In this article, I explore the ethical dimensions of same-sex reproduction achieved through epigenome editing—an innovative and transformative technique. For the first time, I analyse the potential normativity of this disruptive approach for reproductive purposes, focusing on its implications for lesbian couples seeking genetically related offspring. Epigenome editing offers a compelling solution to the complex ethical challenges posed by traditional gene editing, as it sidesteps genome modifications and potential long-term genetic consequences. The focus of this article is to systematically analyse (...) the bioethical issues related to the use of epigenome editing for same-sex reproduction. I critically assess the ethical acceptability of epigenome editing with reproductive purposes from multiple angles, considering harm perspectives, the comparison of ethical issues related to gene and epigenome editing, and feminist theories. This analysis reveals that epigenome editing emerges as an ethically acceptable means for lesbian couples to have genetically related children. Moreover, the experiments of a reproductive use of epigenome editing discussed in this article transcend bioethics, shedding light on the broader societal implications of same-sex reproduction. It challenges established notions of biological reproduction and prompts a reevaluation of how we define the human embryo, while poses some issues in the context of gender self-identification and family structures. In a world that increasingly values inclusivity and diversity, this article aims to reveal a progressive pathway for reproductive medicine and bioethics, as well as underscores the need for further philosophical research in this emerging and fertile domain. (shrink)

Liberal proponents of genetic engineering maintain that developing human germline modification technologies is morally desirable because it will result in a net improvement in human health and well-being. Skeptics of germline modification, in contrast, fear evolutionary harms that could flow from intervening in the human germline, and worry that such programs, even if well intentioned, could lead to a recapitulation of the scientifically and morally discredited projects of the old eugenics. Some bioconservatives have appealed as well to the value of (...) retaining our “given” human biological nature as a reason for restraining the development and use of human genetic modification technologies even where they would tend to increase well-being. In this article, I argue that germline intervention will be necessary merely to sustain the levels of genetic health that we presently enjoy for future generations—a goal that should appeal to bioliberals and bioconservatives alike. This is due to the population-genetic consequences of relaxed selection pressures in human populations caused by the increasing efficacy and availability of conventional medicine. This heterodox conclusion, which I present as a problem of intergenerational justice, has been overlooked in medicine and bioethics due to certain misconceptions about human evolution, which I attempt to rectify, as well as the sordid history of Darwinian approaches to medicine and social policy, which I distinguish from the present argument. (shrink)

In this paper I analyse who should be able to control the use of human embryonic stem cell lines. I distinguish between different kinds of control and analyse a set of arguments that purport to show that the donors of gametes and embryos should not be able to control the use of stem cell lines derived from their embryos. I show these arguments to be either deficient or of so general a scope that they apply not only to donors but (...) also to those who derived the stem cell lines. Since we normally think that stem cell derivers have the right to control the use of the cell lines they derived, we have no justification for denying donors similar rights of control. In the final section I briefly discuss why informed consent is not an appropriate vehicle for transferring or alienating control rights. (shrink)

In debates on the ethics of artificial gametes, concepts of naturalness have been used in a number of different ways. Some have argued that the unnaturalness of artificial gametes means that it is unacceptable to use them in fertility treatments. Others have suggested that artificial gametes are no less natural than many other tissues or processes in common medical use. We suggest that establishing the naturalness or unnaturalness of artificial gametes is unlikely to provide easy answers as to the acceptability (...) of using them in fertility medicine. However, we also suggest that we should be cautious about repudiating any relationship between nature and moral evaluation. The property of being natural or man-made may not per se tell us anything about an entity’s moral status, but it has an important impact on the moral relationship between the creator and the created organism. (shrink)

