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  1. The Ineffability of Induction.David Builes - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    My first goal is to motivate a distinctively metaphysical approach to the problem of induction. I argue that there is a precise sense in which the only way that orthodox Humean and non-Humean views can justify induction is by appealing to extremely strong and unmotivated probabilistic biases. My second goal is to sketch what such a metaphysical approach could possibly look like. After sketching such an approach, I consider a toy case that illustrates the way in which such a metaphysics (...)
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  • Explaining Why There is Something Rather Than Nothing.Andrew Brenner - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-17.
    It is sometimes supposed that, in principle, we cannot offer an explanation for why there is something rather than nothing. I argue that this supposition is a mistake, and stems from a needlessly myopic conception of the form explanations can legitimately take. After making this more general point, I proceed to offer a speculative suggestion regarding one sort of explanation which can in principle serve as an answer to the question “why is there something rather than nothing?” The suggestion is (...)
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  • Beyond Legal Minds: Sex, Social Violence, Systems, Methods, Possibilities.William Brant (ed.) - 2019 - Boston: Brill | Rodopi.
    In this book, William Brant inquires how violence is reduced. Social causes of violence are exposed. War, sexual domination, leadership, propagandizing and comedy are investigated. Legal systems are explored as reducers and implementers of violence and threats.
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  • Existence Puzzles and Probabilistic Explanation.Tyron Goldschmidt - 2016 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 2 (3):469-482.
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  • The Difference Between Epistemic and Metaphysical Necessity.Martin Glazier - 2017 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 6):1409-1424.
    Philosophers have observed that metaphysical necessity appears to be a true or real or genuine form of necessity while epistemic necessity does not. Similarly, natural necessity appears genuine while deontic necessity does not. But what is it for a form of necessity to be genuine? I defend an account of genuine necessity in explanatory terms. The genuine forms of necessity, I argue, are those that provide what I call necessitarianexplanation. I discuss the relationship of necessitarian explanation to ground.
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  • Deriving Actuality From Possibility.Mohsen Moghri - 2020 - Philosophia 49 (1):393-402.
    Many believe that the world exists without a cause or reason. Most of them reject an explanation for the whole concrete world because they accept the traditional idea that concrete existence comes only from things that concretely exist. But I provide reasons for thinking that the world might be actual as a result of a feature that is not concrete but abstract. I begin by outlining ideas that some followers of the Platonic Theory of Forms have developed about whether actuality (...)
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  • بررسی دیدگاه محقق دوانی در مسأله کلام واجب و انتقادات دشتکی بر آن.محمود آهسته - 2019 - دانشگاه امام صادق علیه السلام 16 (2):1-16.
    کلام الهی از پرچالش‌ترین مباحث کلامی در حوزه ذات و صفات واجب به شمار می‌رود. آنچه در این مسئله زمینۀ آرای متعارض را مهیا می‌سازد تبیین حقیقت کلام الهی است. گرچه دیباچه اختلافات حکما و متکلمان مربوط به اثبات حدوث و قدم کلام الهی است، تفسیر حقیقت کلام واجب و کیفیت تعلق آن اوج تشدید اختلافات و تشکیک آراء محسوب می‌گردد. علامه دوانی، بر خلاف بسیاری از حکمای متقدم، کلام الهی را مصدر تألیف کلمات و مغایر با علم الهی می‌داند. (...)
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  • Explanation.Martin Glazier - 2020 - In Michael J. Raven (ed.), Routledge Handbook of Metaphysical Grounding. London: pp. 121-132.
    I survey the philosophical literature on grounding explanation and its connection to metaphysical ground.
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  • Questioning the Question.Stephen Maitzen - 2013 - In Tyron Goldschmidt (ed.), The Puzzle of Existence: Why is There Something Rather than Nothing? Routledge. pp. 252-271.
    Why is there something rather than nothing? Apparently many people regard that question as a challenge to naturalism because they think it’s too fundamental or too sweeping for natural science to answer, even in principle. I argue, on the contrary, that the question has a simple and adequate naturalistic answer: ‘Because there are penguins.’ I then diagnose various confusions underlying the suspicion that the question can’t have such an answer and, more generally, that the question, or else some variant of (...)
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  • Review: Dicker, Georges, Kant's Theory of Knowledge[REVIEW]Andrew Chignell - 2007 - Philosophical Review 116 (2):307-309.
    A review of Georges Dicker's primer on Kant's theoretical philosophy. -/- .
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  • Metaphysical Nihilism and Cosmological Arguments: Some Tractarian Comments.Stig Børsen Hansen - 2012 - European Journal of Philosophy 20 (2):223-242.
    Abstract: This paper explores the relevance of themes from Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus to the ongoing discussion of metaphysical nihilism. I set out by showing how metaphysical nihilism is of paramount importance for cosmological arguments. Metaphysical nihilism is the position that there might have been nothing. Two conflicting intuitions emerge from a survey of discussions of metaphysical nihilism: Firstly, that metaphysical nihilism is true, and secondly, that formulations of the position are somehow unclear or nonsensical. By considering formalizations of philosophical language, (...)
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  • Is Metaphysical Nihilism Interesting?David Efird & Tom Stoneham - 2009 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 90 (2):210-231.
