Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. (1 other version)Minds, brains, and programs.John Searle - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):417-57.
    What psychological and philosophical significance should we attach to recent efforts at computer simulations of human cognitive capacities? In answering this question, I find it useful to distinguish what I will call "strong" AI from "weak" or "cautious" AI. According to weak AI, the principal value of the computer in the study of the mind is that it gives us a very powerful tool. For example, it enables us to formulate and test hypotheses in a more rigorous and precise fashion. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1813 citations  
  • Connectionism and cognitive architecture: A critical analysis.Jerry A. Fodor & Zenon W. Pylyshyn - 1988 - Cognition 28 (1-2):3-71.
    This paper explores the difference between Connectionist proposals for cognitive a r c h i t e c t u r e a n d t h e s o r t s o f m o d e l s t hat have traditionally been assum e d i n c o g n i t i v e s c i e n c e . W e c l a i m t h a t t h (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1144 citations  
  • On the demystification of mental imagery.Stephen M. Kosslyn, Steven Pinker, Sophie Schwartz & G. Smith - 1979 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 2 (4):535-81.
    What might a theory of mental imagery look like, and how might one begin formulating such a theory? These are the central questions addressed in the present paper. The first section outlines the general research direction taken here and provides an overview of the empirical foundations of our theory of image representation and processing. Four issues are considered in succession, and the relevant results of experiments are presented and discussed. The second section begins with a discussion of the proper form (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   200 citations  
  • On the demystification of mental imagery.Stephen M. Kosslyn, Steven Pinker, George E. Smith & Steven P. Shwartz - 1979 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 2 (4):535-548.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   196 citations  
  • Mental imagery: In search of a theory.Zenon W. Pylyshyn - 2002 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (2):157-182.
    It is generally accepted that there is something special about reasoning by using mental images. The question of how it is special, however, has never been satisfactorily spelled out, despite more than thirty years of research in the post-behaviorist tradition. This article considers some of the general motivation for the assumption that entertaining mental images involves inspecting a picture-like object. It sets out a distinction between phenomena attributable to the nature of mind to what is called the cognitive architecture, and (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   123 citations  
  • Intrinsic intentionality.John Searle - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):450-457.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   127 citations  
  • The ‘causal power’ of machines.Zenon W. Pylyshyn - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):442-444.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   84 citations  
  • Repair Theory: A Generative Theory of Bugs in Procedural Skills.John Seely Brown & Kurt VanLehn - 1980 - Cognitive Science 4 (4):379-426.
    This paper describes a generative theory of bugs. It claims that all bugs of a procedural skill can be derived by a highly constrained form of problem solving acting on incomplete procedures. These procedures are characterized by formal deletion operations that model incomplete learning and forgetting. The problem solver and the deletion operator have been constrained to make it impossible to derive “star‐bugs”—algorithms that are so absurd that expert diagnosticians agree that the alogorithm will never be observed as a bug. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   58 citations  
  • S eeingand visualizing: I T' S n otwhaty ou T hink.Zenon Pylyshyn - unknown
    6. Seeing With the Mind’s Eye 1: The Puzzle of Mental Imagery .................................................6-1 6.1 What is the puzzle about mental imagery?..............................................................................6-1 6.2 Content, form and substance of representations ......................................................................6-6 6.3 What is responsible for the pattern of results obtained in imagery studies?.................................6-8..
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   35 citations  
  • The milk of human intentionality.Daniel Dennett - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):428-430.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   42 citations  
  • Mental phenomena and behavior.B. Libet - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):434-434.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   39 citations  
  • The how, what, and why of mental imagery.Stephen M. Kossyln, Steven Pinker, George E. Smith & Steven P. Shwartz - 1979 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 2 (4):570-581.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   29 citations  
  • Is T hinker a Natural Kind?Paul M. Churchland - 1982 - Dialogue 21 (2):223-38.
    Functionalism in the philosophy of mind is here criticized from the perspective of a more naturalistic and less compromising form of materialism. Parallels are explored between the problem of cognitive activity and the somewhat more settled problem of vital activity. The lessons drawn suggest that functionalism in the philosophy of mind may be both counterproductive as a research strategy, and false as a substantive position.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   27 citations  
  • Searle on what only brains can do.J. A. Fodor - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):431-432.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   22 citations  
  • Are connectionist models cognitive?Benny Shanon - 1992 - Philosophical Psychology 5 (3):235-255.
    In their critique of connectionist models Fodor and Pylyshyn (1988) dismiss such models as not being cognitive or psychological. Evaluating Fodor and Pylyshyn's critique requires examining what is required in characterizating models as 'cognitive'. The present discussion examines the various senses of this term. It argues the answer to the title question seems to vary with these different senses. Indeed, by one sense of the term, neither representa-tionalism nor connectionism is cognitive. General ramifications of such an appraisal are discussed and (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   26 citations  
  • Programs, causal powers, and intentionality.John Haugeland - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):432-433.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   16 citations  
  • The functionalist reply.William G. Lycan - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):434-435.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations  
  • How to turn an information processor into an understander.Aaron Sloman & Monica Croucher - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):447-448.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  • What intuitions about homunculi don't show.Ned Block - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):425-426.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  • Simulation games.William E. Smythe - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):448-449.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  • Reductionism and religion.Douglas R. Hofstadter - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):433-434.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  • (1 other version)Don't stop believing: The case against eliminative materialism.Barbara Hannan - 1993 - Mind and Language 8 (2):165-179.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  • (1 other version)Don't Stop Believing: The Case Against Eliminative Materialism.Barbara Hannan - 2007 - Mind and Language 8 (2):165-178.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  • Decentralized minds.Marvin Minsky - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):439-440.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • The chess room: further demythologizing of strong AI.Roland Puccetti - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):441-442.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • Searle and the special powers of the brain.Richard Rorty - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):445-446.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • Computers, cognition and philosophy.Robert Wilensky - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):449-450.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Active symbols and internal models: Towards a cognitive connectionism. [REVIEW]Stephen Kaplan, Mark Weaver & Robert French - 1990 - AI and Society 4 (1):51-71.
    In the first section of the article, we examine some recent criticisms of the connectionist enterprise: first, that connectionist models are fundamentally behaviorist in nature (and, therefore, non-cognitive), and second that connectionist models are fundamentally associationist in nature (and, therefore, cognitively weak). We argue that, for a limited class of connectionist models (feed-forward, pattern-associator models), the first criticism is unavoidable. With respect to the second criticism, we propose that connectionist modelsare fundamentally associationist but that this is appropriate for building models (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   81 citations  
  • Searle's argument is just a set of Chinese symbols.Robert P. Abelson - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):424-425.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Beliefs, machines, and theories.John McCarthy - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):435-435.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • What is musical intuition? Tonal theory as cognitive science.Mark DeBellis - 1999 - Philosophical Psychology 12 (4):471 – 501.
    Lerdahl and Jackendoff's Generative Theory of Tonal Music (GTTM) is an important contribution to cognitive science. Jackendoff claims it is a computationalist theory and that the mental representations it postulates are unconscious. Thus GTTM looks to be a kind of cognitive science remote from the folk-psychological. I argue that this picture of GTTM is mistaken: GTTM is at least as much music analysis as cognitive science. Jackendoff's metatheory fails to explain how a listener can tell that a structural description corresponds (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • What's wrong with the syntactic theory of mind.M. Frances Egan - 1989 - Philosophy of Science 56 (December):664-74.
    Stephen Stich has argued that psychological theories that instantiate his Syntactic Theory of Mind are to be preferred to content-based or representationalist theories, because the former can capture and explain a wider range of generalizations about cognitive processes than the latter. Stich's claims about the relative merits of the Syntactic Theory of Mind are unfounded. Not only is it false that syntactic theories can capture psychological generalizations that content-based theories cannot, but a large class of behavioral regularities, readily explained by (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Brains + programs = minds.Bruce Bridgeman - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):427-428.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • The use and mention of terms and the simulation of linguistic understanding.Arthur C. Danto - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):428-428.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Imagery without arrays.Geoffrey Hinton - 1979 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 2 (4):555-556.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Intentionality: Hardware, not software.Grover Maxwell - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):437-438.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • The primary source of intentionality.Thomas Natsoulas - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):440-441.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Mysticism as a philosophy of artificial intelligence.Martin Ringle - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):444-445.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Understanding Searle.Roger C. Schank - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):446-447.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • On the function of mental imagery.David L. Waltz - 1979 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 2 (4):569-570.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • The Varieties of Eliminativism: Sentential, Intentional and Catastrophic.Andy Clark - 2007 - Mind and Language 8 (2):223-233.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Imagining the purpose of imagery.Robert P. Abelson - 1979 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 2 (4):548-549.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Matters of definition in the demystification of mental imagery.John S. Antrobus - 1979 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 2 (4):549-550.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Neurologizing mental imagery: the physiological optics of the mind's eye.Bruce Bridgeman - 1979 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 2 (4):550-550.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Individualism and the metaphysics of actions.Matias Bulnes - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (1):113-132.
    I examine an intuitive property of folk-psychological explanations I call self-sufficiency. I argue that individualism cannot honor this property and work toward distilling an account of psychological explanation that does honor it, given some fairly standard assumptions. In doing so, my preference for an Externalist individuation of intentional state will emerge unambiguously. The assumptions I rely on are fairly standard but not uncontroversial. Yet not always do I attempt to defend them from objections. My goal is an account of folk (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Mind architecture and brain architecture.Camilo J. Cela-Conde & Gisèle Marty - 1997 - Biology and Philosophy 12 (3):327-340.
    The use of the computer metaphor has led to the proposal of mind architecture (Pylyshyn 1984; Newell 1990) as a model of the organization of the mind. The dualist computational model, however, has, since the earliest days of psychological functionalism, required that the concepts mind architecture and brain architecture be remote from each other. The development of both connectionism and neurocomputational science, has sought to dispense with this dualism and provide general models of consciousness – a uniform cognitive architecture –, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • The Varieties of Eliminativism: Sentential, Intentional and Catastrophic.Andy Clark - 1993 - Mind and Language 8 (2):223-233.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Modeling the mind's eye.Lynn A. Cooper - 1979 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 2 (4):550-551.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • On interpretative processes in imagery.Manuel de Vega - 1979 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 2 (4):551-551.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • A dualist-interactionist perspective.John C. Eccles - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):430-431.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark