Vardanyan's theorem states that the set of PA-valid principles of Quantified Modal Logic, QML, is complete Π0 2. We generalize this result to a wide class of theories. The crucial step in the generalization is avoiding the use of Tennenbaum's Theorem.

This paper is a presentation of astatus quæstionis, to wit of the problemof the interpretability logic of all reasonablearithmetical theories.We present both the arithmetical side and themodal side of the question.Dedicated to Dick de Jongh on the occasion of his 60th birthday.

We investigate the theory IΔ 0 + Ω 1 and strengthen [Bu86. Theorem 8.6] to the following: if NP ≠ co-NP. then Σ-completeness for witness comparison formulas is not provable in bounded arithmetic. i.e. $I\delta_0 + \Omega_1 + \nvdash \forall b \forall c (\exists a(\operatorname{Prf}(a.c) \wedge \forall = \leq a \neg \operatorname{Prf} (z.b))\\ \rightarrow \operatorname{Prov} (\ulcorner \exists a(\operatorname{Prf}(a. \bar{c}) \wedge \forall z \leq a \neg \operatorname{Prf}(z.\bar{b})) \urcorner)).$ Next we study a "small reflection principle" in bounded arithmetic. We prove that for (...) all sentences φ $I\Delta_0 + \Omega_1 \vdash \forall x \operatorname{Prov}(\ulcorner \forall y \leq \bar{x} (\operatorname{Prf} (y. \overline{\ulcorner \varphi \urcorner}) \rightarrow \varphi)\urcorner).$ The proof hinges on the use of definable cuts and partial satisfaction predicates akin to those introduced by Pudlak in [Pu86]. Finally, we give some applications of the small reflection principle, showing that the principle can sometimes be invoked in order to circumvent the use of provable Σ-completeness for witness comparison formulas. (shrink)

This paper is concerned with notions of consequence. On the one hand, we study admissible consequence, specifically for substitutions of Σ 1 0 -sentences over Heyting arithmetic . On the other hand, we study preservativity relations. The notion of preservativity of sentences over a given theory is a dual of the notion of conservativity of formulas over a given theory. We show that admissible consequence for Σ 1 0 -substitutions over HA coincides with NNIL -preservativity over intuitionistic propositional logic . (...) Here NNIL is the class of propositional formulas with no nestings of implications to the left . The identical embedding of IPC -derivability into a consequence relation has in many cases a left adjoint. The main tool of the present paper will be an algorithm to compute this left adjoint in the case of NNIL -preservativity. In the last section, we employ the methods developed in the paper to give a characterization the closed fragment of the provability logic of HA. (shrink)

The provability logic of a theory $T$ is the set of modal formulas, which under any arithmetical realization are provable in $T$. We slightly modify this notion by requiring the arithmetical realizations to come from a specified set $\Gamma$. We make an analogous modification for interpretability logics. We first study provability logics with restricted realizations and show that for various natural candidates of $T$ and restriction set $\Gamma$, the result is the logic of linear frames. However, for the theory Primitive (...) Recursive Arithmetic (PRA), we define a fragment that gives rise to a more interesting provability logic by capitalizing on the well-studied relationship between PRA and I$\Sigma_1$. We then study interpretability logics, obtaining upper bounds for IL(PRA), whose characterization remains a major open question in interpretability logic. Again this upper bound is closely related to linear frames. The technique is also applied to yield the nontrivial result that IL(PRA) $\subset$ ILM. (shrink)

We characterize the bimodal provability logics for certain natural (classes of) pairs of recursively enumerable theories, mostly related to fragments of arithmetic. For example, we shall give axiomatizations, decision procedures, and introduce natural Kripke semantics for the provability logics of (IΔ 0 + EXP, PRA); (PRA, IΣ 1 ); (IΣ m , IΣ n ) for $1 \leq m etc. For the case of finitely axiomatized extensions of theories these results are extended to modal logics with propositional constants.

This paper is concerned with notions of consequence. On the one hand, we study admissible consequence, specifically for substitutions of Σ 1 0 -sentences over Heyting arithmetic . On the other hand, we study preservativity relations. The notion of preservativity of sentences over a given theory is a dual of the notion of conservativity of formulas over a given theory. We show that admissible consequence for Σ 1 0 -substitutions over HA coincides with NNIL -preservativity over intuitionistic propositional logic . (...) Here NNIL is the class of propositional formulas with no nestings of implications to the left . The identical embedding of IPC -derivability into a consequence relation has in many cases a left adjoint. The main tool of the present paper will be an algorithm to compute this left adjoint in the case of NNIL -preservativity. In the last section, we employ the methods developed in the paper to give a characterization the closed fragment of the provability logic of HA. (shrink)

In this paper we formulate a version of Second Incompleteness Theorem. The idea is that a sequential sentence has ‘consistency power’ over a theory if it enables us to construct a bounded interpretation of that theory. An interpretation of V in U is bounded if, for some n , all translations of V -sentences are U -provably equivalent to sentences of complexity less than n . We call a sequential sentence with consistency power over T a pro-consistency statement for T (...) . We study pro-consistency statements. We provide an example of a pro-consistency statement for a sequential sentence A that is weaker than an ordinary consistency statement for A . We show that, if A is $${{\sf S}^{1}_{2}}$$ , this sentence has some further appealing properties, specifically that it is an Orey sentence for EA . The basic ideas of the paper essentially involve sequential theories. We have a brief look at the wider environment of the results, to wit the case of theories with pairing. (shrink)

The goal of this paper is to explore the significance of Montague’s paradox—that is, any arithmetical theory $T\supseteq Q$ over a language containing a predicate $P$ satisfying $P\rightarrow \varphi $ and $T\vdash \varphi \,\therefore\,T\vdash P$ is inconsistent—as a limitative result pertaining to the notions of formal, informal, and constructive provability, in their respective historical contexts. To this end, the paradox is reconstructed in a quantified extension $\mathcal {QLP}$ of Artemov’s logic of proofs. $\mathcal {QLP}$ contains both explicit modalities $t:\varphi $ (...) and also proof quantifiers $x:\varphi $. In this system, the basis for the rule NEC is decomposed into a number of distinct principles governing how various modes of reasoning about proofs and provability can be internalized within the system itself. A conceptually motivated resolution to the paradox is proposed in the form of an argument for rejecting the unrestricted rule NEC on the basis of its subsumption of an intuitively invalid principle pertaining to the interaction of proof quantifiers and the proof-theorem relation expressed by explicit modalities. (shrink)