bradley, while also drawing parallels with (...) the Advaita Vedanta school of Hinduism. The central argument of this paper is that these idealist traditions have greater resources to adequately deal with the problem of evil than comparatively mainstream theist views. While standard forms of theism struggle to make sense of the facts of evil, or are even resoundly defeated by them, the conception of divinity suggested or developed by the British idealists offers possibilities for innovative and fruitful ways of thinking about the relationship between God and evil. (shrink)

Jurgen Habermas is a second-generation social philosopher of the Frankfurt school, the birthplace of critical theory. He suggests that modernity is a project of substituting rationality for religion. In his analysis, such a succession is the result of a process of social evolution, in which each developmental stage has its basic concepts and modes of understanding subjective, objective, and social worlds. For him, the salient feature of rationality consists of differentiation between various validity claims of truth, truthfulness, and sincerity which (...) are indistinguishable in religious language. The rationalization of religion, hence, progresses in terms of a differentiation between validity claims, a decentration of human understanding, the disenchantment of the world, and the linguistification of the sacred. Habermas proposes a universal pragmatics in which two modes of language use are separated: instrumental-strategic, and communicative. He thinks that the failure of the enlightenment movement to replace religion with reason stems from its preoccupation with instrumental reason and language use, dispensing with communicative rationality; and the remedy lies in communicative rationality. (shrink)