This paper presents the foundation upon which the contemporary knowledge of body integrity dysphoria (BID) is built. According to the World Health Organisation’s International Classification of Diseases, 11th edition (ICD-11), the main feature of BID is an intense and persistent desire to become physically disabled in a significant way. Three putative aetiologies that are considered to explain the insurgence of the condition are discussed: neurological, psychological and postmodern theories. The concept of bodily representation within the medical context is highlighted, with (...) the concept of dysphoria, which was brought to the fore with the introduction of the American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, fifth edition (DSM-5), and the ICD-11. Contemporary issues of “justice” are addressed to identify ethically relevant distinctions between BID and sex reassignment surgery. It is argued that there is no ethically relevant difference between the BID actor’s desire for invasive surgical intervention and the wish of gender dysphoric individuals to undergo sex reassignment surgery procedures. Some BID actors self-mutilate, and this presents medical professionals with difficult choices regarding whether or not to intervene in order to satisfy the BID patient’s desire. Both abstention and intervention may lead to severe ethical complications for doctors and patients despite the positive outcomes in terms of quality of life for BID individuals who manage to undergo such procedures. (shrink)

The Bad-Difference View of disability says, roughly, that disability makes one worse off. The Mere-Difference View of disability says, roughly, that it doesn’t. In recent work, Barnes – a MDV proponent – offers a detailed exposition of the MDV. No BDV proponent has done the same. While many thinkers make it clear that they endorse a BDV, they don’t carefully articulate their view. In this paper, I clarify the nature of the BDV. I argue that its best interpretation is probabilistic (...) and comparative: it is the view that a person is likely to be, all things considered, worse off with a disability than without. As such, Barnes – who criticises the version of the BDV that disability by itself, intrinsically or automatically makes a person worse off – misses an opportunity to attack the most plausible and relevant version of the BDV, and the best version remains unchallenged. (shrink)

Moral agential neuroenhancement can transform us into better people. However, critics of MB raise four central objections to MANEs use: It destroys moral freedom; it kills one moral agent and replaces them with another, better agent; it carries significant risk of infection and illness; it benefits society but not the enhanced person; and it’s wrong to experiment on nonconsenting persons. Herein, I defend MANE’s use for prisoners of war fighting unjustly. First, the permissibility of killing unjust combatants entails that, in (...) cases where MANE is equally or more likely as termination to reduce moral recidivism in unjust combatants, then MANE is morally justified. Second, the relevant infections and illnesses caused by MANE are less bad than death, so MANE leaves unjust POWs better off than the alternative. Third, just as incarceration is often permissible despite benefitting society but not the incarcerated, the same holds for unjust POWs. Fourth, we should accept a broader construal of “benefit” that includes moral benefits. Thus, 3 and 4 are false when applied to unjust POWs. Fifth, medical experimentation likely to help nonconsenting persons is sometimes permissible. Because MANE is likely to help unjust POWs irrespective of their consent or lack thereof, its use is permissible. Sixth, basic principles of proper medical care support the use of MANE on unjust POWs as pro tanto morally obligatory. I conclude that militaries should therefore begin to employ MANE for unjust POWs. (shrink)

Medical ethics would be better if people were taught to think more clearly about well-being or the concept of what is good for a person. Yet for a variety of reasons, bioethicists have generally paid little attention to this concept. Here, I argue, first, that focusing on general theories of welfare is not useful for practical medical ethics. I argue, second, for what I call the “theory-without-theories approach” to welfare in practical contexts. The first element of this approach is a (...) focus on examining important and relatively uncontroversial constituents of welfare as opposed to general theories. The second key element is a framework for thinking about choice in relation to welfare, a framework I refer to as “the mild objectivity framework.” I conclude with illustrations of the way in which the “theory without theories approach” can improve thinking in medicine. (shrink)

In this paper, we argue that promoting patient values is a legitimate goal of medicine. Our view offers a justification for certain current practices, including birth control and living organ donation, that are widely accepted but do not fit neatly within the most common extant accounts of the goals of medicine. Moreover, we argue that recognising value promotion as a goal of medicine will expand the scope of medical practice by including some procedures that are sometimes rejected as being outside (...) the scope of acceptable medical practice, such as certain forms of physician-assisted death. We then rebut some common and possible objections to this view. Our aim is not to argue that other accounts are mistaken—except when they argue for a single goal that does not include patient values—but rather to show that value promotion should play a more central role in discussions about the goals of medicine. (shrink)

