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Opportunity and preference learning: A reply to Christian Schubert

Robert Sugden

Economics and Philosophy 31 (2):297-303 (2015)

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Preferences versus opportunities: on the conceptual foundations of normative welfare economics.Roberto Fumagalli - 2024 - Economics and Philosophy 40 (1):77-101.details Normative welfare economics commonly assumes that individuals’ preferences can be reliably inferred from their choices and relies on preference satisfaction as the normative standard for welfare. In recent years, several authors have criticized welfare economists’ reliance on preference satisfaction as the normative standard for welfare and have advocated grounding normative welfare economics on opportunities rather than preferences. In this paper, I argue that although preference-based approaches to normative welfare economics face significant conceptual and practical challenges, opportunity-based approaches fail to provide (...) Download Export citation Bookmark
Aligning Innovation and Ethics: an Approach to Responsible Innovation Based on Preference Learning.Johann Jakob Häußermann & Fabian Schroth - 2020 - Philosophy of Management 19 (3):349-364.details New technologies not only contribute greatly to society and the economy; they also involve fundamental societal shifts, challenging our values and ideas about ourselves and the world. With a view to aligning technological change and innovation with ethical values, the concept of responsible innovation advocates the inclusion of a variety of stakeholders, in particular from society. In shifting moral responsibility towards the producers of innovations, responsible innovation rejects the standard normative economic view that the ethical evaluation of innovations is a (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 2 citations
Nudging and Participation: a Contractualist Approach to Behavioural Policy.Johann Jakob Häußermann - 2020 - Philosophy of Management 19 (1):45-68.details As behavioural economics reveals, human decision-making deviates from neoclassical assumptions about human behaviour and people (often) fail to make the ‘right’ welfare-enhancing choice. The purpose of Sunstein and Thaler’s concept of ‘nudge’ is to improve individual welfare. To provide normative justification, they argue that the only relevant normative criterion is whether the individual is ‘better off as judged by themselves’, so that the direction in which people are to be nudged is defined by their own preferences. In light of behavioural (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 3 citations
A triple test for behavioral economics models and public health policy.Ryota Nakamura, Marc Suhrcke & Daniel John Zizzo - 2017 - Theory and Decision 83 (4):513-533.details We propose a triple test to evaluate the usefulness of behavioral economics models for public health policy. Test 1 is whether the model provides reasonably new insights. Test 2 is on whether these have been properly applied to policy settings. Test 3 is whether they are corroborated by evidence. We exemplify by considering the cases of social interactions models, self-control models and, in relation to health message framing, prospect theory. Out of these sets of models, only a correctly applied prospect (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 1 citation

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