Belief Dynamics: (Epistemo)logical Investigations

Dissertation, University of Amsterdam (2001)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
C.S. Peirce's and Isaac Levi's accounts of the belief-doubt-belief model are discussed and evaluated. It is argued that the contemporary study of belief change has metamorphosed into a branch of philosophical logic where empirical considerations have become obsolete. A case is made for reformulations of belief change systems that do allow for empirical tests. Last, a belief change system is presented that (1) uses finite representations of information, (2) can adequately deal with inconsistencies, (3) has finite operations of change, (4) can do without extra-logical elements, and (5) only licenses consistent beliefs.
No keywords specified (fix it)
PhilPapers/Archive ID
Revision history
Archival date: 2017-10-13
View upload history
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Added to PP index

Total downloads
134 ( #17,639 of 37,117 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
48 ( #7,287 of 37,117 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.