Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. No hope for the Irrelevance Claim.Miguel Egler - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (11):3351-3371.
    Empirical findings about intuitions putatively cast doubt on the traditional methodology of philosophy. Herman Cappelen and Max Deutsch have argued that these methodological concerns are unmotivated as experimental findings about intuitions are irrelevant for assessments of the methodology of philosophy—I dub this the ‘Irrelevance Claim’. In this paper, I first explain that for Cappelen and Deutsch to vindicate the Irrelevance Claim from a forceful objection, their arguments have to establish that intuitions play no epistemically significant role whatsoever in philosophy—call this (...)
    Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • On Philosophical Intuitions.Nicholas D. McGinnis - unknown
    I will argue that the scientific investigation of philosophical intuition is of philosophical interest. I will defend the significance of experimental philosophy against two important types of objection. I will term the first objection 'eliminativism' about intuitions: roughly, it is the claim that philosophical methodology does not in fact rely on intuition, and thus experimental philosophy's investigation is ill-conceived—in the words of one such opponent, 'a big mistake.' I will then consider a second objection, the 'expertise' defence. The expertise defence (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Academic Success in America: Analytic Philosophy and the Decline of Wittgenstein.Guido Bonino & Paolo Tripodi - 2020 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 28 (2):359-392.
    There is a rather widespread consensus, among historians of philosophy, concerning the decline of Wittgenstein amid recent analytic philosophy. However, the exact import of such a decline,...
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Logic in Analytic Philosophy: A Quantitative Analysis.Guido Bonino, Paolo Maffezioli & Paolo Tripodi - 2020 - Synthese 198 (11):10991-11028.
    Using quantitative methods, we investigate the role of logic in analytic philosophy from 1941 to 2010. In particular, a corpus of five journals publishing analytic philosophy is assessed and evaluated against three main criteria: the presence of logic, its role and level of technical sophistication. The analysis reveals that logic is not present at all in nearly three-quarters of the corpus, the instrumental role of logic prevails over the non-instrumental ones, and the level of technical sophistication increases in time, although (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • The Oxford Handbook of Philosophical Methodology.Herman Cappelen, Tamar Szabó Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.) - 2016 - Oxford University Press.
    This is the most comprehensive book ever published on philosophical methodology. A team of thirty-eight of the world's leading philosophers present original essays on various aspects of how philosophy should be and is done. The first part is devoted to broad traditions and approaches to philosophical methodology. The entries in the second part address topics in philosophical methodology, such as intuitions, conceptual analysis, and transcendental arguments. The third part of the book is devoted to essays about the interconnections between philosophy (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  • Philosophical Method and Intuitions as Assumptions.Kevin Patrick Tobia - 2015 - Metaphilosophy 46 (4-5):575-594.
    Many philosophers claim to employ intuitions in their philosophical arguments. Others contest that no such intuitions are used frequently or at all in philosophy. This article suggests and defends a conception of intuitions as part of the philosophical method: intuitions are special types of philosophical assumptions to which we are invited to assent, often as premises in argument, that may serve an independent function in philosophical argument and that are not formed through a purely inferential process. A series of philosophical (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Replies to Weatherson, Chalmers, Weinberg, and Bengson.Herman Cappelen - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 171 (3):577-600.
    Reply to criticsThe replies in this symposium are some of the most insightful contributions to contemporary metaphilosophy I have read. I wish I had seen them before I wrote Philosophy without Intuitions . It would have made it a better book. I also wish I had space to explore all the important issues raised, but unfortunately, the focus here will have to be on points of disagreement. The replies build on each other—I draw on material from the earlier replies in (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  • Moral Thought-Experiments, Intuitions, and Heuristics.Friderik Klampfer - 2018 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 18 (1):133-160.
    Philosophical thought-experimentation has a long and influential history. In recent years, however, both the traditionally secure place of the method of thought experimentation in philosophy and its presumed epistemic credentials have been increasingly and repeatedly questioned. In the paper, I join the choir of the discontents. I present and discuss two types of evidence that in my opinion undermine our close-to-blind trust in moral thought experiments and the intuitions that these elicit: the disappointing record of thought-experimentation in contemporary moral philosophy, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Frankfurt-Style Cases and Moral Responsibility: A Methodological Reflection.Koji Ota - forthcoming - International Journal of Philosophical Studies:1-25.
    Frankfurt-Style Cases seem to elicit the intuitive judgment that an agent is morally responsible despite being unable to act otherwise, which is supposed to falsify the Principle of Alternat...
