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  1. Why Frege Cases Do Involve Cognitive Phenomenology but Only Indirectly.Alberto Voltolini - 2016 - Philosophical Explorations 19 (2):205-221.
    In this paper, I want to hold, first, that a treatment of Frege cases in terms of a difference in cognitive phenomenology of the involved experiential mental states is not viable. Second, I will put forward another treatment of such cases that appeals to a difference in intentional objects metaphysically conceived not as exotica, but as schematic objects, that is, as objects that have no metaphysical nature qua objects of thought. This allows their nature to be settled independently of their (...)
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  • Tim Crane, The Objects of Thought, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013, Xii + 182 Pp., £27.50 , ISBN 978-0-19-968274-4. [REVIEW]Alberto Voltolini - 2016 - Dialectica 70 (2):245-252.
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  • The Singularity of Experiences and Thoughts.Alberto Voltolini - forthcoming - Topoi:1-15.
    Recently, various people have maintained that one must revise either the externalistically-based notion of singular thought or the naïve realism-inspired notion of relational particularity, as respectively applied to some thoughts and to some perceptual experiences. In order to do so, one must either provide a broader notion of singular thought or flank the notion of relational particularity with a broader notion of phenomenal particularity. I want to hold that there is no need of that revision. For the original notions can (...)
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