    Suppose nothing exists. Then it is true that nothing exists. What makes that true? Nothing! So it seems that if nothing existed, then the principle that every truth is made true by something (the truthmaker principle) would be false. So if it is possible that nothing exists, a claim often called 'metaphysical nihilism', then the truthmaker principle is not necessary. This paper explores various ways to resolve this conflict without restricting metaphysical nihilism in such a way that it would become (...)
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  • There Might Be Nothing: The Subtraction Argument Improved.G. Rodriguez-Pereyra - 1997 - Analysis 57 (3):159-166.
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  • Why is There Something Rather Than Nothing? A Logical Investigation.Jan Heylen - 2017 - Erkenntnis 82 (3):531-559.
    From Leibniz to Krauss philosophers and scientists have raised the question as to why there is something rather than nothing. Why-questions request a type of explanation and this is often thought to include a deductive component. With classical logic in the background only trivial answers are forthcoming. With free logics in the background, be they of the negative, positive or neutral variety, only question-begging answers are to be expected. The same conclusion is reached for the modal version of the Question, (...)
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  • Stop Asking Why There’s Anything.Stephen Maitzen - 2012 - Erkenntnis 77 (1):51-63.
    Why is there anything, rather than nothing at all? This question often serves as a debating tactic used by theists to attack naturalism. Many people apparently regard the question—couched in such stark, general terms—as too profound for natural science to answer. It is unanswerable by science, I argue, not because it’s profound or because science is superficial but because the question, as it stands, is ill-posed and hence has no answer in the first place. In any form in which it (...)
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  • The Probability of the Possible.Ron Wilburn - 2014 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 10 (1):44-55.
    In “Why is There Anything at All?” Peter van Inwagen argues that even though it was never necessary that concrete beings existed, it was always maximally probable – just short of necessity – that they did . I argue that van Inwagen’s argument fails, albeit for an interesting reason which has remained so far unnoticed in the literature: there is a critical ten- sion between two of its premises, both essential to its soundness, concerning the nature of comprehensively specified possible (...)
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  • Cosmic Confusions: Not Supporting Versus Supporting Not-.John D. Norton - 2010 - Philosophy of Science 77 (4):501-523.
    Bayesian probabilistic explication of inductive inference conflates neutrality of supporting evidence for some hypothesis H (“not supporting H”) with disfavoring evidence (“supporting not-H”). This expressive inadequacy leads to spurious results that are artifacts of a poor choice of inductive logic. I illustrate how such artifacts have arisen in simple inductive inferences in cosmology. In the inductive disjunctive fallacy, neutral support for many possibilities is spuriously converted into strong support for their disjunction. The Bayesian “doomsday argument” is shown to rely entirely (...)
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  • The New Cosmological Argument: O’Connor on Ultimate Explanation.Tyron Craig Goldschmidt - 2011 - Philosophia 39 (2):267-288.
    Timothy O’Connor presents a novel and powerful version of the cosmological argument from contingency. What distinguishes his argument is that it does not depend on the Principle of Sufficient Reason. This version thus avoids powerful objections facing the Principle. We present and develop the argument, strengthening it in various ways. We fill in big gaps in the argument and answer criticisms. These include the criticisms that O’Connor considers as well as new criticisms. We explain how his replies to a Kantian (...)
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  • Metaphysical Nihilism and Necessary Being.Tyron Goldschmidt - 2012 - Philosophia 40 (4):799-820.
    This paper addresses the most fundamental question in metaphysics, Why is there something rather than nothing? The question is framed as a question about concrete entities, Why does a possible world containing concrete entities obtain rather than one containing no concrete entities? Traditional answers are in terms of there necessarily being some concrete entities, and include the possibility of a necessary being. But such answers are threatened by metaphysical nihilism, the thesis that there being nothing concrete is possible, and the (...)
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  • Could Everything Be True? Probably Not.Matteo Plebani - 2015 - Philosophia 43 (2):499-504.
    Trivialism is the doctrine that everything is true. Almost nobody believes it, but, as Priest shows, finding a non-question-begging argument against it turns out to be a difficult task. In this paper, I propose a statistical argument against trivialism, developing a strategy different from those presented in Priest.
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  • The Incompleteness of the World and Its Consequences.Jan Westerhoff - 2013 - Metaphysica 14 (1):79-92.
    In the recent literature we find various arguments against the possibility of absolutely general quantification. Far from being merely a technical question in the philosophy of logic, the impossibility of absolutely general quantification (if established) would have severe consequence for ontology, for it would imply the non-existence of the world as traditionally conceived. This paper will investigate these implications for ontology and consider some possible ways of addressing them.
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  • Why There is Something Rather Than Nothing.John Shand - 2016 - Think 15 (43):103-115.
    The answer to the question of why there is Something rather than Nothing is that there has to be Something and that Nothing is impossible. There cannot not be Something so there cannot be Nothing. The paper justifies this conclusion, while also explaining why we might believe there may be Nothing. In the course of this, the so-called subtraction-argument is shown to be inadequate and question-begging.
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  • Cosmological Arguments From Contingency.Joshua Rasmussen - 2010 - Philosophy Compass 5 (9):806-819.
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