Citations of:
The quantum measurement problem: State of play
In Dean Rickles (ed.), The Ashgate Companion to Contemporary Philosophy of Physics. Ashgate (2007)
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The paper explains in what sense the GRW matter density theory is a primitive ontology theory of quantum mechanics and why, thus conceived, the standard objections against the GRW formalism do not apply to GRWm. We consider the different options for conceiving the quantum state in GRWm and argue that dispositionalism is the most attractive one. 

Although the present paper looks upon the formal apparatus of quantum mechanics as a calculus of correlations, it goes beyond a purely operationalist interpretation. Having established the consistency of the correlations with the existence of their correlata, and having justified the distinction between a domain in which outcomeindicating events occur and a domain whose properties only exist if their existence is indicated by such events, it explains the difference between the two domains as essentially the difference between the manifested world (...) 

Recently doubts have been raised about the ability of pilot wave theories with field ontology to recover the predictions of quantum field theory. In particular, Struyve has questioned that the overlap between wave functionals of macroscopically different states with fixed particle number is really nonsignificant.With numerical computations and some further plausibility arguments we show that the overlap between nparticle states in field theory decreases almost exponentially with the number of particles and becomes nonsignificant already for small particle numbers. 

Pure interpretations of quantum theory, which throw away the classical part of the Copenhagen interpretation without adding new structure to its quantum part, are not viable. This is a consequence of a nonuniqueness result for the canonical operators. 

A model for measurement in collapsefree nonrelativistic fermionic quantum field theory is presented. In addition to local propagation and effectivelylocal interactions, the model incorporates explicit representations of localized observers, thus extending an earlier model of entanglement generation in Everett quantum field theory (Rubin in Found. Phys. 32:1495–1523, 2002). Transformations of the field operators from the Heisenberg picture to the DeutschHayden picture, involving fictitious auxiliary fields, establish the locality of the model. The model is applied to manifestlylocal calculations of the results (...) 

It is standardly assumed in discussions of quantum theory that physical systems can be regarded as having welldefined Hilbert spaces. It is shown here that a Hilbert space can be consistently partitioned only if its components are assumed not to interact. The assumption that physical systems have welldefined Hilbert spaces is, therefore, physically unwarranted. 

Some analyses of personal fission suggest that an informed subject should expect to have a distinct experience of each outcome simultaneously. Is rational provision for the future possible in such unfamiliar circumstances? I argue that, with some qualification, the subject can reasonably act as if faced with alternative possible outcomes with precise probabilities rather than multiple actual outcomes. 

It is standardly assumed in discussions of quantum theory that physical systems can be regarded as having welldefined Hilbert spaces. It is shown here that a Hilbert space can be consistently partitioned only if its components are assumed not to interact. The assumption that physical systems have welldefined Hilbert spaces is, therefore, physically unwarranted. 

I look at the distinction between between realist and antirealist views of the quantum state. I argue that this binary classification should be reconceived as a continuum of different views about which properties of the quantum state are representationally significant. What's more, the extreme cases  all or none  are simply absurd, and should be rejected by all parties. In other words, no sane person should advocate extreme realism or antirealism about the quantum state. And if we focus on (...) 

The Crazyist Metaphysics of Mind. . ???aop.label??? 

Bohmian mechanics faces an underdetermination problem: when it comes to solving the measurement problem, alternatives to the Bohmian guidance equation work just as well as the official guidance equation. One way to argue that the guidance equation is superior to its rivals is to use a symmetry argument: of the candidate guidance equations, the official guidance equation is the simplest Galileaninvariant candidate. This symmetry argumentif it workedwould solve the underdetermination problem. But the argument does not work. It fails because it (...) 

In the current debate on the concept of probability in the Everett interpretation of quantum mechanics Saunders and Wallace argue for a notion of premeasurement uncertainty whilst Greaves and Myrvold attempt to do without uncertainty altogether. Both these approaches are controversial and I suggest a middle way. I develop in detail an argument which Wallace has hinted at and Greaves has seen as beside the point in order to show that Vaidman’s concept of postmeasurement uncertainty has more relevance to premeasurement (...) 

This work is a critique of the program of "environmentinduced decoherence" as advocated by Zurek, Zeh and Joos, among others. In particular, the alleged relevance of decoherence for a solution of the "measurement problem" is subjected to a detailed philosophical analysis. In the first chapter, an attempt is made to unravel what exactly this "measurement problem" amounts to for the decoherence theorists. The second chapter reviews the standard decoherence literature. The third chapter starts with a brief discussion of the philosophical (...) 

A nonrelativistic quantum mechanical theory is proposed that describes the universe as a continuum of worlds whose mutual interference gives rise to quantum phenomena. A logical framework is introduced to properly deal with propositions about objects in a multiplicity of worlds. In this logical framework, the continuum of worlds is treated in analogy to the continuum of time points; both “time” and “world” are considered as mutually independent modes of existence. The theory combines elements of Bohmian mechanics and of Everett’s (...) 

The widely held picture of dynamical symmetry as surplus structure in a physical theory has many metaphysical applications. Here, I focus on its relevance to the question of which quantities in a theory represent fundamental natural properties. 