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  1. Hume's non-instrumental and non-propositional decision theory.Robert Sugden - 2006 - Economics and Philosophy 22 (3):365-391.
    Hume is often read as proposing an instrumental theory of decision, in which an agent's choices are rational if they maximally satisfy her desires, given her beliefs. In fact, Hume denies that rationality can be attributed to actions. I argue that this is not a gap needing to be filled. Hume's theory provides a coherent and self-contained understanding of action, compatible with current developments in experimental psychology and behavioural economics. On Hume's account, desires are primitive psychological motivations which do not (...)
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  • Utilitarianism and welfarism.Amartya Sen - 1979 - Journal of Philosophy 76 (9):463-489.
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  • Opportunity and preference learning.Christian Schubert - 2015 - Economics and Philosophy 31 (2):275-295.
    :Robert Sugden has suggested a normative standard of freedom as ‘opportunity’ that is supposed to help realign normative economics – with its traditional rational choice orientation – with behavioural economics. While allowing preferences to be incoherent, he wants to maintain the anti-paternalist stance of orthodox welfare economics. His standard, though, presupposes that people respond to uncertainty about their own future preferences by dismissing any kind of self-constraint. We argue that the approach lacks psychological substance: Sugden's normative benchmark – the ‘responsible (...)
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