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  1. Franz Brentano: Die intentionale Beziehung und die Bedeutung der Namen und Aussagen.Joelma Marques de Carvalho, Johannes L. Brandl & Carlo Ierna - 2023 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 100 (1-2):8-53.
    In this article I provide an overview of the many different terms that Brentano sometimes uses as synonyms or as explanations for “intentional inexistence”. The many terms associated with intentional inexistence appear in many different contexts, and we can conclude that Brentano uses these terms primarily to describe a property that is accidental and dependent on the subject from which it arises and with which it passes away. Ontologically, both properties and substances exist, but the former requires a substance (the (...)
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  • Relationality of intentionality.Mohammad Saleh Zarepour - forthcoming - Philosophical Psychology:1-24.
    At face value, intentionality is a relational notion. There are, however, arguments intended to show that it is not. I categorize the strongest arguments against the relationality of intentionality into three major groups: Brentanian arguments, Fregean arguments, and Quinean arguments. I argue that, despite their prima facie plausibility, none of these arguments eventually succeeds. I then conclude that, in the absence of defeating evidence against what at face value looks correct, we are justified to consider intentionality as a relational notion.
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  • Intentionality and Reference: A Brentanian Distinction.Hamid Taieb - 2017 - The Monist 100 (1):120-132.
    Brentano distinguishes between intentionality and reference. According to Brentano, all mental acts are intentionally directed toward something. Some mental acts also refer to something, which is the case when their object exists in reality. For Brentano, such acts, besides their intentionality, have a peculiar relation of similarity to their object. However, there is no mention of Brentano’s distinction between intentionality and reference in the literature. Drawing on some lesser known texts, this paper aims both at showing that Brentano makes such (...)
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