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Is more information always better? Or are there some situations in which more information can make us worse off? Good (1967) argues that expected utility maximizers should always accept more information if the information is cost-free and relevant. But Good's argument presupposes that you are certain you will update by conditionalization. If we relax this assumption and allow agents to be uncertain about updating, these agents can be rationally required to reject free and relevant information. Since there are good reasons (...) |
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Each of us has a story which we can think of as a set of beliefs, hopefully consistent. We make our decisions in view of our beliefs which may be probabilistic, in the general case, but simple yes or no as in this paper. Our beliefs are our envelope just as the shell of a tortoise is its envelope. Decision theory—or single agent game theory tells us when to make the best choice in a game of us against nature. But (...) |
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Common wisdom holds that communication is impossible when messages are costless and communicators have totally opposed interests. This article demonstrates that such wisdom is false. Non-convergent dynamics can sustain partial information transfer even in a zero-sum signalling game. In particular, I investigate a signalling game in which messages are free, the state-act payoffs resemble rock–paper–scissors, and senders and receivers adjust their strategies according to the replicator dynamic. This system exhibits Hamiltonian chaos and trajectories do not converge to equilibria. This persistent (...) |
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In this paper I combine the dynamic epistemic logic ofGerbrandy (1999) with the probabilistic logic of Fagin and Halpern (1994). The resultis a new probabilistic dynamic epistemic logic, a logic for reasoning aboutprobability, information, and information change that takes higher orderinformation into account. Probabilistic epistemic models are defined, and away to build them for applications is given. Semantics and a proof systemis presented and a number of examples are discussed, including the MontyHall Dilemma. |
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My dissertation is about Bayesian rationality for non-ideal agents. I show how to derive subjective probabilities from preferences using much weaker rationality assumptions than other standard representation theorems. I argue that non-ideal agents might be uncertain about how they will update on new information and consider two consequences of this uncertainty: such agents should sometimes reject free information and make choices which, taken together, yield sure loss. The upshot is that Bayesian rationality for non-ideal agents makes very different normative demands (...) |
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Game theoretic pragmatics is a small but growing part of formal pragmatics, the linguistic subfield studying language use. The general logic of a game theoretic explanation of a pragmatic phenomenon is this: the conversational context is modelled as a game between speaker and hearer; an adequate solution concept then selects the to‐be‐explained behavior in the game model. For such an explanation to be convincing, both components, game model and solution concept, should be formulated and scrutinized as explicitly as possible. The (...) |
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Recently, natural language pragmatics started to make use of decision-, game-, and information theoretical tools to determine the usefulness of questions and assertions in a quantitative way. In the first part of this paper several of these notions are related with each other. It is shown that under particular natural assumptions the utility of questions and answers reduces to their informativity, and that the ordering relation induced by utility sometimes even reduces to the logical relation of entailment. The second part (...) |
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I discuss the application of the Model of Pragmatic Information to the study of spontaneous anomalystic mental phenomena like telepathy, precognition, etc. In these phenomena the most important effects are related to anomalous information gain by the subjects. I consider the basic ideas of the Model, as they have been applied to experimental anomalystic phenomena and to spontaneous phenomena that have strong physical effects, like poltergeist cases, highlighting analogies and differences. Moreover, I point out that in such cases we cannot (...) |
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We discuss how issues of information and computation interact with logic today, and what might be a natural extended agenda of investigation. |
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We propose strategic games wherein the strategies consist of players asking each other questions and answering those questions. We study simplifications of such games wherein two players simultaneously ask each other a question that the opponent is then obliged to answer. The motivation for our research is to model conversation including the dynamics of questions and answers, to provide new links between game theory and dynamic logics of information, and to exploit the dynamic/strategic structure that, we think, lies implicitly inside (...) |
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Dynamic update of information states is a new paradigm in logicalsemantics. But such updates are also a traditional hallmark ofprobabilistic reasoning. This note brings the two perspectives togetherin an update mechanism for probabilities which modifies state spaces. |
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We formulate a formal framework in which we combine the theory of dynamic epistemic logic and the theory of games. In particular, we show how we can use tools of dynamic epistemic logic to reason about information change ? and in particular, the effect of communication acts ? in such a game of imperfect information. We show how this framework allows for the formulation of specific assumptions in pragmatics of communication, as well as the formulation of general results about the (...) |
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