- Exploration of the Functional Properties of Interaction: Computer Models and Pointers for Theory.E. B. Roesch, M. Spencer, S. J. Nasuto, T. Tanay & J. M. Bishop - 2013 - Constructivist Foundations 9 (1):26-33.details
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Do Accelerating Turing Machines Compute the Uncomputable?B. Jack Copeland & Oron Shagrir - 2011 - Minds and Machines 21 (2):221-239.details
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Logical machines: Peirce on psychologism.Majid Amini - 2008 - Disputatio 2 (24):335-348.details
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Mathematical definability.Theodore A. Slaman - 1998 - In Harold Garth Dales & Gianluigi Oliveri (eds.), Truth in mathematics. New York: Oxford University Press, Usa. pp. 233.details
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Feminist Philosophy of Science.Lynn Hankinson Nelson - 2002 - In Peter K. Machamer & Michael Silberstein (eds.), The Blackwell guide to the philosophy of science. Malden, Mass.: Blackwell. pp. 312–331.details
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Quantum gravity computers: On the theory of computation with indefinite causal structure.Lucien Hardy - 2009 - In Wayne C. Myrvold & Joy Christian (eds.), Quantum Reality, Relativistic Causality, and Closing the Epistemic Circle. Springer. pp. 379--401.details
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The Value of Computer Science for Brain Research.Ulrike Pompe - 2013 - In Hanne Andersen, Dennis Dieks, Wenceslao J. Gonzalez, Thomas Uebel & Gregory Wheeler (eds.), New Challenges to Philosophy of Science. Springer Verlag. pp. 87--97.details
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On Algorithm and Robustness in a Non-standard Sense.Sam Sanders - 2013 - In Hanne Andersen, Dennis Dieks, Wenceslao J. Gonzalez, Thomas Uebel & Gregory Wheeler (eds.), New Challenges to Philosophy of Science. Springer Verlag. pp. 99--112.details
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Three Philosophical Approaches to Entomology.Jean-Marc Drouin - 2013 - In Hanne Andersen, Dennis Dieks, Wenceslao J. Gonzalez, Thomas Uebel & Gregory Wheeler (eds.), New Challenges to Philosophy of Science. Springer Verlag. pp. 377--386.details
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Turing machine-inspired computer science results.Juris Hartmanis - 2012 - In S. Barry Cooper (ed.), How the World Computes. pp. 276--282.details
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On Mathematicians Who Liked Logic.Ivor Grattan-Guinness - 2012 - In S. Barry Cooper (ed.), How the World Computes. pp. 245--252.details
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Randomness, computation and mathematics.Rod Downey - 2012 - In S. Barry Cooper (ed.), How the World Computes. pp. 162--181.details
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Learning, Social Intelligence and the Turing Test.Bruce Edmonds & Carlos Gershenson - 2012 - In S. Barry Cooper (ed.), How the World Computes. pp. 182--192.details
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Is Turing's Thesis the Consequence of a More General Physical Principle?Matthew P. Szudzik - 2012 - In S. Barry Cooper (ed.), How the World Computes. pp. 714--722.details
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In the Beginning was Game Semantics?Giorgi Japaridze - 2009 - In Ondrej Majer, Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen & Tero Tulenheimo (eds.), Games: Unifying Logic, Language, and Philosophy. Dordrecht, Netherland: Springer Verlag. pp. 249--350.details
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Asymptotic density and computably enumerable sets.Rodney G. Downey, Carl G. Jockusch & Paul E. Schupp - 2013 - Journal of Mathematical Logic 13 (2):1350005.details
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Crossing the Newton-Maxwell Gap: Convergences and Contingencies.Matti Tedre & Erkki Sutinen - 2009 - Spontaneous Generations 3 (1):195-212.details
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The notion of computation is fundamental to an autonomous neuroscience.Garrett Neske - 2010 - Complexity 16 (1):10-19.details
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Complexity of a modelling exercise: A discussion of the role of computer simulation in complex system science.Fabio Boschetti, David McDonald & Randall Gray - 2008 - Complexity 13 (6):21-28.details
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The cognitive architecture for chaining of two mental operations.Jérôme Sackur & Stanislas Dehaene - 2009 - Cognition 111 (2):187-211.details
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Cognitive representation and the process-architecture distinction.Zenon W. Pylyshyn - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1):154-169.details
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Computation without representation.Stephen P. Stich - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1):152-152.details
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Cognition is not computation, for the reasons that computers don't solve the mind-body problems.Walter B. Weimer - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1):152-153.details
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Functional architectures for cognition: are simple inferences possible?Steven W. Zucker - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1):153-154.details
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Functional architecture and model validation.Martin Ringle - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1):150-151.details
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Computation and symbolization.William E. Smythe - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1):151-152.details
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Pylyshyn and perception.William T. Powers - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1):148-149.details
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Penetrating the impenetrable.Georges Rey - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1):149-150.details
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Criteria of cognitive impenetrability.Robert C. Moore - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1):146-147.details
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Explanations in theories of language and of imagery.Steven Pinker - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1):147-148.details
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Computation, consciousness and cognition.George A. Miller - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1):146-146.details
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Cognitive penetrability: let us not forget about memory.James R. Miller - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1):146-146.details
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The elusive visual processing mode: Implications of the architecture/algorithm distinction.Roberta L. Klatzky - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1):142-143.details
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Functional architecture and free will.Henry E. Kyburg - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1):143-146.details
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The borders of cognition.Earl Hunt - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1):140-141.details
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Reductionism and cognitive flexibility.Frank Keil - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1):141-142.details
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Computation, cognition, and representation.John Hell - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1):139-139.details
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From computational metaphor to consensual algorithms.Kenneth Mark Colby - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1):134-135.details
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A remark on the completeness of the computational model of mind.William Demopoulos - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1):135-135.details
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In defence of the armchair.Michael Fortescue - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1):135-136.details
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Human and computer rules and representations are not equivalent.Stephen Grossberg - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1):136-138.details
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Psychology and computational architecture.John Haugeland - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1):138-139.details
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Neuroscience and psychology: should the labor be divided?Patricia Smith Churchland - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1):133-133.details
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Plasticity: conceptual and neuronal.Paul M. Churchland - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1):133-134.details
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Putting together connectionism – again.Paul Smolensky - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (1):59-74.details
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Has the case been made against the ecumenical view of connectionism?Robert Van Gulick - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (1):57-58.details
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The essential opacity of modular systems: Why even connectionism cannot give complete formal accounts of cognition.Marten J. den Uyl - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (1):56-57.details
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From data to dynamics: The use of multiple levels of analysis.Gregory O. Stone - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (1):54-55.details
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How fully should connectionism be activated? Two sources of excitation and one of inhibition.Roger N. Shepard - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (1):52-52.details
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From connectionism to eliminativism.Stephen P. Stich - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (1):53-54.details
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