Nicholas Agar argues that we should avoid certain ‘radical’ enhancement technologies. One reason for this is that they will alienate us from current sources of value by altering our evaluative outlooks. We should avoid this, even if enhancing will provide us with novel, objectively better sources of value. After noting the parallel between Agar’s views and G. A. Cohen’s work on the ‘conservative bias’, I explore Agar’s suggestion in relation to two kinds of radical enhancement: cognitive and anti-ageing. With regard (...) to both, there are reasons to doubt Agar’s empirical predictions about the severity of the evaluative changes we will undergo. Nonetheless, there is some force to the argument as applied to cognitive enhancement; in particular, radical cognitive enhancement may endanger our current valuable relationships with our loved ones. However, even if we find this a plausible worry for radical cognitive enhancement, it is not plausible for even radical anti-ageing enhancement, because the change Agar predicts will not affect our core motivations in the way that cognitive enhancement threatens to. (shrink)

With the arrival of new methods of genome editing, especially CRISPR/cas 9, new perspectives on germline interventions have arisen. Supporters of germ line genome editing claim that the procedure could be used as a means of disease prevention. As a possible life-saving therapy, it provides benefits that outweigh its risks. Opponents of GGE claim that the medical and societal risks, especially the use of GGE for genetic enhancement, are too high. In our paper, we analyze the risks and benefits of (...) GGE. We show that the medical risk on an individual level might be reduced by further research in the near future so that they may be outweighed by the benefits. We also show that the societal risks of the procedure, i.e. genetic enhancement, are manageable by establishing a regulative framework before the GGE is implemented. Since the effects of modifying genes for the genepool of a given population are extremely difficult to model, the medical risks on the population level might be too high. (shrink)

In July 2018, the Nuffield Council of Bioethics released its long-awaited report on heritable genome editing. The Nuffield report was notable for finding that HGE could be morally permissible, even in cases of human enhancement. In this paper, we summarise the findings of the Nuffield Council report, critically examine the guiding principles they endorse and suggest ways in which the guiding principles could be strengthened. While we support the approach taken by the Nuffield Council, we argue that detailed consideration of (...) the moral implications of genome editing yields much stronger conclusions than they draw. Rather than being merely ‘morally permissible’, many instances of genome editing will be moral imperatives. (shrink)

The main objection to genetic enhancement is that it will create a “genetic apartheid,” deepening existing inequalities. This paper offers considerations that can weaken the inequality argument against genetic enhancement. First, I question the dichotomy of treatment versus enhancement since the differences between the two are unclear. Second, I argue that human enhancement is part of human nature and that there is no sound reason to accept it in other domains while rejecting it in genetics. The paper also demonstrates that (...) inequality is present in every dimension of society, that “God-given” genetics is profoundly unequal, and that genetic enhancement can operate as a mechanism by which a new genetic equality can be achieved. However, the paper underlines that genetic equality is not, per se, a value to which we ought to aspire if it leads us to a uniform community of downsized human beings. Genetic equality is only valuable if it enhances humankind in general. (shrink)

Volume 20, Issue 8, August 2020, Page 32-36.

The papers in this volume are largely about research ethics and cover questions of consent, reproduction, pediatric research, ethical codes, and clinical relationships. Half the papers have this common aspect: they are conservative—in the sense of supporting the standard, prevailing, or popular view—but they shift the focus—supporting the standard views in terms of moral factors generally neglected by the literature. The volume provides a diverse set of papers for the reader: variously addressing abstract and concrete problems from within different philosophical (...) traditions. (shrink)

Volume 20, Issue 8, August 2020, Page 30-32.

Balancing the therapeutic potential of genetic science with the adoption of policies that reflect social values has proven to be a formidable task for Latin American countries. This essay presents some reflections on human genetics research policy in Latin America and explores a path forward for policy development.

Participants in the long-running bioethical debate over human germline genetic modification (HGGM) tend to imagine future people abstractly and on the basis of conventionalized characteristics familiar from science fiction, such as intelligence, disease resistance and height. In order to distinguish these from scientifically meaningful terms like “phenotype” and “trait,” this article proposes the term “persemes” to describe the units of difference for hypothetical people. In the HGGM debate, persemes are frequently conceptualized as similar, modular entities, like building blocks to be (...) assembled into genetically modified people. They are discussed as though they each would be chosen individually without affecting other persemes and as though they existed as components within future people rather than being imposed through social context. This modular conceptual framework appears to influence bioethical approaches to HGGM by reinforcing the idea of human capacities as natural primary goods subject to distributive justice and supporting the use of objective list theories of well-being. As a result, assumptions of modularity may limit the ability of stakeholders with other perspectives to present them in the HGGM debate. This article examines the historical trends behind the modular framework for genetically modified people, its likely psychological basis, and its philosophical ramifications. (shrink)

La mejor manera de mostrar la relevancia de filósofos del pasado es utilizar su pensamiento para abordar problemas del presente. En este artículo se utiliza el pensamiento de Ortega y Gasset (1883-1955) para tratar las implicaciones ético-filosóficas de la edición genética. Tras una breve introducción a la edición genética y su situación actual, se analiza la relación entre el pensamiento de Ortega y la genética en dos planos. En primer lugar, mostrando cómo algunos planteamientos orteguianos -como la noción de falta (...) de naturaleza, de sobrenaturaleza, o de autofabricación- podrían servir para establecer unas bases filosóficas desde las que comprender el impacto de las tecnologías de edición genética en seres humanos. En segundo lugar, exponiendo varios puntos concretos del debate en torno a la edición genética en los que las ideas de Ortega resultan valiosas, como sería su respuesta al proyecto transhumanista y su contextualización histórica de las tecnologías de edición genética. (shrink)