Murray Rothbard's Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought demonstrates his mastery of the literature. But his interpretation of the development of economics reflects, and is therefore severely limited by, his Austrian‐libertarian perspective. Indeed, Rothbard appropriates the history of economic thought principally to advance his perspective, as seen in his neglect of social control, his identification of his desired economic system with the natural order of things, and especially in his denigratory treatment of Adam Smith—at bottom for not being (...) an Austrian economist and a true libertarian. A partly informed, partly myopic and sometimes useful interpretation, this is the work of an ideologue. (shrink)

F. A. Hayek's realistic economic theory has been replaced by the formalistic use of equlibrium models that bear little resemblance to reality. These models are as serviceable to the right as to the left: they allow the economist either to condemn capitalism for failing to measure up to the model of perfect competition, or to praise capitalism as a utopia of perfect knowledge and rational expectations. Hayek, by contrast, used equilibrium to show that while capitalism is not perfect, it contains (...) error‐correcting institutions that bring it closer to perfection than is intuitively apparent. (shrink)

This paper analyzes the presence of Israel Kirzner in the History of Economic Thought and focusing on his professional engagement with other economists. His academic trajectory is contextualized on three milestones of the recent history of the Austrian School. The first one is the ending of the socialist economic calculation debate, when the Austrian was considered unconvincing due to the economics’ shift to a general equilibrium model of the economy; in the aftermath of the debate, Kirzner entered at the New (...) York University’s PhD program and was mentored by Ludwig von Mises. At this point, Kirzner started to develop his ideas on entrepreneurship and to aim an audience wider than his Austrian peers. The second is the Austrian Revival in the 1970s, in which the prestigious recovery stage of the Austrian School, thanks to Kirzner assuming a leadership role in the process. The third is in the 1980s, when a more consolidated Austrian School attempts to define itself, as Kirzner retains an Austrian vision founded on the synthesis between Mises and Hayek. It is concluded that Kirzner’s professional engagement was fundamental in the recovery of Austrian theory. He communicated Austrian ideas to a wider audience and synthetized Misesian and Hayekian proposals on the market process. These efforts allow us to recognize a Kirznerian view of the Austrian School, established with the traditional microeconomic theory, but including greater subjectivity on the interpretation of economic phenomena, becoming a more general, more realistic theory. (shrink)

In “Popper, Weber, and Hayek,” I claimed that the economic and political world governed by social democracy is too complex to offer hope for rational social‐democratic policy making. I extrapolated this conclusion from the claim, made by Austrian‐school economists in the 1920s and 30s, that central economic planning would face insurmountable “knowledge problems.” Israel Kirzner's Reply indicates the need to keep the Austrians’ cognitivist argument conceptually distinct from more familiar incentives arguments, which can tacitly reintroduce the assumption of omniscience against (...) which the Austrian economists rebelled. Callahan's Reply illustrates the need to keep in mind the hypothetical, conditional nature of economic arguments. Notturno's Reply changes the subject by asserting the intrinsic value of social‐democratic participation, regardless of its outcomes—even while, like Talisse's Reply, ignoring the evidence that public ignorance and elite dogmatism probably can't be mitigated by more information or by appeals to be open minded. And Hill focuses on the very real imperfections of market and other private‐sphere decision making, without weighing the shortcomings of the political alternatives. Markets and other private‐sphere decision arenas don't have to be perfect for them to improve upon public‐sector processes. In the latter, cognitive demands tend to be much greater, because of the divergence of modern social problems from the conditions that would have faced the hunter‐gatherers whose cognitive apparatus we have inherited. (shrink)

In the 1930s, socialist economists used the assumptions of equilibrium theory to argue that a central planner could coordinate supply and demand from above. This argument led Hayek, over the years, to try to explain the limitations of equilibrium theory and, conversely, to explain how capitalism functioned without the assumptions of equilibrium being met. In a changing world of agents who are ignorant of the future, how is a functioning market “order” possible? One answer can be found in Hayek's argument (...) that evolved rules make people's future behavior more predictable and, more to the point, that they contain previously accumulated knowledge that provides the building blocks for future economic growth. Hayek's evolutionary theory was flawed, however, in failing to explain how people can know which rules are responsible for their success or failure so that they persist in using those rules and pass them forward in time. However, markets provide immediate feedback about success and failure through profits and losses. An evolutionary explanation of the economy would have permitted Hayek to dispense with the metaphor of general equilibrium, which was increasingly irrelevant to his understanding of economic order. (shrink)

Karl Popper's methodology highlights our scientific ignorance: hence the need to institutionalize open‐mindedness through controlled experiments that may falsify our fallible theories about the world. In his endorsement of “piecemeal social engineering,” Popper assumes that the social‐democratic state and its citizens are capable of detecting social problems, and of assessing the results of policies aimed at solving them, through a process of experimentation analogous to that of natural science. But we are not only scientifically but politically ignorant: ignorant of the (...) facts that underpin political debate, which are brought to our attention by theories that, as Max Weber emphasized, can be tested only through counterfactual thought experiments. Public‐opinion and political‐psychology research suggest that human beings are far too unaware, illogical, and doctrinaire to conduct the rigorous theorizing that would be necessary to make piecemeal social engineering work. F.A. Hayek realized that the public could not engage, specifically, in piecemeal economic regulation but failed to draw the conclusion that this was due to a specific type of political ignorance: ignorance of economic theory. (shrink)