In the US, stem cell research is at a moral impasse—many see this research as ethically mandated due to its potential for ameliorating major diseases, while others see this research as ethically impermissible because it typically involves the destruction of embryos and use of ova from women. Because their creation does not require embryos or ova, induced pluripotent stem cells offer the most promising path for addressing the main ethical objections to stem cell research; however, this technology is still in (...) development. In order for scientists to advance induced pluripotent stem cell research to a point of translational readiness, they must continue to use ova and embryos in the interim. How then are we to ethically move forward with stem cell research? We argue that there is personal integrity and value in adopting a ‘moral compromise’ as a means for moving past the moral impasse in stem cell research. In a moral compromise, each party concedes part of their desired outcome in order to engage in a process that respects the values and desires of all parties equitably. Whereas some contend that moral compromise in stem cell research necessarily involves self-contradiction or loss of personal integrity, we argue that in the US context, stem cell research satisfies many of the key pre-conditions of an effective moral compromise. To illustrate our point, we offer a model solution wherein eggs and embryos are temporarily used until non-egg and non-embryonic sources of pluripotent stem cells are developed to a state of translational readiness. (shrink)

Adherents of different moral views hold conflicting views on the permissibility of embryonic stem cell research. Pace Ronald Dworkin, no liberal compromise is possible. Whichever way the decision goes, some people will be deeply hurt and feel that basic moral principles are being flouted. And yet, when a majority exists in defence of such research, it should not hesitate to allow it.

Many scholars have argued that the distinction between the natural and the unnatural does not have any moral relevance, either because the distinction does not make sense or because, even if it does make sense, it does not make any moral sense. Before we can decide on the latter, we must therefore determine first whether a semantic distinction can be made. In this article, I argue that the distinction can be maintained. In spite of the fact that the categories of (...) the natural and the unnatural are blurred as no unnatural things are completely unnatural, I argue that we can meaningfully distinguish between different types of unnaturalness along the natural-unnatural spectrum. To my knowledge, this article is the first publication to distinguish between three types of unnaturalness. (shrink)

Abstract:Research into the development of stem cell-derived (SCD) gametes in humans, otherwise known asin vitrogametogenesis (IVG), is largely motivated by reproductive aims. Especially, the goal of establishing genetic parenthood by means of SCD-gametes is considered an important aim. However, like other applications in the field of assisted reproduction, this technology evokes worries about the possibility of creating so-called ‘designer babies.’ In this paper, we investigate various ways in which SCD-gametes could be used to create such preference-matched offspring, and what this (...) would mean for the acceptability of IVG, if it is premised that it is morally problematic to ‘design’ offspring. We argue that IVG might facilitate the creation of preference-matched offspring, but conclude that this should not undermine the moral acceptability of IVG altogether—even if one concedes the premise that creating ‘designer babies’ is morally problematic. In the light of this, we also point at a possible inconsistency for a position that condemns the creation of ‘designer offspring,’ while accepting the various endeavors to have genetically related offspring. (shrink)

With the development of new procedures in the production of synthetic human gametes it has become important to re-examine the manner in which reproductive cells, taking part in the generation of children, can be understood. Though this can be attempted from many different perspectives, the present study will examine the possibility of considering gametes as representing the persons from whom they originated. From this perspective, it is possible to suggest that, in procreation, the entirety of each human sperm cell may (...) represent and reveal the man from whom it was produced and the entirety of each human egg cell may represent and reveal the woman from whom it was produced.The possible ethical consequences of using synthetic gametes for those who hold this perspective together with their understanding of relational identity will also be examined. (shrink)

In this paper we will look at the various ways in which infertility can be understood and at how need for reproductive therapies can be construed. We will do this against the background of research with artificial gametes. Having explored these questions we will attempt to establish the degree to which technologies such as AGs could expand the array of choices that people have to reproduce and/or become parents. Finally, we will examine whether and in what ways the most promising (...) developments of such technologies are likely to bring about the “end of infertility”. (shrink)

This article explores the consequences of interventions to secure moral enhancement that are at once compulsory and inescapable and of which the subject will be totally unaware. These are encapsulated in an arresting example used by Ingmar Perrson and Julian Savulescu concerning a “God machine” capable of achieving at least three of these four objectives. This article demonstrates that the first objective—namely, moral enhancement—is impossible to achieve by these means and that the remaining three are neither moral nor enhancements nor (...) remotely desirable. Along the way the nature of morality properly so called is further explored. (shrink)