An epistemic agent A is a false epistemic authority for others iff they falsely believe A to be in a position to help them accomplish their epistemic ends. A major divide exists between what I call "epistemic quacks", who falsely believe themselves to be relevantly competent, and "epistemic charlatans", i.e., false authorities who believe or even know that they are incompetent. Both types of false authority do not cover what Lackey (2021) calls "predatory experts": experts who systematically misuse their social-epistemic (...) status as a cover for predatory behavior. Qua experts, predatory experts are competent and thus could (and maybe sometimes do) help their clients. But should we count them as genuine epistemic authorities? No, I argue, they are false epistemic authorities because, in addition to their practical and moral misconduct, such experts systematically deceive their clients, thereby thwarting the clients’ epistemic ends. (shrink)

While AI systems are increasingly assuming roles traditionally occupied by human epistemic authorities (EAs), their epistemological status remains unclear. This paper aims to address this lacuna by assessing the potential for AI systems to be recognized as artificial epistemic authorities. In a first step, I examine the arguments against considering AI systems as EAs, in particular the established model of EAs as engaging in intentional belief transfer via testimony to laypeople – a process seemingly inapplicable to intentionless and beliefless AI. (...) Despite this, AI systems exhibit striking epistemic parallels with human EAs, including epistemic asymmetry and opacity that give rise to comparable challenges for both laypeople and AI users. These challenges include the identification problem – how to recognize reliable EAs/AI systems – and the deference problem – determining the appropriate epistemic stance towards EAs/AI systems. Faced with this dilemma, I discuss three possible solutions: 1. reject the concept of artificial EAs, 2. accept that AI can possess beliefs and intentions and thus align with the standard model, or 3. develop an alternative model that encompasses artificial EAs. I argue that while each option has its benefits and costs, a particularly strong case can be made for option 3. (shrink)

The normative force of expert authority is typically analyzed from the perspective of those who primarily seek experts, namely, non-experts. When a non-expert has good reasons to believe someone is an expert in a domain, they should regard the expert as authoritative in that domain, and that is just what is meant by ‘expert authority’. I call these accounts ‘standpoint-dependent’ accounts of authority. Unfortunately, non-experts may have good reasons to ascribe authority in cases where experts act irresponsibly in their domains (...) and where the non-expert is in no position to discern that irresponsibility. This raises the question: When responsible experts disagree with irresponsible experts but non-experts cannot tell difference, do responsible experts retain any sense of normative epistemic authority? I argue that the answer is yes and expand current accounts of expert authority to include a ‘standpoint-independent’ dimension, which is a normative feature of expert testimony that encompasses more than the expert’s superior epistemic position and that is not restricted to non-experts’ perception of responsible expert behavior. (shrink)