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  1. Rationality in the new paradigm: Strict versus soft Bayesian approaches.Shira Elqayam & Jonathan St B. T. Evans - 2013 - Thinking and Reasoning 19 (3-4):453-470.
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  • Dissociation between magnitude comparison and relation identification across different formats for rational numbers.Maureen E. Gray, Melissa DeWolf, Miriam Bassok & Keith J. Holyoak - 2018 - Thinking and Reasoning 24 (2):179-197.
    The present study examined whether a dissociation among formats for rational numbers can be obtained in tasks that require comparing a number to a non-symbolic quantity. In Experiment 1, college students saw a discrete or else continuous image followed by a rational number, and had to decide which was numerically larger. In Experiment 2, participants saw the same displays but had to make a judgment about the type of ratio represented by the number. The magnitude task was performed more quickly (...)
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  • Base rates, experience, and the big picture.Stephen E. Edgell, Robert M. Roe & Clayton H. Dodd - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):21-21.
    The important question is how people process probabilistic information, not whether they process it in accordance with a normative model that we never should have expected them to be capable of following. Experience is not the cure, as widely thought, to problems with utilizing base rate information.
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  • Dynamic bindings by real neurons: Arguments from physiology, neural network models and information theory.Reinhard Eckhorn - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (3):457-458.
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  • The promise and problems of connectionism.Michael G. Dyer - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (1):32-33.
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  • The role of representativeness in reasoning and metacognitive processes: an in-depth analysis of the Linda problem.Marin Dujmović, Pavle Valerjev & Igor Bajšanski - 2020 - Thinking and Reasoning 27 (2):161-186.
    We conducted a thorough investigation of the impact of representativeness on reasoning and metacognitive processes by employing the Linda problem. In congruent versions, the more representative res...
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  • On the proper treatment of Smolensky.Hubert L. Dreyfus & Stuart E. Dreyfus - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (1):31-32.
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  • Someone is pulling the strings: hypersensitive agency detection and belief in conspiracy theories.Karen M. Douglas, Robbie M. Sutton, Mitchell J. Callan, Rael J. Dawtry & Annelie J. Harvey - 2016 - Thinking and Reasoning 22 (1):57-77.
    We hypothesised that belief in conspiracy theories would be predicted by the general tendency to attribute agency and intentionality where it is unlikely to exist. We further hypothesised that this tendency would explain the relationship between education level and belief in conspiracy theories, where lower levels of education have been found to be associated with higher conspiracy belief. In Study 1 participants were more likely to agree with a range of conspiracy theories if they also tended to attribute intentionality and (...)
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  • Being Rational and Being Wrong.Kevin Dorst - 2023 - Philosophers' Imprint 23 (1).
    Do people tend to be overconfident? Many think so. They’ve run studies on whether people are calibrated: whether their average confidence in their opinions matches the proportion of those opinions that are true. Under certain conditions, people are systematically ‘over-calibrated’—for example, of the opinions they’re 80% confident in, only 60% are true. From this empirical over-calibration, it’s inferred that people are irrationally overconfident. My question: When and why is this inference warranted? Answering it requires articulating a general connection between being (...)
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  • Good Guesses.Kevin Dorst & Matthew Mandelkern - 2023 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 105 (3):581-618.
    This paper is about guessing: how people respond to a question when they aren’t certain of the answer. Guesses show surprising and systematic patterns that the most obvious theories don’t explain. We argue that these patterns reveal that people aim to optimize a tradeoff between accuracy and informativity when forming their guess. After spelling out our theory, we use it to argue that guessing plays a central role in our cognitive lives. In particular, our account of guessing yields new theories (...)
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  • Connectionism and syntactic binding of concepts.Georg Dorffner - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (3):456-457.
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  • Social judgement theory.Michael E. Doherty & Elke M. Kurz - 1996 - Thinking and Reasoning 2 (2 & 3):109 – 140.
    This paper first explores a number of themes in the psychological system developed by the Austrian-American psychologist, Egon Brunswik, focusing on those that had a formative influence on Social Judgement Theory. We show that while perception was a recurring ground for Brunswik's empirical and theoretical work, his psychology was a psychology of cognition in the broadest sense. Next, two major themes in Social Judgement Theory functionalism and probabilism are described, and the elegant formulation known as Brunswik's Lens Model is introduced. (...)
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  • Understanding consciousness for optimal human wellbeing & growth holistically.Xu Di - 2020 - Educational Philosophy and Theory 52 (14):1503-1513.
