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Belief Dynamics: (Epistemo)logical Investigations

Allard Tamminga

Dissertation, University of Amsterdam (2001)

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Paraconsistent Logics for Knowledge Representation and Reasoning: advances and perspectives.Walter A. Carnielli & Rafael Testa - 2020 - 18th International Workshop on Nonmonotonic Reasoning.details This paper briefly outlines some advancements in paraconsistent logics for modelling knowledge representation and reasoning. Emphasis is given on the so-called Logics of Formal Inconsistency (LFIs), a class of paraconsistent logics that formally internalize the very concept(s) of consistency and inconsistency. A couple of specialized systems based on the LFIs will be reviewed, including belief revision and probabilistic reasoning. Potential applications of those systems in the AI area of KRR are tackled by illustrating some examples that emphasizes the importance of (...) Download Export citation Bookmark
How to construct Remainder Sets for Paraconsistent Revisions: Preliminary Report.Rafael Testa, Eduardo Fermé, Marco Garapa & Maurício Reis - 2018 - 17th INTERNATIONAL WORKSHOP ON NON-MONOTONIC REASONING.details Revision operation is the consistent expansion of a theory by a new belief-representing sentence. We consider that in a paraconsistent setting this desideratum can be accomplished in at least three distinct ways: the output of a revision operation should be either non-trivial or non-contradictory (in general or relative to the new belief). In this paper those distinctions will be explored in the constructive level by showing how the remainder sets could be refined, capturing the key concepts of paraconsistency in a (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 1 citation
On the role of the research agenda in epistemic change.Erik J. Olsson & David Westlund - 2006 - Erkenntnis 65 (2):165 - 183.details The standard way of representing an epistemic state in formal philosophy is in terms of a set of sentences, corresponding to the agent’s beliefs, and an ordering of those sentences, reflecting how well entrenched they are in the agent’s epistemic state. We argue that this wide-spread representational view – a view that we identify as a “Quinean dogma” – is incapable of making certain crucial distinctions. We propose, as a remedy, that any adequate representation of epistemic states must also include (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 31 citations
A Four-Valued Dynamic Epistemic Logic.Yuri David Santos - 2020 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 29 (4):451-489.details Epistemic logic is usually employed to model two aspects of a situation: the factual and the epistemic aspects. Truth, however, is not always attainable, and in many cases we are forced to reason only with whatever information is available to us. In this paper, we will explore a four-valued epistemic logic designed to deal with these situations, where agents have only knowledge about the available information, which can be incomplete or conflicting, but not explicitly about facts. This layer of available (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 1 citation
AGM 25 Years: Twenty-Five Years of Research in Belief Change.Eduardo Fermé & Sven Ove Hansson - 2011 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 40 (2):295-331.details The 1985 paper by Carlos Alchourrón, Peter Gärdenfors, and David Makinson, “On the Logic of Theory Change: Partial Meet Contraction and Revision Functions” was the starting-point of a large and rapidly growing literature that employs formal models in the investigation of changes in belief states and databases. In this review, the first twenty-five years of this development are summarized. The topics covered include equivalent characterizations of AGM operations, extended representations of the belief states, change operators not included in the original (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 34 citations

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