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How do Madhyamikas think? Notes on Jay Garfield, Graham Priest, and paraconsistency

Tom J. F. Tillemans

In Mario D'Amato, Jay L. Garfield & Tom J. F. Tillemans (eds.), Pointing at the moon: Buddhism, logic, analytic philosophy. New York: Oxford University Press (2009)

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On Nāgārjuna's Ontological and Semantic Paradox.Koji Tanaka - 2016 - Philosophy East and West 66 (4):1292-1306.details In one of his key texts, the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, Nāgārjuna famously sets out to refute the ontology of essence.1 He presents numerous arguments to show that things don’t exist essentially—that is, that things are empty of essence or inherent existence. The doctrine of emptiness has been variously understood by traditional and contemporary commentators. Most radical is the recent interpretation presented by Garfield and Priest. They have rationally reconstructed Nāgārjuna’s doctrine of emptiness as an endorsement of the contradictory nature of reality. According (...) Download Export citation Bookmark
The Way of Nonacquisition: Jizang's Philosophy of Ontic Indeterminacy.Chien-Hsing Ho - 2014 - In Chen-Kuo Lin & Michael Radich (eds.), A Distant Mirror: Articulating Indic Ideas in Sixth and Seventh Century Chinese Buddhism. Hamburg University Press. pp. 397-418.details For Jizang (549−623), a prominent philosophical exponent of Chinese Madhyamaka, all things are empty of determinate form or nature. Given anything X, no linguistic item can truly and conclusively be applied to X in the sense of positing a determinate form or nature therein. This philosophy of ontic indeterminacy is connected closely with his notion of the Way (dao), which seems to indicate a kind of ineffable principle of reality. However, Jizang also equates the Way with nonacquisition as a conscious (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 1 citation
(1 other version)Dialetheism.Graham Priest - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details A dialetheia is a sentence, A, such that both it and its negation, A, are true (we shall talk of sentences throughout this entry; but one could run the definition in terms of propositions, statements, or whatever one takes as her favourite truth bearer: this would make little difference in the context). Assuming the fairly uncontroversial view that falsity just is the truth of negation, it can equally be claimed that a dialetheia is a sentence which is both true and (...) false. (shrink) Download Export citation Bookmark 24 citations
Dialetheism, Paradox, and Nāgārjuna’s Way of Thinking.Richard H. Jones - 2018 - Comparative Philosophy 9 (2).details Nāgārjuna’s doctrine of emptiness, his ideas on “two truths” and language, and his general method of arguing are presented clearly by him and can be stated without paradox. That the dialetheists today can restate his beliefs in paradoxical ways does not mean that Nāgārjuna argued that way; in fact, their restatements misrepresent and undercut his arguments. Download Export citation Bookmark 1 citation
(1 other version)Dialetheism.Francesco Berto, Graham Priest & Zach Weber - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 2018 (2018).details A dialetheia is a sentence, A, such that both it and its negation, ¬A, are true (we shall talk of sentences throughout this entry; but one could run the definition in terms of propositions, statements, or whatever one takes as her favourite truth-bearer: this would make little difference in the context). Assuming the fairly uncontroversial view that falsity just is the truth of negation, it can equally be claimed that a dialetheia is a sentence which is both true and false. Download Export citation Bookmark 73 citations
Nāgārjuna’s Negation.Chris Rahlwes - 2022 - Journal of Indian Philosophy 50 (2):307-344.details The logical analysis of Nāgārjuna’s catuṣkoṭi has remained a heated topic for logicians in Western academia for nearly a century. At the heart of the catuṣkoṭi, the four corners’ formalization typically appears as: A, Not A, Both, and Neither. The pulse of the controversy is the repetition of negations in the catuṣkoṭi. Westerhoff argues that Nāgārjuna in the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā uses two different negations: paryudāsa and prasajya-pratiṣedha. This paper builds off Westerhoff’s account and presents some subtleties of Nāgārjuna’s use of these (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 3 citations
A Gricean Interpretation of Nāgārjuna’s Catuṣkoṭi and the No-Thesis View.Jenny Hung - 2020 - History and Philosophy of Logic 41 (3):217-235.details Nāgārjuna, the famous founder of the Madhyamika School, proposed the positive catuṣkoṭi in his seminal work, Mūlamadhyamakakārikā: ‘All is real, or all is unreal, all is both real and unreal, all is neither unreal nor real; this is the graded teaching of the Buddha’. He also proposed the negative catuṣkoṭi: ‘“It is empty” is not to be said, nor “It is non-empty,” nor that it is both, nor that it is neither; [“empty”] is said only for the sake of instruction’ (...) Download Export citation Bookmark
Introduction: Buddhism and Contradiction.Koji Tanaka - 2013 - Philosophy East and West 63 (3):315-321.details Download Export citation Bookmark

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