In this essay I propose a new reading of Michel Foucault’s main thesis about biopower and biopolitics. I argue that organisation represents the neglected key to Foucault’s new conceptualisation of power as something that is less political and more organisational. This unique contribution was lost even on his closest interlocutors. Foucault’s work on power had a strong influence on organisation and management theory but interestingly not for the reasons I am proposing. In fact, although theorists in management and organisation studies (...) have emphasised power in relation to discipline, control and subjectivity they have overlooked the transformative meaning of Foucault’s organisation. His work on biopolitics has attracted opposition, too, as evidenced by the controversy sparked by Giorgio Agamben about Foucault’s biopolitics. From Agamben’s critique, it appears that Foucault’s notions of politics and power do not allow a deconstruction of the violence of the concentration camp. However, a critical reading of Primo Levi’s biographical narratives reveals the camp as a place where the prisoners’ability to organise their daily lives secured survival. To make sense of Levi’s revelation, I use John Dewey’s notion of habits as forms of organisation and reconnect it to Foucault’s organisation. A shared understanding of the objective conditions of human activity and experience highlights the similarities between Dewey’s pragmatism and Foucault’s pragmatic metaphysics. In the end, however, Foucault’s metaphysical background has caught up with him, pushing him away from his own most radical proposal that organisation was the new form of power and the new substance of politics. (shrink)

This article aims to analyse the governmental rationalities that took passions as an object in the French seventeenth century, unleashing the modern transformation in emotional power. The classical question of the intertwining between emotions and rationality is approached through a cultural and historical perspective, analyzing historically situated discourses that define political rationalities that propose to govern, with specific techniques and objectives, certain “emotions”’ that are conceived in a certain way. Passions emerged as an object of government through the statement that (...) passions and not inactive reason were the true drivers of human action. Analyzing the treatises on the government of passions as “arts of government” aimed at the authorities of the period, this article explores initially how Neostoic discourses promoted an exchange between Augustinian government of the will and reason of state’s strategies of manipulation of interests. Subsequently, by scrutinizing the texts of French moralists of the second half of the century, this article shows how, under the influence of Jansenism, they invert Neostoic logic and affirm a new emotional rule for political government: enlightened self-love. The idea that the commerce of selfish passions in the market could promote social peace and material progress cleared the path for the acceptance of a concupiscent order. The article’s contribution resides firstly in the history of the shift in the West’s fundamental emotional rule, love, and secondly in the way in which emotional power could work as a condition of possibility for the emergence of modern economic rationality. (shrink)