    Consciousness is a natural and integral part of human beings that is at the core of our physical, emotional, mental, and spiritual functions throughout our lives. However, we tend to be too occupie...
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  • Knowledge and availability.Alexander Dinges - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (4):554-573.
    The mentioning of error-possibilities makes us less likely to ascribe knowledge. This paper offers a novel psychological account of this data. The account appeals to “subadditivity,” a well-known psychological tendency to judge possibilities as more likely when they are disjunctively described.
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  • Some assumptions underlying Smolensky's treatment of connectionism.Eric Dietrich & Chris Fields - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (1):29-31.
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  • Reasoning, learning and neuropsychological plausibility.Joachim Diederich - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (3):455-456.
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  • Adaptivity and rational analysis.Bradley W. Dickinson - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (3):492-493.
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  • Rational analysis: Too rational for comfort?Ronald de Sousa - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (3):492-492.
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  • The essential opacity of modular systems: Why even connectionism cannot give complete formal accounts of cognition.Marten J. den Uyl - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (1):56-57.
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  • Perception of Risk and Terrorism-Related Behavior Change: Dual Influences of Probabilistic Reasoning and Reality Testing.Andrew Denovan, Neil Dagnall, Kenneth Drinkwater, Andrew Parker & Peter Clough - 2017 - Frontiers in Psychology 8:285709.
    The present study assessed the degree to which probabilistic reasoning performance and thinking style influenced perception of risk and self-reported levels of terrorism-related behaviour change. A sample of 263 respondents, recruited via convenience sampling, completed a series of measures comprising probabilistic reasoning tasks (perception of randomness, base rate, probability, and conjunction fallacy), the Reality Testing subscale of the Inventory of Personality Organization (IPO-RT), the Domain-Specific Risk-Taking Scale, and a terrorism-related behaviour change scale. Structural equation modelling examined three progressive models. Firstly, (...)
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  • Latent Profile Analysis of Schizotypy and Paranormal Belief: Associations with Probabilistic Reasoning Performance.Andrew Denovan, Neil Dagnall, Kenneth Drinkwater & Andrew Parker - 2018 - Frontiers in Psychology 9.
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  • The psychological appeal of connectionism.Denise Dellarosa - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (1):28-29.
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  • The heuristic conception of inference to the best explanation.Finnur Dellsén - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 175 (7):1745-1766.
    An influential suggestion about the relationship between Bayesianism and inference to the best explanation holds that IBE functions as a heuristic to approximate Bayesian reasoning. While this view promises to unify Bayesianism and IBE in a very attractive manner, important elements of the view have not yet been spelled out in detail. I present and argue for a heuristic conception of IBE on which IBE serves primarily to locate the most probable available explanatory hypothesis to serve as a working hypothesis (...)
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  • Ignorance, misconceptions and critical thinking.Sara Dellantonio & Luigi Pastore - 2020 - Synthese 198 (8):7473-7501.
    In this paper we investigate ignorance in relation to our capacity to justify our beliefs. To achieve this aim we specifically address scientific misconceptions, i.e. beliefs that are considered to be false in light of accepted scientific knowledge. The hypothesis we put forward is that misconceptions are not isolated false beliefs, but rather form part of a system of inferences—an explanation—which does not match current scientific theory. We further argue that, because misconceptions are embedded in a system, they cannot be (...)
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  • Updating incoherent credences ‐ Extending the Dutch strategy argument for conditionalization.Glauber De Bona & Julia Staffel - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 105 (2):435-460.
    In this paper, we ask: how should an agent who has incoherent credences update when they learn new evidence? The standard Bayesian answer for coherent agents is that they should conditionalize; however, this updating rule is not defined for incoherent starting credences. We show how one of the main arguments for conditionalization, the Dutch strategy argument, can be extended to devise a target property for updating plans that can apply to them regardless of whether the agent starts out with coherent (...)
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  • Saving the armchair by experiment: what works in economics doesn’t work in philosophy.Boudewijn de Bruin - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (8):2483-2508.
    Financial incentives, learning, group consultation, and increased experimental control are among the experimental techniques economists have successfully used to deflect the behavioral challenge posed by research conducted by such scholars as Tversky and Kahneman. These techniques save the economic armchair to the extent that they align laypeople judgments with economic theory by increasing cognitive effort and reflection in experimental subjects. It is natural to hypothesize that a similar strategy might work to address the experimental or restrictionist challenge to armchair philosophy. (...)
