This paper critically reviews Ken Binmore’s non- utilitarian and game theoretic solution to the Arrow problem. Binmore’s solution belongs to the same family as Rawls’ maximin criterion and requires the use of Nash bargaining theory, empathetic preferences, and results in evolutionary game theory. Harsanyi has earlier presented a solution that relies on utilitarianism, which requires some exogenous valuation criterion and is therefore incompatible with liberalism. Binmore’s rigorous demonstration of the maximin principle for the first time presents a real alternative to (...) a utilitarian solution. (shrink)

Roughly, according to conditional egalitarianism, equality is non-instrumentally valuable, but only if it benefits at least one individual. Some political theorists have argued that conditional egalitarianism has the important virtue that it allows egalitarians to avoid the so-called objection. However, in the present article I argue that conditional egalitarianism does not offer the egalitarian a plausible escape route from this objection. First, I explain the levelling down objection and suggest some particular concerns from which it derives its force. Then I (...) provide a more precise definition of conditional egalitarianism. Finally, I give two arguments against this principle. According to the first, it violates the transitivity of the betterness relation (or more specifically, ). According to the second, there is no plausible explanation of why equality must benefit at least one individual in order to be non-instrumentally valuable. (shrink)

The symposium included in this issue of Analyse & Kritik has provided an excellent occasion to re-examine formal as well as motivational issues underlying the so-called liberal paradox. This rejoinder discusses the significance of the new results and analyses, their bearing on the formulation and implications of rights, and also corrects a misinterpretation. Reflections precipitated by the liberal paradox can influence the acceptability of different principles of social decisions, and also the interpretation of ‘preference’ and ‘unanimity’. They also point to (...) some concerns that are relevant in the formation of individual preferences in a society with interdependent lives. (shrink)