This paper aims to come to grips with the rich philosophy of Charles Taylor by focusing on his concept of ‘strong evaluation’. I argue that a close examination of this term brings out more clearly the continuing tensions in his writings as a whole. I trace back the origin of strong evaluation in Taylor’s earliest writings, and continue by laying out the different philosophical themes that revolve around it. Next, the focus is on the separate arguments in which strong evaluation (...) is central, uncovering several methodological conflicts in Taylor’s strategies. Arguing against most of his commentators, I suggest that a distinction should be drawn between the philosophical anthropological, moral, and ontological implications of strong evaluation. As a result, the contribution of this paper is threefold. First, it clarifies the issue of strong evaluation by distinguishing the different arguments in which Taylor employs the concept. Second, it makes the case for multiple tensions within Taylor’s methods. Third, as a consequence, this analysis not only enables us to evaluate the potential and limits of his subject-centered philosophy but also separates his objectivist claims from his theories of human subjectivity, opening up the question of the metaphysical status of his ontological view. (shrink)

This paper examines Charles Taylor’s claim that personal identity is a matter of strong evaluations. Strong evaluations are in this paper analyzed as stable preferences, which are strongly identified with and which are based on qualitative distinctions concerning the non-instrumental value of options. In discussing the role of strong evaluations in personal identity, the focus is on "self-identity", not on the criteria of personhood or on the logical relation of identity. Two senses of self-identity can be distinguished: identity as practical (...) orientation and identity as self-definition in a more encompassing sense. The former consists of one’s strong evaluations only, the latter is a more comprehensive notion, in which strong evaluations have a double role. Strong evaluations are first of all directly a constituent of self-definitions, and secondly, self-definition with respect to other features proceeds in the light of the strong evaluations. (shrink)

Charles Taylor defines `hypergoods' as the fundamental, architechtonic goods that serve as the basis of our moral frameworks. He also believes that, in principle, we can use reason to reconcile the conflicts that hypergoods engender. This belief, however, relies upon a misindentification of hypergoods as goods rather than as works of art, an error which is itself a result of an overly adversarial conception of practical reason. For Taylor fails to distinguish enough between ethical conflicts and those relating to the (...) religio-aesthetic domain. A proper identification of hypergoods as aesthetic, moreover, requires us to revise his accounts of ordinary life, of evil and of the controversy over university curricula. (shrink)

The writings of Weber and Taylor have some strong affinities. Both start from the anthropological idea that man evaluates his position in the world and constitutes the social world by values. Their analyses of values aim at an understanding of those intersubjective meanings that have constituted western modernity. But, at the same time, their anthropological starting point leads to different interpretations of modernity. Historically, both argue that rationalization (as instrumental rationality) is one of the most influential Kulturbedeutung of modernity. Weber's (...) thesis of rationalization is, however, entangled in a paradox. Overemphasizing the rationalized elements of modernity, he fails scientifically to grasp certain counter-movements in modernity, such as individuation, subjectivity and new life forms. Taylor, investigating the moral sources of expressivism, shows that these life forms are an inherent part of modernity. Yet his method of articulating the sources of modernity is insufficient to transform it towards a causal explanation of behaviour in everyday life. (shrink)

This article uses the interpretive work of Dreyfus, Gadamer, Nussbaum and Taylor to explore the natural environment as a shared ecological and social commonality. I focus on the supposition that the natural world possesses intrinsic value and new political structures are needed. I explore how we might better engage with multiple cultures concerning matters at the heart of ecological politics. Political interpretivists offer processes of equal facilitation and maximization that work to include environmental values in democratic thought. Interpretivists differ from (...) earth-based and neo-conservative environmentalists, who dominate modern debates. The differences involve understanding the role of practical reasoning and how humanity interacts with the natural world. Intriguingly, then, interpretivists concur with Deep Ecologists that nature possesses intrinsic value, but do so guided by an ideal of authenticity. (shrink)

W artykule rekonstruuję podstawowe elementy koncepcji „sekularyzmu otwartego” przedstawionej przez Jocelyna Maclure’a i Charlesa Taylora w książce Secularism and Freedom of Conscience (2011). Wskazuję, że jedną z wyróżniających cech ich teorii jest opowiedzenie się za tzw. działaniami dostosowawczymi, których celem jest ochrona wolności sumienia. Następnie zarysowuję główne stanowiska w sporze o status przekonań sumienia i na tym tle przedstawiam „subiektywną” koncepcję wolności sumienia, jaką proponują Maclure i Taylor. W dalszej części artykułu przedstawiam zarzuty, jakie pod adresem kanadyjskich filozofów wyraziła Cecile (...) La- borde, a także odpowiedź na nie udzieloną przez Maclure’a. W ostatniej części artykułu staram się pokazać, że subiektywna teoria przekonań sumienia, w tej postaci, w jakiej została przedstawiona w Secularism and Freedom of Conscience, pozostaje w sprzeczności z leżącą u jej podstaw Taylorowską koncepcją „silnych wartościowań”. (shrink)

Charles Taylor is one of the most distinctive figures in the landscape of contemporary philosophy. His ability to contribute to philosophical conversations across a wide spectrum of ideas is especially impressive in a time of increasing specialization. These areas include moral theory, theories of subjectivity, political theory, epistemology, hermeneutics, philosophy of mind, philosophy of language and aesthetics. Most recently, Taylor has branched into the study of religion. Written by a team of international authorities, this collection will be read primarily by (...) students and academic professionals in philosophy, political science, and religious studies, and will also appeal to a broad swathe of professionals across the humanities and social sciences. Ruth Abbey is Senior Lecturer in Political Theory at University of Kent at Canterbury. She has published numerous articles and is author of Nietzsche's Middle Period (Oxford University Press, 2000) and Philosophy Now: Charles Taylor (Princeton University Press, 2000). (shrink)

This article uses the interpretive work of Dreyfus, Gadamer, Nussbaum and Taylor to explore the natural environment as a shared ecological and social commonality. I focus on the supposition that the natural world possesses intrinsic value and new political structures are needed. I explore how we might better engage with multiple cultures concerning matters at the heart of ecological politics. Political interpretivists offer processes of equal facilitation and maximization that work to include environmental values in democratic thought. Interpretivists differ from (...) earth-based and neo-conservative environmentalists, who dominate modern debates. The differences involve understanding the role of practical reasoning and how humanity interacts with the natural world. Intriguingly, then, interpretivists concur with Deep Ecologists that nature possesses intrinsic value, but do so guided by an ideal of authenticity. (shrink)

In this article, I discuss Charles Taylor's reading of Nietzsche. Taylor argues that Nietzsche presents a challenge on the 'deepest level' because, on Taylor's reading, Nietzsche forces us to consider whether or not our 'continuing allegiance to standards of justice and benevolence' goes against our inner nature. I argue that this purported Nietzschean challenge is more self-revealing of Taylor than it is foreboding, as it brings to light the tension between the open and pluralistic content of Taylor's faith, and the (...) epistemological grounding of it, which a more well-rounded appreciation of Nietzsche could help to alleviate. Key Words: Charles Taylor • genealogy • ontology • moral reasoning • Nietzsche • theism. (shrink)

Charles Taylor and John Gray offer competing liberal responses to the contemporary challenge of pluralism. Gray's morally minimal 'modus vivendi liberalism' aims at peaceful coexistence between plural ways of life. It is, in Judith Shklar's phrase, a 'liberalism of fear' that is skeptical of attempts to harmonize clashing values. In contrast, Taylor's 'hermeneutic liberalism' is based on dialogical engagement with difference and holds out the possibility that incompatible values and traditions can be reconciled without oppression or distortion. Although Taylor's theory (...) is superior to Gray's because it recognizes that dialogue is crucial for respecting pluralism, both theories fail to fully articulate the ethical ideal of citizenship that they imply. Citizens who are able to dialogically engage with pluralism must be cultivated through liberal education to possess certain ethical traits, and this requirement inevitably limits the range of pluralism liberal societies can accommodate. The theoretical overemphasis on pluralism in recent liberal theory serves to obscure this point. (shrink)

This article focuses on Charles Taylor’s and William Connolly’s attempts to fashion alternative forms of secular public reasoning to those of liberals like Rawls and Galston. I provide a weak defense of Taylor against both Connolly and many of Taylor’s liberal secular foes. Despite its noted shortcomings that Connolly can help to address, Taylor’s model does provide a more adequate basis for thinking through a public morality appropriate to the times because it takes seriously the hold certain values have on (...) non-secular individuals, and thus is very much attuned to the realities of ethical deliberation in early 21st-century western democracies Key Words: democracy • liberalism • pluralism • secularism • theism. (shrink)