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • The Role of Intuition in Philosophical Practice.Tinghao Wang - 2016 - Dissertation,
    This dissertation examines the recent arguments against the “Centrality” thesis—the thesis that intuition plays central evidential roles in philosophical inquiry—and their implications for the negative program in experimental philosophy. Two types of objections to Centrality are discussed. First, there are some objections which turn out to only work against Centrality when it is taken as a potential form of philosophical exceptionalism. I respond by showing that negative experimental philosophy doesn’t need the assumption that philosophy is distinctive in its reliance on (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Experimental Philosophy and the Method of Cases.Joachim Horvath & Steffen Koch - 2021 - Philosophy Compass 16 (1):e12716.
    In this paper, we first briefly survey the main responses to the challenge that experimental philosophy poses to the method of cases, given the common assumption that the latter is crucially based on intuitive judgments about cases. Second, we discuss two of the most popular responses in more detail: the expertise defense and the mischaracterization objection. Our take on the expertise defense is that the available empirical data do not support the claim that professional philosophers enjoy relevant expertise in their (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • The Intuition Deniers.Jennifer Nado - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (3):781-800.
    ‘Intuition deniers’ are those who—like Timothy Williamson, Max Deutsch, Herman Cappelen and a few others—reject the claim that philosophers centrally rely on intuitions as evidence. This ‘Centrality’ hypothesis, as Cappelen terms it, is standardly endorsed both by traditionalists and by experimental philosophers. Yet the intuition deniers claim that Centrality is false—and they generally also suggest that this undermines the significance of experimental philosophy. Three primary types of anti-Centrality argument have cross-cut the literature thus far. These arguments, I’ll claim, have differing (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   16 citations  
  • A Defence of Experimental Philosophy in Aesthetics.Clotilde Torregrossa - 2020 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 63 (8):885-907.
    Although experimental philosophy is now over a decade old, it has only recently been introduced to the domain of philosophical aesthetics. So why is there already a need to defend it? Because, as I argue in this paper, we can anticipate the three main types of objection generally addressed to experimental philosophy and show that none of them concern experimental philosophers in aesthetics. I begin with some general considerations about experimental philosophy and its, sometimes conflicting, characteristics. This framework is designed (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Knowledge, Noise, and Curve-Fitting: A Methodological Argument for JTB?Jonathan M. Weinberg - forthcoming - In R. Borges, C. de Almeida & P. Klein (eds.), Explaining Knowledge: New Essays on the Gettier Problem. Oxford University Press.
    The developing body of empirical work on the "Gettier effect" indicates that, in general, the presence of a Gettier-type structure in a case makes participants less likely to attribute knowledge in that case. But is that a sufficient reason to diverge from a JTB theory of knowledge? I argue that considerations of good model selection, and worries about noise and overfitting, should lead us to consider that a live, open question. The Gettier effect is perhaps so transient, and so sensitive (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Intuition in Contemporary Philosophy.Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa - 2016 - In Lisa M. Osbeck & Barbara S. Held (eds.), Rational Intuition. Cambridge university Press. pp. 192-210.
    This chapter will consider three themes relating to the significance of intuitions in contemporary philosophy. In §1, I’ll review and explore the relationship between philosophical use of words like ‘intuitively’ and any kinds of mental states that might be called ‘intuitions’. In §2, I’ll consider the widely-discussed analogy between intuitive experience and perceptual experience, drawing out some interesting similarities and differences. Finally, in §3, I’ll introduce the recent movement of ‘experimental philosophy’, and consider to what extent its projects are tied (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • On Going Nowhere with Our Words: New Skepticism About the Philosophical Method of Cases.Avner Baz - 2016 - Philosophical Psychology 29 (1):64-83.
    The philosophical “method of cases” has been the subject of intense discussion. In a recent paper, Frank Jackson attempts to vindicate the method by proposing that it is underwritten by the “representational view of language.” Jackson's proposal is potentially very significant. For if it is true, then the method of cases stands, but quite possibly also falls, with the representational view of language as characterized by Jackson. The aim of this paper is to question the philosophical method of cases by (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  • A Defence of Experimental Philosophy in Aesthetics.Clotilde Torregrossa - 2017 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy:1-23.
    Although experimental philosophy is now over a decade old, it has only recently been introduced to the domain of philosophical aesthetics. So why is there already a need to defend it? Because, as I argue in this paper, we can anticipate the three main types of objection generally addressed to experimental philosophy and show that none of them concern experimental philosophers in aesthetics. I begin with some general considerations about experimental philosophy and its, sometimes conflicting, characteristics. This framework is designed (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Philosophical Expertise Beyond Intuitions.Anna Drożdżowicz - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (2):253-277.
    In what sense, if any, are philosophers experts in their domain of research and what could philosophical expertise be? The above questions are particularly pressing given recent methodological disputes in philosophy. The so-called expertise defense recently proposed as a reply to experimental philosophers postulates that philosophers are experts qua having improved intuitions. However, this model of philosophical expertise has been challenged by studies suggesting that philosophers’ intuitions are no less prone to biases and distortions than intuitions of non-philosophers. Should we (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations