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  1. There May Be Many Arithmetical Gödel Sentences.Kaave Lajevardi & Saeed Salehi - 2021 - Philosophia Mathematica 29 (2):278–287.
    We argue that, under the usual assumptions for sufficiently strong arithmetical theories that are subject to Gödel’s First Incompleteness Theorem, one cannot, without impropriety, talk about *the* Gödel sentence of the theory. The reason is that, without violating the requirements of Gödel’s theorem, there could be a true sentence and a false one each of which is provably equivalent to its own unprovability in the theory if the theory is unsound.
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  • The absorption law: Or: how to Kreisel a Hilbert–Bernays–Löb.Albert Visser - 2020 - Archive for Mathematical Logic 60 (3-4):441-468.
    In this paper, we show how to construct for a given consistent theory U a $$\varSigma ^0_1$$ Σ 1 0 -predicate that both satisfies the Löb Conditions and the Kreisel Condition—even if U is unsound. We do this in such a way that U itself can verify satisfaction of an internal version of the Kreisel Condition.
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  • Gödel’s Second Incompleteness Theorem: How It is Derived and What It Delivers.Saeed Salehi - 2020 - Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 26 (3-4):241-256.
    The proofs of Gödel (1931), Rosser (1936), Kleene (first 1936 and second 1950), Chaitin (1970), and Boolos (1989) for the first incompleteness theorem are compared with each other, especially from the viewpoint of the second incompleteness theorem. It is shown that Gödel’s (first incompleteness theorem) and Kleene’s first theorems are equivalent with the second incompleteness theorem, Rosser’s and Kleene’s second theorems do deliver the second incompleteness theorem, and Boolos’ theorem is derived from the second incompleteness theorem in the standard way. (...)
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  • Provability logic.Rineke Verbrugge - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    -/- Provability logic is a modal logic that is used to investigate what arithmetical theories can express in a restricted language about their provability predicates. The logic has been inspired by developments in meta-mathematics such as Gödel’s incompleteness theorems of 1931 and Löb’s theorem of 1953. As a modal logic, provability logic has been studied since the early seventies, and has had important applications in the foundations of mathematics. -/- From a philosophical point of view, provability logic is interesting because (...)
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  • Current Research on Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorems.Yong Cheng - 2021 - Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 27 (2):113-167.
    We give a survey of current research on Gödel’s incompleteness theorems from the following three aspects: classifications of different proofs of Gödel’s incompleteness theorems, the limit of the applicability of Gödel’s first incompleteness theorem, and the limit of the applicability of Gödel’s second incompleteness theorem.
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