We argue against Thomson’s view that abortion is permissible even if fetuses have high moral status. Against this, we argue that, because many mothers are morally responsible for their pregnancies, they have a special obligation to assist. Finally, we address an objection according to which many mothers whose pregnancies are not a product of rape are not morally responsible to a sufficient degree, and so an obligation to assist is not generated. This objection assumes that the force of the mother’s (...) right to bodily integrity is not diminished if she is insufficiently morally responsible. We challenge this assumption. Our complete thesis is as follows: If a mother is morally responsible to a sufficient degree, she acquires an obligation to assist. If she is not, the force of her right to bodily integrity may be reduced. (shrink)

This dissertation contributes to the development of philosophy of disability by drawing on disability studies, feminist philosophy, phenomenology, and philosophy of biology in order to contest epistemic and ontological assumptions about disability within biomedical ethics as well as within philosophical work on the body, demonstrating how philosophical inquiry is radically transformed when experiences of disability are taken seriously. In the first two chapters, I focus on epistemological and ontological concerns surrounding disability within biomedical ethics. Although disabled people and their advocates (...) have been quite vocal regarding their views on disability and in critiquing bioethicists’ approaches to issues that affect them, the interests, knowledge, and experiences of disabled people have had minimal impact on discussions within biomedical ethics textbooks. The risks of making problematic assumptions about disability are high within this subfield insofar as bioethicists impact practices within medical facilities, public policy, and, through student engagement with their texts in biomedical ethics courses, the views of potential health care professionals. All of these, in turn, affect the care provided to disabled people and potential/actual parents of disabled children. Chapter three raises ontological issues related to disability theory, examining the role of the impairment/disability distinction in framing discussions of the body as well as the status of experience. I discuss two approaches to incorporating subjective experiences of the body in disability, arguing that neither is sufficient. I examine debates within feminist theory on questions related to experience. I argue that a feminist phenomenological approach that builds on Merleau-Ponty’s work offers the best way to address bodily experiences in disability theory. The assumptions that disability theorists and Merleau-Ponty make about disability are often at odds. Chapter four points out the ableism in Merleau-Ponty’s use of a case study and considers some of the oversights within Phenomenology of Perception. In spite of my critique, I argue that his approach to phenomenology—with appropriate modifications—is useful not only for theorizing the experiences of disabled people but also for addressing other types of marginalized embodiment. Chapter five applies this method to body integrity identity disorder (BIID), arguing that combining Merleau-Ponty’s insights with those of disability theory allows us to address lived experiences of BIID and to identify assumptions about disability within research on this condition. (shrink)

The Problem of Overlappers is a puzzle about what makes it the case, and how we can know, that we have the parts we intuitively think we have. In this paper, I develop and motivate an overlooked solution to this puzzle. According to what I call the self-making view it is within our power to decide what we refer to with the personal pronoun ‘I’, so the truth of most of our beliefs about our parts is ensured by the very (...) mechanism of self-reference. Other than providing an elegant solution to the Problem of Overlappers, the view can be motivated on independent grounds. It also has wide-ranging consequences for how we should be thinking about persons. Among other things, it can help undermine an influential line of argument against the permissibility of elective amputation. After a detailed discussion and defence of the self-making view, I consider some objections to it. I conclude that none of these objections is persuasive and we should at the very least take seriously the idea that we are to some extent self-made. (shrink)