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  • Perceived similarity of imagined possible worlds affects judgments of counterfactual plausibility.Felipe De Brigard, Paul Henne & Matthew L. Stanley - 2021 - Cognition 209 (C):104574.
    People frequently entertain counterfactual thoughts, or mental simulations about alternative ways the world could have been. But the perceived plausibility of those counterfactual thoughts varies widely. The current article interfaces research in the philosophy and semantics of counterfactual statements with the psychology of mental simulations, and it explores the role of perceived similarity in judgments of counterfactual plausibility. We report results from seven studies (N = 6405) jointly supporting three interconnected claims. First, the perceived plausibility of a counterfactual event is (...)
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  • A Non-Spatial Reality.Massimiliano Sassoli de Bianchi - 2020 - Foundations of Science 26 (1):143-170.
    It is generally assumed, and usually taken for granted, that reality is fully contained in space. However, when taking a closer look at the strange behavior of the entities of the micro-world, we are forced to abandon such a prejudice and recognize that space is just a temporary crystallization of a small theatre for reality, where the material entities can take a place and meet with each other. More precisely, phenomena like quantum entanglement, quantum interference effects and quantum indistinguishability, when (...)
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  • The purpose of experiments: Ecological validity versus comparing hypotheses.Robyn M. Dawes - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):20-20.
    As illustrated by research Koehler himself cites (Dawes et al. 1993), the purpose of experiments is to choose between contrasting explanations of past observations – rather than to seek statistical generalizations about the prevalence of effects. True external validity results not from sampling various problems that are representative of “real world” decision making, but from reproducing an effect in the laboratory with minimal contamination (including from real world factors).
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  • Making a middling mousetrap.Michael R. W. Dawson & Istvan Berkeley - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (3):454-455.
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  • Structural Rationality and the Property of Coherence.Marc-Kevin Daoust - 2023 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 104 (1):170-194.
    What is structural rationality? Specifically, what is the distinctive feature of structural requirements of rationality? Some philosophers have argued, roughly, that the distinctive feature of structural requirements is coherence. But what does coherence mean, exactly? Or, at least, what do structuralists about rationality have in mind when they claim that structural rationality is coherence? This issue matters for making progress in various active debates concerning rationality. In this paper, I analyze three strategies for figuring out what coherence means in the (...)
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  • The comparison problem for approximating epistemic ideals.Marc-Kevin Daoust - 2023 - Ratio 36 (1):22-31.
    Some epistemologists think that the Bayesian ideals matter because we can approximate them. That is, our attitudes can be more or less close to the ones of our ideal Bayesian counterpart. In this paper, I raise a worry for this justification of epistemic ideals. The worry is this: In order to correctly compare agents to their ideal counterparts, we need to imagine idealized agents who have the same relevant information, knowledge, or evidence. However, there are cases in which one’s ideal (...)
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  • Imperfection, Accuracy, and Structural Rationality.Marc-Kevin Daoust - 2024 - Erkenntnis 89 (3):1095-1116.
    Structural requirements of rationality prohibit various things, like having inconsistent combinations of attitudes, having means-end incoherent combinations of attitudes, and so on. But what is the distinctive feature of structural requirements of rationality? And do we fall under an obligation to be structurally rational? These issues have been at the heart of significant debates over the past fifteen years. Some philosophers have recently argued that we can unify the structural requirements of rationality by analyzing what is constitutive of our attitudes (...)
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  • Toward a Better Understanding of the Relationship between Belief in the Paranormal and Statistical Bias: The Potential Role of Schizotypy.Neil Dagnall, Andrew Denovan, Kenneth Drinkwater, Andrew Parker & Peter Clough - 2016 - Frontiers in Psychology 7.
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  • Probability, confirmation, and the conjunction fallacy.Vincenzo Crupi, Branden Fitelson & Katya Tentori - 2007 - Thinking and Reasoning 14 (2):182 – 199.
    The conjunction fallacy has been a key topic in debates on the rationality of human reasoning and its limitations. Despite extensive inquiry, however, the attempt to provide a satisfactory account of the phenomenon has proved challenging. Here we elaborate the suggestion (first discussed by Sides, Osherson, Bonini, & Viale, 2002) that in standard conjunction problems the fallacious probability judgements observed experimentally are typically guided by sound assessments of _confirmation_ relations, meant in terms of contemporary Bayesian confirmation theory. Our main formal (...)
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  • From is to ought, and back: how normative concerns foster progress in reasoning research.Vincenzo Crupi & Vittorio Girotto - 2014 - Frontiers in Psychology 5.
