This paper argues that autonomy is an educational ideal. Since personal autonomy is essentially a matter of the person governing herself, a plausible account of autonomy presupposes an account of u person's identity. I support a conception of autonomy which presupposes a hierarchical theory of the self, yet allows rationality a significant place in a person's identity. I defend this conception of autonomy as an educational ideal from recent criticisms by Stone (1990) and Cuypers (1992).

This paper argues that autonomy is an educational ideal. Since personal autonomy is essentially a matter of the person governing herself, a plausible account of autonomy presupposes an account of u person's identity. I support a conception of autonomy which presupposes a hierarchical theory of the self, yet allows rationality a significant place in a person's identity. I defend this conception of autonomy as an educational ideal from recent criticisms by Stone (1990) and Cuypers (1992).

We have conflicting pre-philosophical intuitions about what it means ‘to be true to ourselves.’ On the one hand, autonomy and authenticity seem closely connected to the lucidity of reflectiveness; on the other, they seem tightly interwoven with the immediacy of unreflectiveness. As opposed to a ‘Platonic’ intuition about the inferiority of the unexamined life, we have an equally strong ‘Nietzschean’ intuition about the corrosiveness of the examined life. Broadly speaking, the first intuition is more akin to the tradition of the (...) Enlightenment, and the second, more to that of Romanticism; the one is reminiscent of Descartes and Hume, the other of Rousseau and Herder.The use of the technical term ‘autonomy’ and the concomitant term ‘self’ is primarily limited to philosophy, while in daily life ‘freedom’ and ‘person,’ respectively, are used instead. Unfortunately, in their deployment of these technical terms philosophers have generally failed to acknowledge the two modes of ‘being true to ourselves’ associated with the Enlightenment and Romanticism, for they usually employ the concept of autonomy in a unitary way. (shrink)

It is suggested that the current hierarchical (Frankfurt-Dworkin) model of personal autonomy in philosophical anthropology gives expression to the fundamental presupposition of self-determination in much educational practice and pedagogical theory. Radical criticisms are made of the notions of self-identification and self-evaluation which are of the utmost importance to this model. Instead of relying on such ‘acts of the will’ as decision and choice for the explanation of self-identification and self- evaluation, the non-intentional as well as the non-individualistic character of these (...) processes is stressed and analysed in terms of volitional necessity and social dependence. The consequence of this criticism is the substitution of the concept of extreme personal autonomy by that of caring about oneself as the first principle of education. (shrink)

It is suggested that the current hierarchical (Frankfurt-Dworkin) model of personal autonomy in philosophical anthropology gives expression to the fundamental presupposition of self-determination in much educational practice and pedagogical theory. Radical criticisms are made of the notions of self-identification and self-evaluation which are of the utmost importance to this model. Instead of relying on such ‘acts of the will’ as decision and choice for the explanation of self-identification and self- evaluation, the non-intentional as well as the non-individualistic character of these (...) processes is stressed and analysed in terms of volitional necessity and social dependence. The consequence of this criticism is the substitution of the concept of extreme personal autonomy by that of caring about oneself as the first principle of education. (shrink)

We haveconflictingpre-philosophical intuitions about what it means ‘to be true to ourselves.’ On the one hand, autonomy and authenticity seem closely connected to the lucidity of reflectiveness; on the other, they seem tightly interwoven with the immediacy of unreflectiveness. As opposed to a ‘Platonic’ intuition about the inferiority of the unexamined life, we have an equally strong ‘Nietzschean’ intuition about the corrosiveness of the examined life. Broadly speaking, the first intuition is more akin to the tradition of the Enlightenment, and (...) the second, more to that of Romanticism; the one is reminiscent of Descartes and Hume, the other of Rousseau and Herder.The use of the technical term ‘autonomy’ and the concomitant term ‘self’ is primarily limited to philosophy, while in daily life ‘freedom’ and ‘person,’ respectively, are used instead. Unfortunately, in their deployment of these technical terms philosophers have generally failed to acknowledge the two modes of ‘being true to ourselves’ associated with the Enlightenment and Romanticism, for they usually employ the concept of autonomy in a unitary way. (shrink)