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  1. Intentionality Without Exotica.Mark Sainsbury - 2010 - In Robin Jeshion (ed.), New Essays on Singular Thought. Oxford University Press.
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  • Consequences of Schematism.Alberto Voltolini - 2009 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (1):135-150.
    In his (2001a) and in some related papers, Tim Crane has maintained that intentional objects are schematic entities, in the sense that, insofar as being an intentional object is not a genuine metaphysical category, qua objects of thought intentional objects have no particular nature. This approach to intentionalia is the metaphysical counterpart of the later Husserl's ontological approach to the same entities, according to which qua objects of thought intentionalia are indifferent to existence. But to buy a metaphysically deflationary approach (...)
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  • Intentional Inexistence and Phenomenal Intentionality.Uriah Kriegel - 2007 - Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):307-340.
    How come we can represent Bigfoot even though Bigfoot does not exist, given that representing something involves bearing a relation to it and we cannot bear relations to what does not exist?This is the problem of intentional inexistence. This paper develops a two-step solution to this problem, involving an adverbial account of conscious representation, or phenomenal inten- tionality, and the thesis that all representation derives from conscious representation. The solution is correspondingly two-part: we can consciously represent Bigfoot because consciously representing (...)
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  • All the Existences That There Are.Alberto Voltolini - 2012 - Disputatio 4 (32):361-383.
    In this paper, I will defend the claim that there are three existence properties: the second-order property of being instantiated, a substantive first-order property (or better a group of such properties) and a formal, hence universal, first-order property. I will first try to show what these properties are and why we need all of them for ontological purposes. Moreover, I will try to show why a Meinong-like option that positively endorses both the former and the latter first-order property is the (...)
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  • How to Allow for Intentionalia in the Jungle.Alberto Voltolini - 2007 - Russell: The Journal of Bertrand Russell Studies 27 (1):86-105.
    In this paper I will Wrst contend that semantically based arguments in favour of or against problematic entitiesz—zlike those provided, respectively, in a realist Meinongian and in an antirealist Russellian campz—zare ultimately inconclusive. Indeed, only genuinely ontological arguments, speciWcally addressed to prove (or to reject) the existence of entities of a deWnite kind, suit the purpose. Thus, I will sketch an argument intended to show that there really are entities of an apparently speciWc kind, i.e. intentionalia, broadly conceived as things (...)
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  • Thinking, Language, And Experience.Hector-Neri CASTAÑEDA - 1989 - Minneapolis: University Of Minn Press.
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  • Nonexistent Objects.Terence Parsons - 1980 - Yale University Press.
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  • Fiction and Metaphysics.Amie L. Thomasson - 1998 - Cambridge University Press.
    This challenging study places fiction squarely at the centre of the discussion of metaphysics. Philosophers have traditionally treated fiction as involving a set of narrow problems in logic or the philosophy of language. By contrast Amie Thomasson argues that fiction has far-reaching implications for central problems of metaphysics. The book develops an 'artifactual' theory of fiction, whereby fictional characters are abstract artifacts as ordinary as laws or symphonies or works of literature. By understanding fictional characters we come to understand how (...)
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  • Are There Non-Existent Intentionalia&Quest;.Alberto Voltolini - 2006 - Philosophical Quarterly 56 (224):436-441.
    In his recent book on the philosophy of mind, Tim Crane has maintained that intentional objects are to be conceived as schematic entities, having no particular intrinsic nature. I take this metaphysical thesis as fundamentally correct. Yet in this paper I want to cast some doubts on whether this thesis prevents intentionalia, especially nonexistent ones, from belonging to the general inventory of what there is, as Crane seems to think. If my doubts are grounded, Crane’s treatment of intentionalia may further (...)
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  • On What There Is.W. V. Quine - 1953 - In From a Logical Point of View. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. pp. 1-19.
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  • Towards Non-Being: The Logic and Metaphysics of Intentionality.Graham Priest - 2005 - Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 14 (1):116-118.
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  • Towards Non-Being: The Logic and Metaphysics of Intentionality.Graham Priest - 2005 - Oxford University Press.
    Graham Priest presents a ground-breaking account of the semantics of intentional language--verbs such as "believes," "fears," "seeks," or "imagines." Towards Non-Being proceeds in terms of objects that may be either existent or non-existent, at worlds that may be either possible or impossible. The book will be of central interest to anyone who is concerned with intentionality in the philosophy of mind or philosophy of language, the metaphysics of existence and identity, the philosophy of fiction, the philosophy of mathematics, or cognitive (...)
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  • The Dispensability of (Merely) Intentional Objects.Uriah Kriegel - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 141 (1):79-95.
    The ontology of (merely) intentional objects is a can of worms. If we can avoid ontological commitment to such entities, we should. In this paper, I offer a strategy for accomplishing that. This is to reject the traditional act-object account of intentionality in favor of an adverbial account. According to adverbialism about intentionality, having a dragon thought is not a matter of bearing the thinking-about relation to dragons, but of engaging in the activity of thinking dragon-wise.
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  • Intentional Objects.Tim Crane - 2001 - Ratio 14 (4):298-317.
    Is there, or should there be, any place in contemporary philosophy of mind for the concept of an intentional object? Many philosophers would make short work of this question. In a discussion of what intentional objects are supposed to be, John Searle...
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  • Singular Thought.Tim Crane & Jody Azzouni - 2011 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 85 (1):21-43.
    A singular thought can be characterized as a thought which is directed at just one object. The term ‘thought’ can apply to episodes of thinking, or to the content of the episode (what is thought). This paper argues that episodes of thinking can be just as singular, in the above sense, when they are directed at things that do not exist as when they are directed at things that do exist. In this sense, then, singular thoughts are not object-dependent.
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  • In Defense of the Contingently Nonconcrete.Bernard Linsky & Edward N. Zalta - 1996 - Philosophical Studies 84 (2-3):283-294.
    In "Actualism or Possibilism?" (Philosophical Studies, 84 (2-3), December 1996), James Tomberlin develops two challenges for actualism. The challenges are to account for the truth of certain sentences without appealing to merely possible objects. After canvassing the main actualist attempts to account for these phenomena, he then criticizes the new conception of actualism that we described in our paper "In Defense of the Simplest Quantified Modal Logic" (Philosophical Perspectives 8: Philosophy of Logic and Language, Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview, 1994). We respond (...)
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  • Meinong Reconstructed Versus Early Russell Reconstructed.Nino Cocchiarella - 1982 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 11 (2):183 - 214.
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  • Bare Possibilia.Timothy Williamson - 1998 - Erkenntnis 48 (2-3):257--73.
    The theorems of the simplest and strongest sensible quantified modal logic include the Barcan Formula and its converse. Both formulas face strong intuitive objections. This paper develops a theory of possibilia to meet those objections.
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  • To Think is to Have Something in One’s Thought.Alberto Voltolini & Elisabetta Sacchi - 2012 - Quaestio 12:395-422.
    Along with a well-honoured tradition, we will accept that intentionality is at least a property a thought holds necessarily, i.e., in all possible worlds that contain it; more specifically, a necessary relation, namely the relation of existential dependence of the thought on its intentional object. Yet we will first of all try to show that intentionality is more than that. For we will claim that intentionality is an essential property of the thought, namely a property whose predication to the thought (...)
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  • Abstract Objects: An Introduction to Axiomatic Metaphysics.Edward N. Zalta - 1983 - D. Reidel.
    . THEORY, DATA, AND EXPLANATION In this book, we shall produce a research program in metaphysics. Following Lakatos, a research program in metaphysics ...
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  • The Necessary Framework of Objects.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Topoi 19 (2):201-208.
    The full-text of this article is not currently available in ORA, but the original publication is available at springerlink.com . Citation: Williamson, T. . 'The necessary framework of objects', Topoi 19, 201-208. N.B. Tim Williamson is now based at the Faculty of Philosophy, University of Oxford.
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  • What is the Problem of Non-Existence?Tim Crane - 2012 - Philosophia 40 (3):417-434.
    It is widely held that there is a problem of talking about or otherwise representing things that not exist. But what exactly is this problem? This paper presents a formulation of the problem in terms of the conflict between the fact that there are truths about non-existent things and the fact that truths must be answerable to reality, how things are. Given this, the problem of singular negative existential statements is no longer the central or most difficult aspect of the (...)
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  • Intentional Identity.P. T. Geach - 1967 - Journal of Philosophy 64 (20):627-632.
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  • Summary of "Elements of Mind" and Replies to Critics.Tim Crane - 2004 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 4 (11):223-240.
    Elements of Mind (EM) has two themes, one major and one minor. The major theme is intentionality, the mind’s direction upon its objects; the other is the mind–body problem. I treat these themes separately: chapters 1, and 3–5 are concerned with intentionality, while chapter 2 is about the mind–body problem. In this summary I will first describe my view of the mind–body problem, and then describe the book’s main theme. Like many philosophers, I see the mind–body problem as containing two (...)
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  • Elements of Mind: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind.Tim Crane - 2001 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Elements of Mind provides a unique introduction to the main problems and debates in contemporary philosophy of mind. Author Tim Crane opposes those currently popular conceptions of the mind that divide mental phenomena into two very different kinds (the intentional and the qualitative) and proposes instead a challenging and unified theory of all the phenomena of mind. In light of this theory, Crane engages students with the central problems of the philosophy of mind--the mind-body problem, the problem of intentionality (or (...)
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  • Meinongian Theories and a Russellian Paradox.William J. Rapaport - 1978 - Noûs 12 (2):153-180.
    This essay re-examines Meinong's "Über Gegenstandstheorie" and undertakes a clarification and revision of it that is faithful to Meinong, overcomes the various objections to his theory, and is capable of offering solutions to various problems in philosophy of mind and philosophy of language. I then turn to a discussion of a historically and technically interesting Russell-style paradox (now known as "Clark's Paradox") that arises in the modified theory. I also examine the alternative Meinong-inspired theories of Hector-Neri Castañeda and Terence Parsons.
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  • Theories of Actuality.Robert Merrihew Adams - 1974 - Noûs 8 (3):211-231.
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  • On What There is Not.Richard Routley - 1982 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 43 (2):151-177.
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  • Gegenstandstheoretische Grundlagen der Logik Und Logistik.Ernst Mally - 1914 - Philosophical Review 23 (4):470-471.
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  • How Ficta Follow Fiction.Alberto Voltolini - 2006 - Springer.
    This book presents a novel theory of fictional entities which is syncretistic insofar as it integrates the work of previous authors. It puts forward a new metaphysical conception of the nature of these This This book presents a novel theory of fictional entities which is syncretistic insofar as it integrates the work of previous authors. It puts forward a new metaphysical conception of the nature of these entities, according to which a fictional entity is a compound entity built up from (...)
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  • Intensional Logic and the Metaphysics of Intentionality.Edward N. Zalta - 1988 - MIT Press.
    This book tackles the issues that arise in connection with intensional logic -- a formal system for representing and explaining the apparent failures of certain important principles of inference such as the substitution of identicals and existential generalization -- and intentional states --mental states such as beliefs, hopes, and desires that are directed towards the world. The theory offers a unified explanation of the various kinds of inferential failures associated with intensional logic but also unifies the study of intensional contexts (...)
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  • Intentionality.John Searle - 1983 - Oxford University Press.
    Chapter THE NATURE OF INTENTIONAL STATES I. INTENTIONALITY AS DIRECTEDNESS As a preliminary formulation we might say: Intentionality is that property of ...
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  • Thinking, Language and Experience.[author unknown] - 1991 - Philosophical Quarterly 41 (162):109-111.
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  • Gegenstandstheoretische Grundlagen der Logik Und Logistik. E. Mally - 1914 - Philosophical Review 23:470.
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  • Against Fictional Realism.Anthony Everett - 2005 - Journal of Philosophy 102 (12):624 - 649.
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  • The Fiction of Creationism.Frederick Kroon - 2011 - In Franck Lihoreau (ed.), Truth in Fiction. Ontos Verlag. pp. 38--203.
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  • Necessary Identity and Necessary Existence.Timothy Williamson - 1990 - In Rudolf Haller & Johannes Brandl (eds.), Wittgenstein - Towards a Re-Evaluation: Proceedings of the 14th International Wittgenstein-Symposium, Vol. I. Holder-Pichler-Tempsky.
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  • The Objects of Intentionality.Colin McGinn - 2004 - In Richard Schantz (ed.), The Externalist Challenge. De Gruyter.
    A sketch is given of the view that there are non-existent intentional objects: such things as Pegasus and Zeus, which do not exist but which can be the subject of thought, which can be referred to, and to which true predicates can be applied. It is claimed that non-existent objects are the foundation of all intentionality: whenever there is intentionality towards an existent object, there is concurrent intentionality towards a non-existent one. The consequences of this view for perception and reference (...)
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  • Abstract Objects.Edward N. Zalta - 1985 - Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 90 (1):135-137.
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  • Existence as a Real Property.Francesco Berto - 2012 - Synthèse Library, Springer.
    This book is both an introduction to and a research work on Meinongianism. “Meinongianism” is taken here, in accordance with the common philosophical jargon, as a general label for a set of theories of existence – probably the most basic notion of ontology. As an introduction, the book provides the first comprehensive survey and guide to Meinongianism and non-standard theories of existence in all their main forms. As a research work, the book exposes and develops the most up-to-date Meinongian theory (...)
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