The suggestion of something akin to a ‘relativist solution to the Mind-Body problem’ has recently been held by some scientists and philosophers; either explicitly (Galadí, 2023; Lahav & Neemeh, 2022; Ludwig, 2015) or in more implicit terms (Solms, 2018; Velmans, 2002, 2008). In this paper I provide an argument in favor of a relativist approach to the Mind-Body problem, more specifically, an argument for ‘1st/3rd person relativism’, the claim that ‘The truth value of some sentences or propositions is relative to (...) 1st and 3rd person perspectives’. The argument for 1st/3rd person relativism is close to a forma proof. It is shown that, just by assuming the 1st/3rd person distinction itself and using first order logic and set theory, ‘1st/3rd person relativism’ follows as a theorem. Some consequences of ‘1st/3rd person relativism’ to the Mind-Body Problem are evaluated. It is shown that ‘1st/3rd person relativism’ predicts the existence of an (apparent) Explanatory Gap; explains why the Explanatory Gap is just apparent (and the origins of such illusion); dissolves the Hard-Problem; provides a possible solution the problem of Mental Causation; explains why Mental Causation looks like a problem in the first place and accurately predicts the actual empirically found correlation and covariation between conscious experiences and brain states. This explanatory power of ‘1st/3rd person relativism’ is particularly impressive since it was not designed as a possible solution to the Mind-Body problem in the first place. (shrink)

Merker, Williford, and Rudrauf argue persuasively that integrated information is not identical to or sufficient for consciousness, and that projective geometries more closely formalize the spatial features of conscious phenomenology. However, these too are not identical to or sufficient for consciousness. Although such third-person specifiable functional theories can describe the many forms of consciousness, they cannot account for its existence.

In recent years the science-and-religion/spirituality/theology dialogue has flourished, but the impact on the minds of the general public, on society as a whole, has been less impressive. Also, religious believers and outspoken atheists face each other without progressing toward a common understanding. The view taken here is that achieving a more marked impact of the dialogue would be beneficial for a peaceful survival of humanity. I aim to argue the why and how of that task by analyzing three possible purposes (...) of the dialogue and their logical interdependence, suggest conceivable improvements of the quality and extent of the current efforts toward a negotiated action plan, and consider an enlargement of the circle of the actors involved. The dialogue that has been carried on between science and religion/spirituality/theology could be expanded and usefully applied to some major problems in the present world. (shrink)

Freedom of will is fundamental to morality, intuition of self, and normal functioning of society. However, science does not provide a clear logical foundation for this idea. This paper considers the fundamental argument against free will, so called reductionism, and why the choice for dualism against monism, follows logically. Then, the paper summarizes unexpected conclusions from recent discoveries in cognitive science. Classical logic turns out not to be a fundamental mechanism of the mind. It is replaced by dynamic logic. Mathematical (...) and experimental evidence are considered conceptually. Dynamic logic counters logical arguments for reductionism. Contemporary science of mind is not reducible; free will can be scientifically accepted along with scientific monism. (shrink)

Content Introduction I. EDWs, the Hypernothing (EW0) and Physics Chapter 1 The principles of “epistemologically different worlds” perspective 1.1 The principles concerning existence and interactions of objects 1.2 Epistemologically Different Worlds (EDWs) 1.3 The chains of EDWs Chapter 2 The “Big Bang” (from actual Physics) versus Hypermetaphysics: the EDWs perspective regarding the accidental appearances of the first EDWs (the EW1a-n) in hypercorrespondences to Hypernothing (the EW0) 2.1 The history of “Universe” in Cosmology today 2.2 Classification of (hyper)correspondences 2.3 The rejection (...) of “antimatter” 2.4 More details about electromagnetic field (the field-EW) 2.5 More details about special theory of relativity 2.6 More details about general theory of relativity Chapter 3 More details about Hypernothing and its hyperontology 3.1 Hypernothing (epistemologically different then “something” and “nothing”) 3.2 The principles of hyperontology of Hypernothing 3.3 More details about the accidental appearances of the EW1a-n in hypercorrespondences to the EW0 Chapter 4 Friedman’s “relativized a priori” and “change of paradigms in science” versus EDWs 4.1 Geometry and Physics: relativized a priori for Newton/Kant, Helmholtz, Poincare and Einstein 4.2 The change of paradigm in scientific knowledge: Cassirer, Carnap versus Meyerson and Kuhn II. “Antireductionism” under the Umbrella of Epistemology/lLanguage within the Unicorn World Chapter 5 Few words about Gell-Mann’s “antireductionism” Chapter 6 Dual aspect theory (Spinoza-Velmans) versus the EDWs perspective 6.1 Velmans’ Understanding consciousness (2000) 6.2 Velmans’ article 2008 (Journal of Consciousness Studies, 15 (2), pp. 5-50) 6.3 My view consciousness in few words Chapter 7 Heil’s “Real tables” or “linguistic disease” in the philosophy/sciences of the 20th century III. Paradigms and Revolutions Chapter 8 Kuhn’s “paradigms” and the EDWs hyper-paradigm Conclusion The EDWs perspective and some truths Bibliography . (shrink)

This brief note corrects some basic errors in Meijsing’s (2011) JCS paper on “The Whereabouts of Pictorial Space”, concerning the status of phenomenal objects in the reflexive model of perception. In particular I clarify the precise sense in which a phenomenal object relates to the object itself (the noumenal object) in visual perception.

Our chronically impoverished explanatory capacity in respect of P-consciousness is highly suggestive of a problem with science itself, rather than its lack of acquisition of some particular knowledge. The hidden assumption built into science is that science itself is a completed human behaviour. Removal of this assumption is achieved through a simple revision to our science model which is constructed, outlined and named ‘dual aspect science’ (DAS). It is constructed with reference to existing science being ‘single aspect science’. DAS is (...) consistent with and predictive of the very explanatory poverty that generated it and is simultaneously a seamless upgrade; no existing law of nature is altered or lost. The framework is completely empirically self-consistent and is validated empirically. DAS eliminates the behavioural inconsistencies currently inhabiting a world in which single aspect science has been inherited rather than chosen and in which its presuppositions are implemented through habit rather than by scientific examination of options by the scientists actually carrying out science. The proposed DAS framework provides a working vantage point from which an explanation of P-consciousness becomes expected and meaningful. The framework requires that we rediscover what we scientists do and then discover something new about ourselves: that how we have been doing science is not the entire story. Dual aspect science shows us what we have not been doing. (shrink)

Dual-aspect monism and neutral monism offer interesting alternatives to mainstream positions concerning the mind-matter problem. Both assume a domain underlying the mind-matter distinction, but they also differ in definitive ways. In the twentieth century, variants of both positions have been advanced by a number of protagonists. One of these variants, the dual-aspect monism due toWolfgang Pauli and Carl Gustav Jung, will be described and commented on in detail. As a unique feature in the Pauli-Jung conception, the duality of mental and (...) material aspects is specified in terms of a complementarity. This sounds innocent, but entails a number of peculiarities distinguishing their conjecture from other approaches. (shrink)

Context: Varela’s neurophenomenology was conceived from the outset as a criticism and dissolution of the “hard problem” of the physical origin of consciousness. Indeed, the standard (….

However robust the mind's cognitive strategies of objectifying and rendering in object terms conscious experience, there is nevertheless that which resists object/substantivity categorization: an exteriority that comes out of perception itself and that is here termed the 'background '. In seeking out, in this inquiry, the non- objectified and non-thingness part of the observed world, we must first of all distinguish this background from such misrepresenta- tions as mere 'seeming '. The background -- while not thing-like or detectable as data (...) will be defended as existing concretely and empirically to the observer, notwithstanding our objectifying and substantive way of framing our understanding of the world. It will be shown to have verifiability despite being knowable only from the first-person perspective. The aim is to demonstrate its presence by way of a number of its features, and to show that far from being a mere subjective quality, it stands as real as do spatial objects or whatever arises spatially as a discretizable information source in the empirical world. (shrink)

Various facets of the MBI are discussed, and how it can be used in connection with experimental philosophy, experimental psychology and neuroscience. Brief historical references are given. The large implications of the MBI with regards to McTaggart's paradox and the resolution of the difficulties with quantum mechanics is mentioned. Later sections deal with the mereological fallacy, multiple universes, teletransportation, mind cloning and mind splitting. Dreamwork is chosen as a prime example of the use of the MBI and recent work by (...) Tononi and Baars is referred to. (shrink)