- By Which We May Be Judged: Moral Epistemology, Mind-Independent Truth Conditions And Sources Of Normativity.Maarten Van Doorn - 2022 - Dissertation, Central European Universitydetails
|
|
Reasons as Reasons for Preferences.Rach Cosker-Rowland - 2022 - American Philosophical Quarterly 59 (3):297-311.details
|
|
Who’s on first.Daniel Wodak - 2020 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 15.details
|
|
Hyperintensionality and Normativity.Federico L. G. Faroldi - 2019 - Cham, Switzerland: Springer Verlag.details
|
|
A Dilemma for Non‐Analytic Naturalism.Andrew T. Forcehimes - 2018 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 99 (2):228-247.details
|
|
How Do Reasons Accrue?Shyam Nair - 2016 - In Errol Lord & Barry Maguire (eds.), Weighing Reasons. New York, NY: Oxford University Press USA. pp. 56–73.details
|
|
Conflicting reasons, unconflicting ‘ought’s.Shyam Nair - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (3):629-663.details
|
|
The place of reasons in epistemology.Kurt Sylvan & Ernest Sosa - 2018 - In Daniel Star (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. New York, NY, United States of America: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Putting Reasons First: A Defense of Normative Non-Naturalism.Andrew T. Forcehimes - unknowndetails
|
|
The Metaphysics of Reasons.Jonas Olson - 2018 - In Daniel Star (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. New York, NY, United States of America: Oxford University Press. pp. 255-274.details
|
|
Normative Accounts of Fundamentality.Kris McDaniel - 2017 - Philosophical Issues 27 (1):167-183.details
|
|
Reasons Consequentialism.Benjamin Sachs - 2013 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 10 (5):671-682.details
|
|
Reasons and oughts: an explanation and defence of deontic buck-passing.Euan Hans Metz - 2018 - Dissertation, University of Readingdetails
|
|