Switch to: References

Citations of:

The Good, the Bad, and the Badass: On the Descriptive Adequacy of Kant's Conception of Moral Evil

In Significance and System: Essays on Kant's Ethics. New York: Oup Usa. pp. 293-330 (2017)

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Kant’s Principia Diiudicationis and Executionis.John Walsh - forthcoming - Kantian Review.
    A core feature of Kant’s Critical account of moral motivation is that pure reason can be practical by itself. I argue that Kant developed this view in the 1770s concerning the principium diiudicationis and principium executionis. These principles indicate the normative and performative aspects of moral motivation. I demonstrate that cognition of the normative principle effects the moral incentive. So, the hallmark of Kant’s Critical account of motivation was contained in his pre-Critical view. This interpretation resolves a controversy about Kant’s (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Kant’s Derivation of Imperatives of Duty.Laurenz Ramsauer - 2024 - Kantian Review 29 (1):39-59.
    On the currently dominant reading of the Groundwork, Kant’s derivation of ‘imperatives of duty’ exemplifies a decision procedure for the derivation of concrete duties in moral deliberation. However, Kant’s response to an often-misidentified criticism of the Groundwork by G. A. Tittel suggests that Kant was remarkably unconcerned with arguing for the practicality of the categorical imperative as a decision procedure. Instead, I argue that the main aim of Kant’s derivation of imperatives of duty was to show how his analysis of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Making Sense of Kant’s Formula of Universal Law: On Kleingeld’s Volitional Self-Contradiction Interpretation.Mark Timmons - 2023 - Philosophia 51 (2):463-475.
    This article examines Pauline Kleingeld’s “volitional self-contradiction” (VSC) interpretation of Kant’s formula of universal law. It begins in §1 with an outline of Kleingeld’s interpretation and then proceeds in §2 to raise some worries about how the interpretation handles Kant’s egoism example. §3 considers VSC’s handling of the false promise example comparing it in §4 with the Logical/Causal Law (LCL) interpretation, which arguably does better than its VSC competitor in handling this example. §5 deploys the LCL interpretation to consider the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • May Kantians commit virtual killings that affect no other persons?Tobias Flattery - 2021 - Ethics and Information Technology 23 (4):751-762.
    Are acts of violence performed in virtual environments ever morally wrong, even when no other persons are affected? While some such acts surely reflect deficient moral character, I focus on the moral rightness or wrongness of acts. Typically it’s thought that, on Kant’s moral theory, an act of virtual violence is morally wrong (i.e., violate the Categorical Imperative) only if the act mistreats another person. But I argue that, on Kant’s moral theory, some acts of virtual violence can be morally (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • A Contradiction of the Right Kind: Convenience Killing and Kant’s Formula of Universal Law.Pauline Kleingeld - 2019 - Philosophical Quarterly 69 (274):64-81.
    One of the most important difficulties facing Kant’s Formula of Universal Law (FUL) is its apparent inability to show that it is always impermissible to kill others for the sake of convenience. This difficulty has led current Kantian ethicists to de-emphasize the FUL or at least complement it with other Kantian principles when dealing with murder. The difficulty stems from the fact that the maxim of convenience killing fails to generate a ‘contradiction in conception’, producing only a ‘contradiction in the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  • Duties to Self, Consent, and Respect in Kant’s Moral Philosophy.Luke J. Davies - 2024 - Journal of Moral Philosophy:1-24.
    In Kantian ethics, do we wrong someone when our use of them requires that they violate a duty to self, even when they have consented to that use? In this paper, I answer this question in the negative. Consent that constitutes a violation of a duty to self is impermissible yet normatively transformative. But it also matters how consent was obtained. For example, it matters whether consent is solicited or unsolicited, whether our action amounts to complicity with the violation, and (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark