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Jennifer Hawkins
Duke University
  1.  16
    Well-Being, The Self, and Radical Change.Jennifer Hawkins - 2019 - In Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics, Vol 9. Oxford, UK: pp. 251-270.
    This chapter explores radical personal change and its relationship to well-being, welfare, or prudential value. Many theorists of welfare are committed to what is here called the future-based reasons view (FBR), which holds (1) that the best prudential choice in a situation is determined by which possible future has the greatest net welfare value for the subject and (2) what determines facts about future welfare are facts about the subject and the world at that future time. Although some cases of (...)
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  2.  30
    Internalism and Prudential Value.Jennifer Hawkins - 2019 - In Russ Shafer Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Vol. 14. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. pp. 95-120.
    Existence internalism claims that facts about human psychological responsiveness constrain the metaphysics of value in particular ways. Here I examine whether some form of existence internalism holds for prudential value (as opposed to moral or aesthetic value). I emphasize the importance of a modal distinction that has been traditionally overlooked. Some facts about personal good are facts about realized good. For example, right now it may be true that x is good for me. Other facts about goodness are facts about (...)
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  3.  16
    Well-Being: What Matters Beyond the Mental?Jennifer Hawkins - 2015 - In Mark Timmons (ed.), Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics, Vol 4. Oxford, UK: pp. 210-235.
    Most philosophers these days assume that more matters for well-being than simply mental states. However, there is an important distinction that is routinely overlooked. When it is said that more matters than mental states, this could mean either that certain mind-independent events count when it comes to assessing the prudential value of a life (the mind-independent events thesis or MIE), or it could mean that it is prudentially important for individuals to have the right kind of epistemic relation to life (...)
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