This paper examines the increasing trend by nursing scholars such as Patricia Benner to conceptualize ethics as a contextual and embodied ‘way of knowing’, embedded in nursing expertise. The intellectual origins of this development and its debt to neo‐Aristotelian thinkers such as philosopher Charles Taylor are discussed. It will be argued that rather than revealing a truth about ethical expertise, the emergence of the ‘expert’ nurse as a moral and ethical category is the result of the elaboration of neo‐Thomist discourses (...) in the educational and professional shaping of nurses. These discourses act on and are enacted by the individual nurse through his or her participation in specific ethical exercises that result in the constitution of the desired subjectivity – or ‘expertise’. Central to this shaping are particular notions of ‘the good’ and its relationship to knowledge, skill and practice. Critiques of these neo‐Aristotelian perspectives are discussed and applied to the notion of moral expertise in nursing, and the claims made by its proponents concerning the ‘ethical’ distinction between experienced and expert nurses. Finally, a call is made for a more pluralistic approach to ethics. (shrink)

My argument in this paper is that Charles Taylor’s view of liberty and ethics unites Isaiah Berlin’s liberal pluralism with Elizabeth Anscombe’s virtue ethics. Berlin identifies, in “Two Concepts of Liberty,” a tradition of negative liberty advocated by figures like Locke and Mill. He maintains that this concept of liberty is unique to modernity, and it is the form of liberty best suited to the political sphere. The much older concept of positive liberty, which is found in ancient philosophers like (...) Plato and Aristotle, as well as modern thinkers like Hegel, Berlin regards as ill-suited to the political sphere. Anscombe, in “Modern Moral Philosophy,” specifically identifies and criticizes the Anglo-Saxon tradition of moral philosophy. Utilitarian thinkers like Mill are, for Anscombe, consequentialists. The virtue ethics of Aristotle gives a basis for the intrinsic goodness and badness of actions not in sentiment but reason. Charles Taylor draws upon the views of both thinkers. He advocates a liberal pluralism in a manner comparable to Berlin. However, Taylor strongly emphasizes, with Anscombe, that the most complete conception of ethical and political life must be rooted in virtue ethics and positive liberty. Thus, Taylor’s views constitute a synthesis of the approaches of his two mentors. (shrink)

After characterizing Taylor’s general approach to the problems of solidarity, we distinguish and reconstruct three contexts of solidarity in which this approach is developed: the civic, the socio-economic, and the moral. We argue that Taylor’s distinctive move in each of these contexts of solidarity is to claim that the relationship at stake poses normatively justified demands, which are motivationally demanding, but insufficiently motivating on their own. On Taylor’s conception, we need some understanding of extra motivational sources which explain why people (...) do (or would) live up to the exacting demands. Taylor accepts that our self-understanding as members of either particular communities or humanity at large has some motivational power, but he suspects that in many cases the memberships are too thin to resonate deeply and enduringly within us. In Taylor’s view, a realistic picture of what moves people to solidarity has to account for the extra motivation, when it happens. We propose an alternative view in which morality, democracy and socio-economic cooperation can be seen as separate spheres or relations which are normatively justified, motivationally demanding, but also sufficiently motivating on their own. (shrink)

Este artículo analiza la discusión entre Taylor y Rorty sobre los resultados de la superación de la epistemología. Primeramente, este artículo resume la crítica de Taylor a Rorty. En segundo lugar, considera la respuesta rortyana a Taylor y sus propios argumentos contra el realismo de Taylor. Los desacuerdos principales entre Rorty y Taylor son los siguientes: 1) Rorty dice que el pragmatismo supera la epistemología, mientras que Taylor dice que el realismo no-comprometido es el que supera la tradición epistemológica popular; (...) 2) ellos están en desacuerdo sobre cómo entender cierto vocabulario: Taylor afirma que siempre es posible conocer qué vocabulario describe mejor al mundo, pero Rorty parece sostener que los vocabularios son inconmensurables; 3) Taylor piensa a la verdad como una relación de correspondencia con el mundo; Rorty, sin embargo, rechaza esta concepción. En tercer lugar, se hace aquí una evaluación de los argumentos ofrecidos por cada lado, especialmente la sección que argumenta contra la concepción rortyana de los juegos del lenguaje y sus consecuencias no-realistas. Finalmente, se sugiere una reconsideración de la dicotomía realismo-pragmatismo. (shrink)