- Imprecise color constancy versus color realism.Brian V. Funt - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):29-30.details
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Productance physicalism and a posteriori necessity.Don Dedrick - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):28-29.details
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“Color realism” shows a subjectivist' mode of thinking.Michael H. Brill - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):23-24.details
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Fictionalism and the attitudes.Chris John Daly - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 139 (3):423 - 440.details
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Expanding the Empirical Realm: Constructive Empiricism and Augmented Observation.Finnur Dellsén - 2024 - In Claus Beisbart & Michael Frauchiger (eds.), Scientific Theories and Philosophical Stances: Themes from van Fraassen. De Gruyter. pp. 127-146.details
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Assessing relational quantum mechanics.Ricardo Muciño, Elias Okon & Daniel Sudarsky - 2022 - Synthese 200 (5):1-26.details
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The Trajectory of Color.B. A. C. Saunders & J. Van Brakel - 2002 - Perspectives on Science 10 (3):302-355.details
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Rumos da Epistemologia v. 11.Luiz Dutra & Alexandre Meyer Luz (eds.) - 2011 - Núcleo de Epistemologia e Lógica.details
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A Causal-Pluralist Metatheory of Observation.Osvaldo Pessoa - 2019 - Open Philosophy 2 (1):657-667.details
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Have Byrne & Hilbert answered Hardin's challenge?Adam Pautz - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):44-45.details
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Qual ontologia para o empirismo construtivo?Alessio Gava - 2014 - Princípios: Revista de Filosofia 21 (35):413-427.details
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(1 other version)To Believe in Belief.Herman C. D. G. de Regt - 2006 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 37 (1):21-39.details
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Should a historically motivated anti-realist be a Stanfordite?Greg Frost-Arnold - 2019 - Synthese 196:535-551.details
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Teorías generales del progreso científico: alcances y límites.Damian Islas - 2012 - Agora (misc.) 15 (29):87-106.details
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A puzzle about voluntarism about rational epistemic stances.Anjan Chakravartty - 2011 - Synthese 178 (1):37-48.details
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Beautiful red squares.Robert Van Gulick - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):50-51.details
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Hue magnitudes and revelation.John Kulvicki - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):36-37.details
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Color and content.Frank Jackson - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):34-34.details
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Parallels between hearing and seeing support physicalism.Stephen Handel & Molly L. Erickson - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):31-32.details
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Orange laser beams are not illusory: The need for a plurality of “real” color ontologies.Lieven Decock & Jaap van Brakel - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):27-28.details
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The deep Black sea: Observability and modality afloat.F. A. Muller - 2005 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 56 (1):61-99.details
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(1 other version)Perceptual objects may have nonphysical properties.Aaron Ben-Ze’ev - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):22-23.details
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What is Wrong with Husserl's Scientific Anti-Realism?Harald A. Wiltsche - 2012 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 55 (2):105-130.details
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Reflectance-to-color mappings depend critically on spatial context.Michael E. Rudd - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):46-47.details
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Color nominalism, pluralistic realism, and color science.Mohan Matthen - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):39-40.details
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Can a physicalist notion of color provide any insight into the nature of color perception?Rainer Mausfeld & Reinhard Niederée - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):41-42.details
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Surface color perception in constrained environments.Laurence T. Maloney - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):38-39.details
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Olive green or chestnut brown?Rolf G. Kuehni - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):35-36.details
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Why not color physicalism without color absolutism?Zoltán Jakab & Brian P. McLaughlin - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):34-35.details
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Do metamers matter?Martin Hahn - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):30-31.details
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Ecological considerations support color physicalism.James J. Clark - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):24-25.details
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Kusch and van Fraassen on microscopic experience.Alessio Gava - 2019 - Revista Latinoamericana de Filosofia 45 (1):7-31.details
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Experimental and interdisciplinary approaches in philosophy: Methodological caveats.Marco Antonio Azevedo & Jairo Othero - 2015 - Dissertatio 41 (S2):94-118.details
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Science, Realism and Correlationism. A Phenomenological Critique of Meillassoux' Argument from Ancestrality.Harald A. Wiltsche - 2017 - European Journal of Philosophy 25 (3):808-832.details
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Scientific Theories and Philosophical Stances: Themes from van Fraassen.Claus Beisbart & Michael Frauchiger (eds.) - 2024 - De Gruyter.details
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The delusive benefit of the doubt.Tomasz Wysocki - 2023 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 100 (C):47-55.details
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Kant’s Cognitive Semantics, Newton’s Rule Four of Philosophy and Scientific Realism.Kenneth R. Westphal - 2011 - Bulletin of the Hegel Society of Great Britain 63 (1-2):27-49.details
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Coincidence and reproducibility in the EHT black hole experiment.Galina Weinstein - 2021 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 85:63-78.details
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Byrne and Hilbert's chromatic ether.C. L. Hardin - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):32-33.details
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Evidence, Explanation, and the Empirical Status of Scientific Realism.Igor Douven - 2005 - Erkenntnis 63 (2):253-291.details
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Confusion of sensations and their physical correlates.Richard M. Warren - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):51-51.details
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Neuronal Agnosticism and Constructive Empiricism.Ju Young Lee - unknowndetails
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Spatial position and perceived color of objects.Romi Nijhawan - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):43-44.details
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To Believe in Belief.Herman C. De Regt - 2006 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 37 (1):21-39.details
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Color as a material, not an optical, property.Bruce J. MacLennan - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):37-38.details
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A imagem reversa da observação.Alessio Gava - 2013 - Perspectiva Filosófica 1 (39):111-122.details
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Scientific phenomena and patterns in data.Pascal Ströing - 2018 - Dissertation, Lmu Münchendetails
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True color only exists in the eye of the observer.Frans W. Cornelissen, Eli Brenner & Jeroen Smeets - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):26-27.details
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Surreptitious substitution.Barbara Saunders - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):47-48.details
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