I argue that death can be (and sometimes is) bad for cattle because it destroys relationships that are valuable for cattle for their own sake. The argument relies on an analogy between valuable human relationships and relationships cattle form with conspecifics. I suggest that the reasons we have for thinking that certain rich and meaningful human relationships are valuable for their own sake should also lead us to think that certain cattle relationships are valuable for their own sake. And just (...) as death is bad for us when it destroys our valuable relationships, so death is bad for cattle when it destroys their valuable relationships. This argument is important because it pinpoints something that is bad about death for cattle that is overlooked by popular accounts of the badness of death for non-human animals that focus exclusively on the impact of death on lifetime well-being levels. Thus, the argument reveals an overlooked moral cost of some of our farming practices. (shrink)

This article puts Buddhist moral phenomenology in dialogue with ethical veganism to propose a new way of thinking about animal ethics. It first defines ethical veganism and outlines Buddhist moral phenomenology before articulating what a moral phenomenological approach to ethical veganism looks like. It then provides some examples of this approach to ethical veganism in both Tibetan and Western settings to demonstrate its viability. It concludes by thinking through some of the implications of a moral phenomenological approach to ethical veganism (...) and argues that moral phenomenology is an exemplary mode of understanding and establishing ethical veganism. (shrink)