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  • Explaining Away, Augmentation, and the Assumption of Independence.Nicole Cruz, Ulrike Hahn, Norman Fenton & David Lagnado - 2020 - Frontiers in Psychology 11.
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  • Critique of pure Bayesian cognitive science: A view from the philosophy of science.Vincenzo Crupi & Fabrizio Calzavarini - 2023 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 13 (3):1-17.
    Bayesian approaches to human cognition have been extensively advocated in the last decades, but sharp objections have been raised too within cognitive science. In this paper, we outline a diagnosis of what has gone wrong with the prevalent strand of Bayesian cognitive science (here labelled pure Bayesian cognitive science), relying on selected illustrations from the psychology of reasoning and tools from the philosophy of science. Bayesians’ reliance on so-called method of rational analysis is a key point of our discussion. We (...)
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  • Bayesian reasoning with ifs and ands and ors.Nicole Cruz, Jean Baratgin, Mike Oaksford & David E. Over - 2015 - Frontiers in Psychology 6.
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  • From symbols to neurons: Are we there yet?Garrison W. Cottrell - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (3):454-454.
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  • Surprising rationality in probability judgment: Assessing two competing models.Fintan Costello, Paul Watts & Christopher Fisher - 2018 - Cognition 170 (C):280-297.
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  • Surprisingly rational: Probability theory plus noise explains biases in judgment.Fintan Costello & Paul Watts - 2014 - Psychological Review 121 (3):463-480.
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  • Probability Theory Plus Noise: Descriptive Estimation and Inferential Judgment.Fintan Costello & Paul Watts - 2018 - Topics in Cognitive Science 10 (1):192-208.
    We describe a computational model of two central aspects of people's probabilistic reasoning: descriptive probability estimation and inferential probability judgment. This model assumes that people's reasoning follows standard frequentist probability theory, but it is subject to random noise. This random noise has a regressive effect in descriptive probability estimation, moving probability estimates away from normative probabilities and toward the center of the probability scale. This random noise has an anti-regressive effect in inferential judgement, however. These regressive and anti-regressive effects explain (...)
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  • Efficient Creativity: Constraint‐Guided Conceptual Combination.Fintan J. Costello & Mark T. Keane - 2000 - Cognitive Science 24 (2):299-349.
    This paper describes a theory that explains both the creativity and the efficiency of people's conceptual combination. In the constraint theory, conceptual combination is controlled by three constraints of diagnosticity, plausibility, and informativeness. The constraints derive from the pragmatics of communication as applied to compound phrases. The creativity of combination arises because the constraints can be satisfied in many different ways. The constraint theory yields an algorithmic model of the efficiency of combination. The C3 model admits the full creativity of (...)
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  • Are humans good intuitive statisticians after all? Rethinking some conclusions from the literature on judgment under uncertainty.L. Cosmides - 1996 - Cognition 58 (1):1-73.
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  • The Ethics of Argumentation.Vasco Correia - 2012 - Informal Logic 32 (2):222-241.
    Normative theories of argumentation tend to assume that logical and dialectical rules suffice to ensure the rationality of argumentative discourse. Yet, in everyday debates people use arguments that seem valid in light of such rules but nonetheless biased and tendentious. This article seeks to show that the rationality of argumentation can only be fully promoted if we take into account its ethical dimension. To substantiate this claim, I review some of the empirical evidence indicating that people’s inferential reasoning is systematically (...)
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  • Normative theories of categorization.James E. Corter - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (3):491-492.
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  • Normative theories of argumentation: are some norms better than others?Adam Corner & Ulrike Hahn - 2013 - Synthese 190 (16):3579-3610.
    Norms—that is, specifications of what we ought to do—play a critical role in the study of informal argumentation, as they do in studies of judgment, decision-making and reasoning more generally. Specifically, they guide a recurring theme: are people rational? Though rules and standards have been central to the study of reasoning, and behavior more generally, there has been little discussion within psychology about why (or indeed if) they should be considered normative despite the considerable philosophical literature that bears on this (...)
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  • Could static binding suffice?Paul R. Cooper - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (3):453-454.
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  • Are base rates a natural category of information?Terry Connolly - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):19-20.
    The base rate fallacy is directly dependent on a particular judgment paradigm in which information may be unambiguously designated as either “base rate” or “individuating,” and in which subjects make two-stage sequential judgments. The paradigm may be a poor match for real world settings, and the fallacy may thus be undefined for natural ecologies of judgment.
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