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Acquaintance and Fallible Non-Inferential Justification

In Michael Bergmann & Brett Coppenger (eds.), Intellectual Assurance: Essays on Traditional Epistemic Internalism. Oxford University Press. pp. 43-60 (2016)

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  1. Foundationalist Theories of Epistemic Justification.Richard Fumerton & Ali Hasan - forthcoming - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  • Knowledge by Acquaintance Vs. Description.Ali Hasan & Richard Fumerton - 2019 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  • Knowledge by Acquaintance Vs. Description.Richard Fumerton - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  • Acquaintance.Matt Duncan - 2021 - Philosophy Compass 16 (3):e12727.
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  • Corrigendum To: Why Punitive Intent Matters.Nathan Hanna - 2021 - Analysis 81 (3):496-496.
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  • Traditional Internalism and Foundational Justification.Gregory Stoutenburg - 2020 - Erkenntnis 85 (1):121-138.
    Several arguments attempt to show that if traditional, acquaintance-based epistemic internalism is true, we cannot have foundational justification for believing falsehoods. I examine some of those arguments and find them wanting. Nevertheless, an infallibilist position about foundational justification is highly plausible: prima facie, much more plausible than moderate foundationalism. I conclude with some remarks about the dialectical position we infallibilists find ourselves in with respect to arguing for our preferred view and some considerations regarding how infallibilists should develop their account (...)
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  • The Gradation Puzzle of Intellectual Assurance.Xiaoxing Zhang - 2021 - Analysis 81 (3):488-496.
    The Cartesian thesis that some justifications are infallible faces a gradation puzzle. On the one hand, infallible justification tolerates absolutely no possibility for error. On the other hand, infallible justifications can vary in evidential force: e.g. two persons can both be infallible regarding their pains while the one with stronger pain is nevertheless more justified. However, if a type of justification is gradable in strength, why can it always be absolute? This paper explores the potential of this gradation challenge by (...)
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  • Why Punitive Intent Matters.Nathan Hanna - 2021 - Analysis 81 (3):426-435.
    Many philosophers think that punishment is intentionally harmful and that this makes it especially hard to morally justify. Explanations for the latter intuition often say questionable things about the moral significance of the intent to harm. I argue that there’s a better way to explain this intuition.
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  • Knowledge, Infallibility, and Skepticism.Gregory Douglas Stoutenburg - 2016 - Dissertation, University of Iowa
    I argue that to know that a proposition is true one must have justification for being certain that the proposition is true. That is, one must have infallible epistemic justification for believing the proposition. It is widely accepted among epistemologists that we rarely, if ever, have such strong justification for our beliefs. It follows that there is precious little that we know. That conclusion is unacceptable to many philosophers. I argue that the positions that lead to the skeptical conclusion are (...)
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