Virtue argumentation theory focuses on the arguers’ character, whereas pragma-dialectics focuses on argumentation as a procedure. In this paper I attempt to explain that both theories are not opposite approaches to argumentation. I argue that, with the help of some non-fundamental changes in pragma-dialectics and some restrictions in virtue argumentation theory, it is possible to regard these theories as complementary approaches to the argumentative practice.

In this overview article, we first explain what we take informal logic to be, discussing misconceptions and distinguishing our conception of it from competing ones; second, we briefly catalogue recent informal logic research, under 14 headings; third, we suggest four broad areas of problems and questions for future research; fourth, we describe current scholarly resources for informal logic; fifth, we discuss three implications of informal logic for philosophy in particular, and take note ofpractical consequences of a more general sort.

If we think of fallacies as violations of the preconditions governing the products, processes, and procedures of argumentation, we see that fallacies do not merely weaken arguments, but rather undermine the possibility of argument itself. This approac h recommends itself on several counts. First, it accounts for diversity in fallacy analysis. Second, it makes possible investigations into new kinds of fallacies. Third, it provides new applications for ongoing developments in fallacy theory.

Pragma-Dialectics (PD) is an approach to argumentation that can be described as disagreement-centric. On PD, disagreement is the condition which defines argument, it is the practical problem to be solved by it, and disagreement’s management is the ultimate source of argument’s normativity. On PD, arguing in the context of agreement is taken to be “incorrect” and arguments where agreement already reigns are “pointless.” Even the PD account of fallacies is disagreement-centered: a fallacy is something that impedes resolution of a dispute. (...) We argue here that the disagreement-focus of PD yields procedural errors of application in cases of arguments given explicitly for agreement-management, that there are explanations of fallacies better understood as agreement-focused (straw man and ad hominem in particular), and that there are unique meta-argumentative errors emergent in instances of agreement. (shrink)