This article discusses the acquisition of a physical impairment/disability through voluntary body modification, or transability. From the perspectives of critical genealogy and feminist intersectional analysis, the article considers the ability and cis*/trans* axes in order to question the boundaries between trans and transabled experience and examines two assumptions impeding the conceptualization of their placement on the same continuum: 1) trans studies assumes an able-bodied trans identity and able-bodied trans subject of analysis; and 2) disability studies assumes a cis* disabled identity. (...) The perception of transsexuality and transability as mutually exclusive phenomena results from a nonintersectional analysis of transsexuality as an issue of sex/gender, but not of ability, and of transability as an issue of ability, but not of sex/gender. Difficulty recognizing continuities between these phenomena thus stems from an ableist interpretation of sex/gender and a cisnormative* interpretation of ability. This article aims to: 1) enrich intersectional analysis in trans and disability studies and transability scholarship; 2) complicate disability studies, in which disabilities are often presumed to be “involuntary,” and encourage the decentering of a cis* subject; 3) encourage trans studies to decenter an able-bodied subject; and 4) advocate for increased dialogue and the creation of alliances between trans and disability studies and movements. (shrink)

Unter Body Integrity Identity Disorder (BIID) versteht man das sehr seltene Phänomen, dass jemand die Amputation einer oder mehrerer gesunder Gliedmaßen oder die Beibringung einer Querschnittslähmung verlangt. Manche dieser Menschen verstümmeln sich selbst; andere fordern von Chirurgen eine Amputation oder die Durchtrennung des Rückenmarks. Von Psychologen und Psychiatern gibt es unterschiedliche Erklärungsansätze für dieses Phänomen; bisher ist aber keine erfolgreiche psychotherapeutische oder pharmazeutische Therapie bekannt. Betroffenenvertreter erklären den Amputationswunsch in Analogie zu dem Verlangen von Transsexuellen nach chirurgischer Angleichung an ihr (...) Wunschgeschlecht. Unter Medizinethikern ist die Amputation gesunder Gliedmaßen höchst umstritten; einerseits wird aus dem Autonomie-Prinzip das Recht auf Körpermodifikation abgeleitet, andererseits wird angenommen, dass der Amputationswunsch aus innerem Zwang oder Wahn resultiert. Neurologische Befunde legen nahe, dass BIID wahrscheinlich eine hirnorganisch bedingte Störung des Körperbildes ist, vergleichbar mit bestimmten Schlaganfallfolgen. Wenn BIID eine neuropsychologische Störung ist, zu deren Symptomen fehlende Krankheitseinsicht und eine durch inneren Zwang eingeschränkte Fähigkeit zu vernünftigen Entscheidungen gehören, sind die von BIID-Aktivisten und einigen Medizinethikern geforderten Amputationen kontraindiziert und stellen Körperverletzungen an Menschen mit einer neuropsychologischen Störung dar. Statt des Kurierens an einem Symptom sollte eine kausale Therapie entwickelt werden, mit dem Ziel der Integration des als fremd empfundenen Körperteils in das Körperbild. (shrink)

Some 14 years ago, I published an article in which I identified a prime site for bioethicists to ply their trade: medical responses to requests for hormonal and surgical interventions aimed at facilitating transgendered people’s transition to their desired genders. Deep issues about the impact of biotechnologies and health care practices on central aspects of our conceptual system, I argued, were raised by how doctors understood and responded to people seeking medical assistance in changing their gender, and there were obviously (...) significant issues of regulation involved as well. Yet mainstream bioethics was conspicuous by its relative absence from the discussion. Here, I return to the matter and find that, while the conceptual issues are just as profound and their connection to health care practice and policy just as intimate, even as transgender issues have become much more socially visible, bioethical engagement with gender reassignment has increased only slightly. I set the little movement that has occurred against the backdrop of the situation as I saw it in 1998 and conclude, once again, by trying to make the bait for bioethicists inviting. (shrink)

Upon first consideration, the desire of an individual to amputate a seemingly healthy limb is a foreign, perhaps unsettling, concept. It is, however, a reality faced by those who suffer from body integrity identity disorder (BIID). In seeking treatment, these individuals request surgery that challenges both the statutory provisions that sanction surgical operations and the limits of consent as a defence in New Zealand. In doing so, questions as to the influence of public policy and the extent of personal autonomy (...) become important. Beyond legal issues, BIID confronts dominant conceptions of bodily integrity, medical treatment, and ethical obligations. This paper seeks to identify the relevant public policy concerns raised by BIID in New Zealand and the limits of autonomy, before moving on to consider how BIID sufferers may legally seek the treatment they require and how a doctor might be protected from criminal proceedings for assault for performing this treatment. It will be argued that it is possible to legally consent to the amputation of a healthy limb as medical treatment and that public perception should not be allowed to take precedence over this right. (shrink)

Abstract: What grounds the experience of our body as our own? Can we rationally doubt that this is our own body when we feel sensations in it? This article shows how recent empirical evidence can shed light on issues on the body and the self, such as the grounds of the sense of body ownership and the immunity to error through misidentification of bodily self-ascriptions. In particular, it discusses how bodily illusions (e.g., the Rubber Hand Illusion), bodily disruptions (e.g., somatoparaphrenia), (...) and the multimodal nature of bodily self-knowledge challenge a classic view of ownership and immunity that puts bodily sensations at its core. (shrink)

The term body integrity identity disorder (BIID) describes the extremely rare phenomenon of persons who desire the amputation of one or more healthy limbs or who desire a paralysis. Some of these persons mutilate themselves; others ask surgeons for an amputation or for the transection of their spinal cord. Psychologists and physicians explain this phenomenon in quite different ways; but a successful psychotherapeutic or pharmaceutical therapy is not known. Lobbies of persons suffering from BIID explain the desire for amputation in (...) analogy to the desire of transsexuals for surgical sex reassignment. Medical ethicists discuss the controversy about elective amputations of healthy limbs: on the one hand the principle of autonomy is used to deduce the right for body modifications; on the other hand the autonomy of BIID patients is doubted. Neurological results suggest that BIID is a brain disorder producing a disruption of the body image, for which parallels for stroke patients are known. If BIID were a neuropsychological disturbance, which includes missing insight into the illness and a specific lack of autonomy, then amputations would be contraindicated and must be evaluated as bodily injuries of mentally disordered patients. Instead of only curing the symptom, a causal therapy should be developed to integrate the alien limb into the body image. (shrink)

What grounds my experience of my body as my own? The body that one experiences is always one’s own, but it does not follow that one always experiences it as one’s own. One might even feel that a body part does not belong to oneself despite feeling sensations in it, like in asomatognosia. The article aims at understanding the link between bodily sensations and the sense of ownership by investigating the role played by the body schema.

Rita Charon says that narrative medicine is about honoring stories of illness. In a system where physicians and patients can often feel as though they are reduced to numbers, narrative medicine is a plea to take the narratives of illness seriously. But what does it mean to honor a story? In this essay, I use the framework of narrative medicine to offer narrative reflections on the concept of honor inspired by on three definitions, including respect, moral rightness, and high regard. (...) I explain how each definition illustrates an aspect of honor and its role as an ethical virtue in narrative medicine. (shrink)

Most people have a clear sense of what they mean by disability, and have little trouble identifying conditions they consider disabling. Yet providing a clear and consistent definition of disability is far from straightforward. Standardly, disability is understood as the restriction in our abilities to perform tasks, as a result of an impairment of normal physical or cognitive human functioning. However, which inabilities matter? We are all restricted by our bodies, and are all incapable of performing some tasks, but most (...) of these inabilities are not considered disabilities. If, then, we are to avoid the category of disability becoming overly broad—and thus politically and practically useless—we need some way of picking out the specific inabilities that are disabling. I argue that our answer should be informed by an account of the opportunities individuals are entitled to be able to perform as a matter of justice. Thus, to be disabled is to have these opportunities restricted, and not to deviate from the species norm or lack any ability that might improve our well-being. (shrink)

In this article, I argue that persons suffering from Body Integrity Identity Disorder (BIID) can give informed consent to surgical measures designed to treat this disorder. This is true even if the surgery seems radical or irrational to most people. The decision to have surgery made by a BIID patient is not necessarily coerced, incompetent or uninformed. If surgery for BIID is offered, there should certainly be a screening process in place to insure informed consent. It is beyond the scope (...) of this work, however, to define all the conditions that should be placed on the availability of surgery. However, I argue, given the similarities between BIID and gender dysphoria and the success of such gatekeeping measures for the surgical treatment of gender dysphoria, it is reasonable that similar conditions be in place for BIID. Once other treatment options are tried and gatekeeping measures satisfied, A BIID patient can give informed consent to radical surgery. (shrink)

