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  1. Fichte’s Method of Moral Justification.Owen Ware - 2019 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 27 (6):1173-1193.
    ABSTRACTWhile Kant’s claim that the moral law discloses our freedom to us has been extensively discussed in recent decades, the reactions to this claim among Kant’s immediate successors have gone largely overlooked by scholars. Reinhold, Creuzer, and Maimon were among three prominent thinkers of the era unwilling to follow Kant in making the moral law the condition for knowing our freedom. Maimon went so far as to reject Kant’s method of appealing to our everyday awareness of duty on the grounds (...)
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  • Kant's Criticism of Common Moral Rational Cognition.Martin Sticker - 2017 - European Journal of Philosophy 25 (1):85-108.
    There is a consensus that Kant's aim in the Groundwork is to clarify, systematize and vindicate the common conception of morality. Philosophical theory hence serves a restorative function. It can strengthen agents' motivation, protect against self-deception and correct misunderstandings produced by uncritical moral theory. In this paper, I argue that Kant also corrects the common perspective and that Kant's Groundwork shows in which senses the common perspective, even considered apart from its propensity to self-deception and without being influenced by misleading (...)
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  • Kant’s Deductions of Morality and Freedom.Owen Ware - 2017 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 47 (1):116-147.
    It is commonly held that Kant ventured to derive morality from freedom in Groundwork III. It is also believed that he reversed this strategy in the second Critique, attempting to derive freedom from morality instead. In this paper, I set out to challenge these familiar assumptions: Kant’s argument in Groundwork III rests on a moral conception of the intelligible world, one that plays a similar role as the ‘fact of reason’ in the second Critique. Accordingly, I argue, there is no (...)
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  • Accessing the Moral Law Through Feeling.Owen Ware - 2015 - Kantian Review 20 (2):301-311.
    In this article I offer a critical commentary on Jeanine Grenberg’s claim that, by the time of the second Critique, Kant was committed to the view that we only access the moral law’s validity through the feeling of respect. The issue turns on how we understand Kant’s assertion that our consciousness of the moral law is a ‘fact of reason’. Grenberg argues that all facts must be forced, and anything forced must be felt. I defend an alternative interpretation, according to (...)
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  • Kant, y la polémica entre el constructivismo y el realismo. Reflexiones para un enfoque kantiano-constitutivista del dilema de Eutifrón.Martín Fleitas González - 2017 - Tópicos: Revista de Filosofía 52:117-150.
    La intensa discusión que mantienen los constructivistas y realistas en torno a si Kant habría asumido una teoría de valor “proyeccionista” o “detectivista”, ha puesto al desnudo las insuficiencias del lenguaje y los términos empleados. Lo que podríamos llamar “lenguaje de Eutifrón”, no parece abrigar la suficiente sensibilidad como para capturar la singularidad de la ética kantiana. Ciertamente, Kant realiza afirmaciones proyeccionistas y detectivistas, y esto se debe a que su enfoque acerca de la normatividad posee componentes tanto constructivistas como (...)
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  • Freedom and the Fact of Reason.Richard Galvin - 2019 - Kantian Review 24 (1):27-51.
    The focus of my argument is whether, and in what sense, freedom is “revealed” by the fact of reason in Kant’s second Critique. I examine the passages in which Kant refers to the fact of reason and conclude that he uses the term to refer to our taking morality as authoritative, and to our apprehending the content of the moral law. I then point out how various commentators have claimed each to be the fact of reason. Next I address how (...)
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  • Kant and the Ground of Dignity: The Centrality of the Fact of Reason.William Britton - unknown
    Kant famously claims that autonomy is the ground of dignity. If he is correct about the grounding relationship, then doubts about our autonomy entail doubts about our dignity. Here, I attempt to show that Kant is sensitive to this problem, and invokes the ‘fact of reason’ as the key piece of evidence for our autonomy, and therefore our dignity. But as is well known, Kant’s appeal to the Faktum is controversial. After presenting an exegetical case for the connection between dignity (...)
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  • El Faktum de la razón como actividad autoconstitutiva. Sobre la fundamentación de la moralidad kantiana.Gustavo Macedo Rodríguez - 2018 - Dianoia 63 (80):53-69.
    Resumen En el § 7 de la Crítica de la razón práctica Kant expone su primera definición de la ley moral universal. Ahí afirma que la conciencia de ella es un “Faktum de la razón”. La ambigüedad de esta expresión ha hecho que algunos autores argumenten que Kant no deduce la ley moral satisfactoriamente ni aclara cómo llegamos a ser conscientes de ella. Sin embargo estos críticos olvidan en sus análisis un aspecto relevante de la filosofía moral kantiana y que (...)
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  • Practical Cognition and Knowledge of Things-in-Themselves.Karl Schafer - forthcoming - In Evan Tiffany & Dai Heide (eds.), Kantian Freedom. Oxford University Press.
    Famously, in the second Critique , Kant claims that our consciousness of the moral law provides us with sufficient grounds to attribute freedom to ourselves as noumena or things-in-themselves. In this way, while we have no rational basis to make substantive assertions about things-in-themselves from a theoretical point of view, it is rational (in some sense) for us to believe that we are noumenally free from a practical one.
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  • Kant's Demonstration of Free Will, Or, How to Do Things with Concepts.Benjamin S. Yost - 2016 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 2 (2):291-309.
    Kant famously insists that free will is a condition of morality. The difficulty of providing a demonstration of freedom has left him vulnerable to devastating criticism: critics charge that Kant's post-Groundwork justification of morality amounts to a dogmatic assertion of morality's authority. My paper rebuts this objection, showing that Kant offers a cogent demonstration of freedom. My central claim is that the demonstration must be understood in practical rather than theoretical terms. A practical demonstration of x works by bringing x (...)
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  • Realism and Constructivism in Kantian Metaethics 1 : Realism and Constructivism in a Kantian Context.Karl Schafer - 2015 - Philosophy Compass 10 (10):690-701.
    Metaethical constructivism is one of the main movements within contemporary metaethics – especially among those with Kantian inclinations. But both the philosophical coherence and the Kantian pedigree of constructivism are hotly contested. In the first half of this article, I first explore the sense in which Kant's own views might be described as constructivist and then use the resulting understanding as a guide to how we might think about Kantian constructivism today. Along the way, I hope to suggest that a (...)
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