- Intentionality, mind and folk psychology.Winand H. Dittrich & Stephen E. G. Lea - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):39-41.details
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The psychology of folk psychology.Alvin I. Goldman - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):15-28.details
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The law of large numbers in children's diversity-based reasoning.Gedeon Deák, Hong Li, Yiyuan Li, Bihua Cao & Fuhong Li - 2009 - Thinking and Reasoning 15 (4):388-404.details
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The risks of rationalising cognitive development.Beatrice de Gelder - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (4):713-714.details
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Redescribing redescription.Terry Dartnall - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (4):712-713.details
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The anthropology of folk psychology.Steven Daniel - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):38-39.details
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How directly do we know our minds?Maria Czyzewska & Pawel Lewicki - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):37-38.details
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The naked truth about first-person knowledge.Michael Chandler & Jeremy Carpendale - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):36-37.details
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Self-ascription without qualia: A case study.David J. Chalmers - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):35-36.details
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Categorization, theories and folk psychology.Nick Chater - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):37-37.details
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There's more to mental states than meets the inner “l”.Kimberly Wright Cassidy - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):34-35.details
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Science and Core Knowledge.Susan Carey & Elizabeth Spelke - 1996 - Philosophy of Science 63 (4):515 - 533.details
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Representational redescription and cognitive architectures.Antonella Carassa & Maurizio Tirassa - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (4):711-712.details
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Representational redescription and cognitive architectures.Antonella Carassa & Maurizio Tirassa - 1994 - Carassa, Antonella and Tirassa, Maurizio (1994) Representational Redescription and Cognitive Architectures. [Journal (Paginated)] 17 (4):711-712.details
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What's getting redescribed?Robert L. Campbell - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (4):710-711.details
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Knowing levels and the child's understanding of mind.Robert L. Campbell & Mark H. Bickhard - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):33-34.details
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Towards an ecology of mind.George Butterworth - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):31-32.details
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Experimenting in relation to Piaget: Education is a chaperoned process of adaptation.Jeremy Trevelyan Burman - 2008 - Perspectives on Science 16 (2):pp. 160-195.details
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Natural epistemology or evolved metaphysics? Developmental evidence for early-developed, intuitive, category-specific, incomplete, and stubborn metaphysical presumptions.Pascal Boyer - 2000 - Philosophical Psychology 13 (3):277 – 297.details
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Natural epistemology or evolved metaphysics? Developmental evidence for early-developed, intuitive, category-specific, incomplete, and stubborn metaphysical presumptions.Pascal Boyer - 2000 - Philosophical Psychology 13 (3):277-297.details
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Representational redescription: A question of sequence.Margaret A. Boden - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (4):708-708.details
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A Fodorian guide to Switzerland: Jung and Piaget combined?Péter Bodor & Csaba Pléh - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (4):709-710.details
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Thinking through language.Paul Bloom & Frank C. Keil - 2001 - Mind and Language 16 (4):351–367.details
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The real problem with constructivism.Paul Bloom & Karen Wynn - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (4):707-708.details
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Syntactic cues in the acquisition of collective nouns.Paul Bloom & Deborah Kelemen - 1995 - Cognition 56 (1):1-30.details
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Intention, history, and artifact concepts.Paul Bloom - 1996 - Cognition 60 (1):1-29.details
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The concept of intentionality: Invented or innate?Simon Baron-Cohen - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):29-30.details
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Are false beliefs representative mental states?Karen Bartsch & David Estes - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):30-31.details
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Causes are perceived and introspected.D. M. Armstrong - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):29-29.details
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Which theoretical concepts do children use?Andrew Woodfield - 1996 - Philosophical Papers 25 (1):1-20.details
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Evolutionary Debunking and the Folk/Theoretical Distinction.M. Scarfone - forthcoming - Philosophia:1-19.details
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The psychologist's fallacy.Philip David Zelazo & Douglas Frye - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):89-90.details
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From the decline of development to the ascent of consciousness.Philip David Zelazo - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (4):731-732.details
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Intentionality, theoreticity and innateness.Deborah Zaitchik & Jerry Samet - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):87-89.details
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Three questions for Goldman.Andrew Woodfield - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):86-87.details
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Do Your Concepts Develop?Andrew Woodfield - 1993 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 34:41-67.details
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Is there an implicit level of representation?Annie Vinter & Pierre Perruchet - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (4):730-731.details
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Common sense, functional theories and knowledge of the mind.Max Velmans - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):85-86.details
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Where's the person?Michael Tomasello - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):84-85.details
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Why Alison Gopnik should be a behaviorist.Nicholas S. Thompson - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):83-84.details
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Categories, categorisation and development: Introspective knowledge is no threat to functionalism.Kim Sterelny - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):81-83.details
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The developmental history of an illusion.Keith E. Stanovich - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):80-81.details
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Initial knowledge: six suggestions.Elizabeth Spelke - 1994 - Cognition 50 (1-3):431-445.details
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Early knowledge of object motion: continuity and inertia.Elizabeth S. Spelke, Gary Katz, Susan E. Purcell, Sheryl M. Ehrlich & Karen Breinlinger - 1994 - Cognition 51 (2):131-176.details
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Becoming self-directed: Abstract representations support endogenous flexibility in children.Hannah R. Snyder & Yuko Munakata - 2010 - Cognition 116 (2):155-167.details
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Modal knowledge and transmodularity.Leslie Smith - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (4):729-730.details
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Knowing children's minds.Michael Siegal - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):79-80.details
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The challenge of representational redescription.Thomas R. Shultz - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (4):728-729.details
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Special access lies down with theory-theory.Sydney Shoemaker - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):78-79.details
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Redescribing development.Ellin Kofsky Scholnick - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (4):727-728.details
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