Body integrity identity disorder (BIID), formerly also known as apotemnophilia, is characterized by a desire for amputation of a healthy limb and is claimed to straddle or to even blur the boundary between psychiatry and neurology. The neurological line of approach, however, is a recent one, and is accompanied or preceded by psychodynamical, behavioural, philosophical, and psychiatric approaches and hypotheses. Next to its confusing history in which the disorder itself has no fixed identity and could not be classified under a (...) specific discipline, its sexual component has been an issue of unclarity and controversy, and its assessment a criterion for distinguishing BIID from apotemnophilia, a paraphilia. Scholars referring to the lived body—a phenomenon primarily discussed in the phenomenological tradition in philosophy—seem willing to exclude the sexual component as inessential, whereas other authors notice important similarities with gender identity disorder or transsexualism, and thus precisely focus attention on the sexual component. This contribution outlines the history of BIID highlighting the vicissitudes of its sexual component, and questions the justification for distinguishing BIID from apotemnophilia and thus for omitting the sexual component as essential. Second, we explain a hardly discussed concept from Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception (1945a), the sexual schema, and investigate how the sexual schema could function in interaction with the body image in an interpretation of BIID which starts from the lived body while giving the sexual component its due. (shrink)

In this paper, we offer a new account of disability. According to our account, some state of a person's biology or psychology is a disability if that state makes it more likely that a person's life will get worse, in terms of his or her own wellbeing, in a given set of social and environmental circumstances. Unlike the medical model of disability, our welfarist approach does not tie disability to deviation from normal species’ functioning, nor does it understand disability in (...) essentialist terms. Like the social model of disability, the welfarist approach sees disability as a harmful state that results from the interaction between a person's biology and psychology and his or her surrounding environment. However, unlike the social model, it denies that the harm associated with disability is entirely due to social prejudice or injustice. In this paper, we outline and clarify the welfarist approach, answer common objections and illustrate its usefulness in addressing a range of difficult ethical questions involving disability. (shrink)

Body integrity identity disorder (BIID), previously called apotemnophilia, is an extremely rare condition where sufferers desire the amputation of a healthy limb because of distress associated with its presence. This paper reviews the medical and philosophical literature on BIID. It proposes an evidenced based and ethically informed approach to its management. Amputation of a healthy limb is an ethically defensible treatment option in BIID and should be offered in some circumstances, but only after clarification of the diagnosis and consideration of (...) other treatment options. (shrink)

The term body integrity identity disorder (BIID) describes the extremely rare phenomenon of persons who desire the amputation of one or more healthy limbs or who desire a paralysis. Some of these persons mutilate themselves; others ask surgeons for an amputation or for the transection of their spinal cord. Psychologists and physicians explain this phenomenon in quite different ways; but a successful psychotherapeutic or pharmaceutical therapy is not known. Lobbies of persons suffering from BIID explain the desire for amputation in (...) analogy to the desire of transsexuals for surgical sex reassignment. Medical ethicists discuss the controversy about elective amputations of healthy limbs: on the one hand the principle of autonomy is used to deduce the right for body modifications; on the other hand the autonomy of BIID patients is doubted. Neurological results suggest that BIID is a brain disorder producing a disruption of the body image, for which parallels for stroke patients are known. If BIID were a neuropsychological disturbance, which includes missing insight into the illness and a specific lack of autonomy, then amputations would be contraindicated and must be evaluated as bodily injuries of mentally disordered patients. Instead of only curing the symptom, a causal therapy should be developed to integrate the alien limb into the body image. (shrink)

Recently, the discussion regarding the physicians’ “Right of Conscience” has been on the rise. This issue is often confined to the “reproductive health” arena within the political context. The recent dispute of the Bush-Obama administrations regarding the legal protections of health workers who refuse to provide care that violates their personal beliefs is an example of the political aspects of this dispute. The involvement of the political system automatically shifts the discussion regarding physicians’ ROC into the narrow area of “reproductive (...) health laws.” Indeed, the immediate association that comes to mind when thinking about the practical implications of this dispute is related to the reproductive health arena. This is partly because of the historical context of the first “conscience clauses,” initially enacted by Congress and state legislatures in the mid-1970s; in fact, most of these clauses provided specific exemptions for abortion and few exempted sterilization as well. (shrink)

