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I See Dead People: Disembodied Souls and Aquinas’s ‘Two-Person’ Problem

In Oxford Studies in Medieval Philosophy. pp. 25-45 (2014)

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  1. Resisting the Remnant-Person Problem.Eric Yang - 2020 - Acta Analytica 35 (3):389-404.
    Some opponents of animalism have offered a relatively new worry: the remnant-person problem. After presenting the problem, I lay out several responses and show why they are either problematic or come with too many theoretical costs. I then present my own response to the problem, which unlike the other responses, it is one that can be adopted by animalists of any stripe. What I hope to show is that some of the key assumptions of the remnant-person problem can be rejected, (...)
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  • "The Phenomenology of Immortality (1200-1400)".VanDyke Christina - 2019 - In The History of the Philosophy of Mind. Vol. 2: Philosophy of Mind in the Early and High Middle Ages. London: pp. 219-239.
    Discussions of immortality in the Middles Ages tend to focus on the nature of the rational soul and its prospects for surviving the death of the body. The question of how medieval figures expected to experience everlasting life—what I will be calling the phenomenology of immortality—receives far less attention. In this paper, I explore the range of these expectations during a relatively narrow but intensely rich temporal and geographical slice of the Middle Ages (the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries in the (...)
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  • What Am I? Descartes’s Various Ways of Considering the Self.Colin Chamberlain - 2020 - Journal of Modern Philosophy 2 (1):2.
    In the _Meditations_ and related texts from the early 1640s, Descartes argues that the self can be correctly considered as either a mind or a human being, and that the self’s properties vary accordingly. For example, the self is simple considered as a mind, whereas the self is composite considered as a human being. Someone might object that it is unclear how merely considering the self in different ways blocks the conclusion that a single subject of predication—the self—is both simple (...)
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  • Split Brains: No Headache for the Soul Theorist.David B. Hershenov & Adam P. Taylor - 2014 - Religious Studies 50 (4):487-503.
    Split brains that result in two simultaneous streams of consciousness cut off from each other are wrongly held to be grounds for doubting the existence of the divinely created soul. The mistake is based on two related errors: first, a failure to appreciate the soul's dependence upon neurological functioning; second, a fallacious belief that if the soul is simple, i.e. without parts, then there must be a unity to its thought, all of its thoughts being potentially accessible to reflection or (...)
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