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  1. Believing badly ain’t so bad.Ema Sullivan-Bissett - 2023 - Philosophical Psychology 36 (6):1208-1216.
    The Covid-19 pandemic provides the newest example of staunch polarization in the epistemic community, providing ample opportunity for profound disagreements on its origin and the international resp...
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  • True Believers: The Incredulity Hypothesis and the Enduring Legacy of the Obedience Experiments.John M. Niemi Doris - 2024 - Philosophia Scientiae 28-2 (28-2):53-89.
    De nombreux commentaires des expériences de Milgram soutiennent l’Hypothèse d’incrédulité, laquelle soutient que les participants de Milgram n’auraient en général pas cru qu’ils administraient des chocs électriques réels. Si l’Hypothèse d’incrédulité était juste, on devrait en conclure que les sujets obéissants ne croyaient pas mal agir, ce qui impliquerait que Milgram a échoué à mettre en évidence des niveaux alarmants d’obéissance destructrice. Dans cet article, nous démontrons que l’Hypothèse d’incrédulité n’est, en général, pas exacte : elle n’explique que très difficilement (...)
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  • Scepticism about Self-Knowledge of Motives.Pablo Hubacher Haerle - 2025 - The Monist 108 (1):92-104.
    Many philosophers claim that we have a duty to know our motives. However, prominent theories of the mind suggest that we can’t. Such scepticism about knowledge of one’s motives is based on psychological evidence. I show that this evidence only mandates scepticism about knowledge of one’s motives if we rely on a mistaken assumption which I call ‘the myth of the one true motive’. If we reject this myth, we see that there is space to plausibly interpret the empirical data (...)
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  • The Manipulationist Threat to moral responsibility.Kristoffer Moody - 2024 - Synthese 204:1-23.
    Standard compatibilist accounts adjudicating when individuals are morally responsible for their actions are predicated on the assumption that individuals will have responsibility for the valuational structure undergirding their actions. However, I will claim that evidence from psychology and social psychology seems to show that manipulation of our valuational structure, far from being esoteric, is more common than we might pre-theoretically think. I call this evidence of manipulation the Manipulationist Threat. Given the Manipulationist Threat, I will argue that the strategies employed (...)
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