Value and responsibility are two central concepts in philosophy and bioethics. The articles that comprise this issue of The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy engage topics of moral injury, madness, transhumanism, cognitive enhancement, and the woman’s responsibility to assist her fetus. Clearly diverse in matter, these subject articles univocally present fruitful ground for engagement with contemporary questions that impact society today. The ability to cure or to enhance, to treat or to terminate through advances in medical technology are all actions (...) that come with personal and social responsibility for their consequences. By approaching each article through the dual lens of value and responsibility, the reader is challenged to think seriously about the values we hold as human persons and the responsibility we take to pursue and protect these values. (shrink)

It is widely agreed that living kidney donation is permitted but living kidney sales are not. Call this the Received View. One way to support the Received View is to appeal to a particular understanding of the conditions under which living kidney transplantation is permissible. It is often claimed that donors must act altruistically, without the expectation of payment and for the sake of another. Call this the Altruism Requirement. On the conventional interpretation, the Altruism Requirement is a moral fact. (...) It states a legitimate constraint on permissible transplantation and is accepted on the basis of cogent argument. The present paper offers an alternative interpretation. I suggest the Altruism Requirement is a moral fiction—a kind of motivated falsehood. It is false that transplantation requires altruism. But the Requirement serves a purpose. Accepting it allows kidney donation but not kidney sale. It, in short, rationalizes the Received View. (shrink)

Physicians are expected to engage patients as partners in identifying the possible benefits and harms associated with treatment options and selecting from among medically appropriate treatment options, rather than simply dictating what treatments patients will and will not receive. This collaborative model reflects the recognition that citizens in multicultural societies have diverse values and are likely to have different views about whether the possible benefits of a medical intervention outweigh the possible harms. However, there are circumstances in which the collaborative (...) process breaks down due to irresolvable disagreement. Especially challenging are cases in which patients are expected to die if they do not receive a treatment and either the patients or their surrogates insist on the treatment despite the physician's belief that providing it is ill advised. The source of disagreement is often differing appraisals of the risks and potential benefits. In such cases, physicians generally judge that there is insufficient likelihood or magnitude of benefit to justify the burdens or expense of treatment, while patients or surrogates believe that the small chance of preventing the patient's death is sufficient to justify the costs and potential burdens to the patient.There is a perception that surgeons enjoy considerable discretion in deciding when the risks of a procedure outweigh the expected benefits. An important contrast can be drawn between surgeons and intensivists—physicians who specialize in the medical management of critically ill patients. We will argue that there are good reasons for subjecting the decisions of both surgeons and intensivists to some oversight. We begin by showing that, for many cases, major professional society guidelines for intensivists recommend oversight via a procedural mechanism rather than unilateral decision‐making by individual clinicians. Next, we present reasons for adopting a procedural approach to dispute resolution, and we argue that these reasons apply to situations in which intensivists believe that patients or surrogates are requesting inappropriate life support as well as to many disagreements between surgeons and surrogates. Finally, we present and respond to several objections. (shrink)

In this paper, I explore the meaning of bodily integrity in disfiguring breast cancer. Bodily integrity is a normative principle precisely because it does not simply refer to actual physical or functional intactness. It rather indicates what should be regarded and respected as inviolable in vulnerable and damageable bodies. I will argue that this normative inviolability or wholeness can be based upon a person's embodied experience of wholeness. This phenomenological stance differs from the liberal view that identifies respect for integrity (...) with respect for autonomy (resulting in an invalidation of bodily integrity's proper normative meaning), as well as from the view that bodily integrity is based upon ideologies of wholeness (which runs the risk of being disadvantageous to women). I propose that bodily integrity involves a process of identification between the experience of one's body as “Leib” and the experience of one's body as “Körper.” If identification fails or is not possible, one's integrity is threatened. This idea of bodily integrity can support breast cancer patients and survivors in making decisions about possible corrective interventions. To implement this idea in oncology care, empirical-phenomenological research needs to establish how breast cancer patients express their embodied self-experiences. (shrink)

Beneficence and respect for autonomy are two of the most fundamental moral duties in general and in bioethics in particular. Beyond the usual questions of how to resolve conflicts between these duties in particular cases, there are more general questions about the possible forms of the interactions between them. Only recognition of the full spectrum of possible interactions will ensure optimal moral deliberation when duties potentially conflict. This paper has two simultaneous objectives. The first is to suggest a typological scheme (...) of all possible modes of interaction; these will be classified under the “discrete,” “semi-discrete,” and “non-discrete” categories, according to whether the meaning and/or forms of expression of each duty are treated as independent from or rather as constrained by the other. The second objective is to show that all logical possibilities of interaction indeed have real expressions in medical ethics, to provide clear illustrations of each, and in particular to stress those that have usually escaped recognition. (shrink)

Physician-assisted death (PAD) of patients whose suffering does not stem from terminal conditions has become more prevalent during the last few decades. This paper is focused on decision-making competence for PAD, specifically in situations in which PAD is related solely to psychiatric illness. First, a theoretical analysis presents the premises for the argument that competence for physician-assisted death for psychiatric patients (PADPP) should be determined based on a higher threshold in comparison to the required competence for conventional medical interventions. Second, (...) the higher threshold for decision-making competence for PADPP is illustrated. Third, several real PADPP cases are critically discussed, as an illustration to decision-making competence evaluations that would not have met the higher standard. Finally, a short summary of practical suggestions regarding the assessment of decision-making competence for PADPP is presented. Psychiatrists are called to address the ethical, legal, societal and clinical challenges related to PADPP and should be prepared for its probable expansion. (shrink)

Technological measures meant to change sexual orientation are, we have argued elsewhere, deeply alarming, even and indeed especially if they are safe and effective. Here we point out that this in part because they produce a distinctive kind of ‘clinical collective action problem’, a sort of dilemma for individual clinicians and researchers: a treatment which evidently relieves the suffering of particular patients, but in the process contributes to a practice that substantially worsens the conditions that produce this suffering in the (...) first place. We argue that the role obligations of clinicians to relieve the suffering of their patients put them in a poor position to solve this problem, though they can take measures to avoid complicity in the harms that would result from widespread use of individually safe and effective reorientation biotechnology. But in the end the medical community as a whole still seems obligated to provide these measures, if they become technologically feasible. Medical researchers are in a better position to prevent the harms that would result if reorientation techniques were safe, effective and widely available. We argue that the harms attendant on the development of safe and effective re-orientation techniques give researchers reason to avoid ‘applied‘ research aimed at developing these techniques, and to be careful in the conduct of basic orientation research which might be applied in this way. (shrink)

The bioethical principle of autonomy is of paramount importance within medical practice. The extent to which a patient’s autonomy overlaps or conflicts with the physician’s duty of beneficence and non-maleficence, however, is not so clear cut, especially for those cases in which the patient’s request for medical intervention goes against the physician’s advice, either because of personal belief or because there is uncertainty regarding the therapeutic approach. Body integrity dysphoria (BID) is a condition that has been included recently in the (...) International Classification of Diseases, 11th edition (ICD-11). It may lead an affected individual to develop an intense desire to remove a specific body part in order to restore congruity between their body and their mind. Thus, its occurrence creates challenging moral and ethical dilemmas for the medical world (Loriga, 2023). The aim of this study was to investigate how Czech physicians understood, assessed and supported patient autonomy regarding requests for invasive body modifications. The objective was to produce a blueprint regarding how much a patient could influence the medical treatment they could gain within the Czech medical system and to develop a comparison with the ethical challenges of BID. A five-section survey was designed and submitted to Czech physicians on topics relevant to the BID debate. On the surface, the results showed an apparent predisposition toward collaboration between doctors and patients. However, further investigation showed that this supposed collaboration crumbled as the physiological risk-reward ratio moved further toward risk, which caused physicians progressively to rely less on the patient’s opinion and psychological needs. Moreover, a strongly authoritarian approach was evident, which became overwhelming in cases of amputation requests and removed, a priori, any collaboration. The results indicate that the Czech medical system does not accept or comprehend fully patients’ psychological needs, and therefore the BID phenomenon is a long way from being understood, which requires a fundamental paradigm shift. (shrink)