Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. An empirical solution to the puzzle of weakness of will.Julia Haas - 2018 - Synthese (12):1-21.
    This paper presents an empirical solution to the puzzle of weakness of will. Specifically, it presents a theory of action, grounded in contemporary cognitive neuroscientific accounts of decision making, that explains the phenomenon of weakness of will without resulting in a puzzle.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Brain–computer interfaces and dualism: a problem of brain, mind, and body.Joseph Lee - 2016 - AI and Society 31 (1):29-40.
    The brain–computer interface (BCI) has made remarkable progress in the bridging the divide between the brain and the external environment to assist persons with severe disabilities caused by brain impairments. There is also continuing philosophical interest in BCIs which emerges from thoughtful reflection on computers, machines, and artificial intelligence. This article seeks to apply BCI perspectives to examine, challenge, and work towards a possible resolution to a persistent problem in the mind–body relationship, namely dualism. The original humanitarian goals of BCIs (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • From commonsense to science, and back: The use of cognitive concepts in neuroscience.Jolien C. Francken & Marc Slors - 2014 - Consciousness and Cognition 29:248-258.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  • (1 other version)Pretense as alternative sense-making: a praxeological enactivist account.Martin Weichold & Zuzanna Rucińska - 2022 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 21 (5):1131-1156.
    The project of this paper is to synthesize enactivist cognitive science and practice theory in order to develop a new account of pretend play. Pretend play is usually conceived of as a representationalist phenomenon where a pretender projects a fictional mental representation onto reality. It thus seems that pretense can only be explained in representationalist terms. In this paper, we oppose this usual approach. We instead propose not only new explanatory tools for pretend play, but also a fundamental reconceptualization of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Probing for Intentions: Why Clocks Do Not Provide the Only Measurement of Time.Ceci Verbaarschot, Pim Haselager & Jason Farquhar - 2019 - Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 13.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • (2 other versions)Lost in time..Ceci Verbaarschot, Jason Farquhar & Pim Haselager - 2015 - Consciousness and Cognition 33:300-315.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Nowhere and Everywhere: The Causal Origin of Voluntary Action.Aaron Schurger & Sebo Uithol - 2015 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (4):761-778.
    The idea that intentions make the difference between voluntary and non-voluntary behaviors is simple and intuitive. At the same time, we lack an understanding of how voluntary actions actually come about, and the unquestioned appeal to intentions as discrete causes of actions offers little if anything in the way of an answer. We cite evidence suggesting that the origin of actions varies depending on context and effector, and argue that actions emerge from a causal web in the brain, rather than (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   15 citations  
  • No Intentions in the Brain: A Wittgensteinian Perspective on the Science of Intention.Annemarie Kalis - 2019 - Frontiers in Psychology 10.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  • Neither mindful nor mindless, but minded: habits, ecological psychology, and skilled performance.Manuel Heras-Escribano & Miguel Segundo-Ortin - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):10109-10133.
    A widely shared assumption in the literature about skilled motor behavior is that any action that is not blindly automatic and mechanical must be the product of computational processes upon mental representations. To counter this assumption, in this paper we offer a radical embodied (non-representational) account of skilled action that combines ecological psychology and the Deweyan theory of habits. According to our proposal, skilful performance can be understood as composed of sequences of mutually coherent, task-specific perceptual-motor habits. Such habits play (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  • The Integration of Emotional Expression and Experience: A Pragmatist Review of Recent Evidence From Brain Stimulation.Caruana Fausto - 2019 - Emotion Review 11 (1):27-38.
    A common view in affective neuroscience considers emotions as a multifaceted phenomenon constituted by independent affective and motor components. Such dualistic connotation, obtained by rephrasing the classic Darwin and James’s theories of emotion, leads to the assumption that emotional expression is controlled by motor centers in the anterior cingulate, frontal operculum, and supplementary motor area, whereas emotional experience depends on interoceptive centers in the insula. Recent stimulation studies provide a different perspective. I will outline two sets of findings. First, affective (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • How action selection can be embodied: intracranial gamma band recording shows response competition during the Eriksen flankers test.Fausto Caruana, Sebo Uithol, Gaetano Cantalupo, Ivana Sartori, Giorgio Lo Russo & Pietro Avanzini - 2014 - Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 8.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • From Freedom From to Freedom To: New Perspectives on Intentional Action.Sofia Bonicalzi & Patrick Haggard - 2019 - Frontiers in Psychology 10:459073.
    There are few concepts as relevant as that of intentional action in shaping our sense of self and the interaction with the environment. At the same time, few concepts are so elusive. Indeed, both conceptual and neuroscientific accounts of intentional agency have proven to be problematic. On the one hand, most conceptual views struggle in defining how agents can adequately exert control over their actions. On the other hand, neuroscience settles for definitions by exclusion whereby key features of human intentional (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Pluralistic Attitude-Explanation and the Mechanisms of Intentional Action.Daniel Burnston - 2021 - In David Shoemaker (ed.), Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility Volume 7. Oxford University Press. pp. 130-153.
    According to the Causal Theory of Action (CTA), genuine actions are individuated by their causal history. Actions are bodily movements that are causally explained by citing the agent’s reasons. Reasons are then explained as some combination of propositional attitudes – beliefs, desires, and/or intentions. The CTA is thus committed to realism about the attitudes. This paper explores current models of decision-making from the mind sciences, and argues that it is far from obvious how to locate the propositional attitudes in the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Thinking with things: An embodied enactive account of mind–technology interaction.Anco Peeters - 2019 - Dissertation, University of Wollongong
    Technological artefacts have, in recent years, invited increasingly intimate ways of interaction. But surprisingly little attention has been devoted to how such interactions, like with wearable devices or household robots, shape our minds, cognitive capacities, and moral character. In this thesis, I develop an embodied, enactive account of mind--technology interaction that takes the reciprocal influence of artefacts on minds seriously. First, I examine how recent developments in philosophy of technology can inform the phenomenology of mind--technology interaction as seen through an (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Act and Intentionality.Benjamin Sheredos - 2016 - Dissertation, University of California, San Diego
    Understanding the “intentionality” of mental phenomena is widely regarded as a key problem in philosophy of mind. Franz Brentano (along with his students, especially Edmund Husserl) is widely credited with bringing intentionality to philosophers’ attention. In early treatment by the Brentano school, intentionality is at least nominally understood as executed, brought about, or achieved in mental acts. And in the early 20th century, historians of psychology regarded this “act conception” of intentionality as integral for understanding the phenomenon. Yet the secondary (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark