Over the past 10 years two concepts of central significance in the social sciences have come up for rediscussion: ‘space’ and ‘gender’. Today the two concepts are seen as relational, as a production process based on relation and demarcation. Gender and space alike are a provisional result of an – invariably temporal – process of attribution and arrangement that both forms and reproduces structures. This article takes a microsociological look at the construction of the local, seeking to trace the genderization (...) of spaces. For this purpose, it discusses the organization of perceptions, in particular of glances and corresponding body technologies. Referring to the example of beach life, the article shows that the genderization of perception leads, in the sense of an embodiment of social order, to a practice of localization that reproduces the structural principles of society. In other words, gender may be seen as inscribed, via body practices, in the production of spaces. (shrink)

ZusammenfassungIn diesem Aufsatz wird zunächst das klassische Theodizee-problem dargelegt und eine Typologie seiner möglichen Lösungsarten (apologetische Konzeptionen, Atheismus, begriffliche Modifikationen an der Gottesvorstellung, Agnostizismus) entworfen. Nach einer zusammenfassenden Erörterung dieser Strategien wendet sich der Verfasser einer reizvollen, bislang kaum beachteten Stellungnahme von J. S. Mill zu, die er dann innerhalb der weiteren Ausführungen zu berücksichtigen sucht. Im zweiten Teil des Aufsatzes wird die apologetische Lösung der Theodizee durch F. v. Kutschera systematisch rekonstruiert und kritisch beleuchtet. Diese Lösung hebt hervor, der (...) letzte Sinn des Leidens sei zwar für uns nicht erfassbar, wir könnten aber im Vertrauen auf die Vorsehung Gottes annehmen und uns im Rahmen der Gemeinschaft mit Gott darauf verlassen, dass Heilsgeschichte zugleich Leidensgeschichte sei. Hierbei sollen wir im Glauben mit Gott den Weg zueinander gehen – wohin er auch führt. Nach einer partiellen Infragestellung dieser Lösung, stellt der Verfasser die Frage, ob unser Vertrauen zu Gott unter allen denkbaren Umständen bedingungslos bleiben sollte. Dabei wird auf die Risiken eines blinden und fanatischen Glaubens hingewiesen. Demgegenüber wird das Bedürfnis danach bejaht, unseren Glauben doch an die positiven Aussichten für die Erfüllung gewisser menschlicher Fundamentalerwartungen (keine Vernichtung von Menschheit sowie anderer Lebewesen, kein sinnloser und umfassender Weltuntergang, die Anerkennung und Bewahrung der Schöpfung etc.) zu binden. (shrink)

It is very useful to distinguish between four types of interactions in nature: gravitation, and then electromagnetism, weak interaction and strong interaction. The mathematical structure of electromagnetism but also of weak and strong interaction could be understood as induced by a local gauge group. The associated groups are the unitary group in one dimension—U—for electromagnetism, the special unitary group in two dimensions—SU—for the weak interaction, and the special unitary group in three dimensions—SU—for the strong interaction. The essence of this article (...) is to give a “first-principles” explanation for the three gauge groups. (shrink)

In this commentary to Khatam and Shafiee (2013), we outline the results which are obtained three decades after Weizsäcker’s “Aufbau der Physik” (1985). It is essential to go beyond the “urs” to a yet more abstract conception. With the protyposis, abstract quantum bits without any special meaning, the understanding of matter becomes new basis. As a result, also a scientific understanding of mind will be obtained.

The aim of science is the explanation of complicated systems by reducing it to simple subsystems. According to a millennia-old imagination this will be attained by dividing matter into smaller and smaller pieces of it. The popular superstition that smallness implies simplicity seems to be ineradicable. However, since the beginning of quantum theory it would be possible to realize that the circumstances in nature are exactly the other way round. The idea “smaller becomes simpler” is useful only down to the (...) atoms of chemistry. Planck’s formula shows that smaller extensions are related to larger energies. That more and more energy should result in simpler and simpler structures, this does not only sound absurd, it is absurd. A reduction to really simple structures leads one to smallest energies and, thus, to utmost extended quantum systems. The simplest quantum structure, referred to as quantum bit, has a two-dimensional state space, and it establishes a cosmological structure. Taking many of such quantum bits allows also for the construction of localized particles. The non-localized fraction of quantum bits can appear as “dark matter”. (shrink)

This article examines Cohen’s “transcendental method”, Windelband’s “critical method”, the neo-Kantian distinctions between natural science and the humanities (i. e., human or cultural sciences), and Weber’s account of ideal-typical explanations. The Marburg and the Southwest Schools of neo-Kantianism have in common that their respective philosophies of science focused on method, but they substantially differ in their approaches. Cohen advanced the “transcendental method”, which was taken up and transformed by Natorp and Cassirer; later, it became influential in neo-Kantian approaches to 20th (...) century physics. Windelband distinguished between facts and values, linking the former to the “genetic” method of history and the latter to the “critical” method of philosophy; and between the “nomothetic” and “idiographic” methods of the empirical sciences, a distinction further elaborated by Rickert. The distinction does not give rise to a sharp discrimination but is rather what Weber would later call an ideal type. All these approaches contribute in different ways to understanding the structure of scientific knowledge, focusing on different aspects of the general path of the empirical sciences between rationalism and empiricism. (shrink)

It is shown that the method of operationaldefinition of theoretical terms applied inphysics may well support constructivist ideasin cognitive sciences when extended toobservational terms. This leads to unexpectedresults for the notion of reality, inductionand for the problem why mathematics is sosuccessful in physics.A theory of cognitive operators is proposedwhich are implemented somewhere in our brainand which transform certain states of oursensory apparatus into what we call perceptionsin the same sense as measurement devicestransform the interaction with the object intomeasurement results. Then, (...) perceivedregularities, as well as the laws of nature wewould derive from them can be seen asinvariants of the cognitive operators concernedand are by this human specific constructsrather than ontologically independent elements.. So, reality in so far it isrepresented by the laws of nature has no longeran independent ontological status. This isopposed to Campbell's `natural selectionepistemology'. From this it is shown that thereholds an incompleteness theorem for physicallaws similar to Gödels incompletenesstheorem for mathematical axioms, i.e., there isno definitive or object `theory of everything'.This constructivist approaches to cognitionwill allow a coherent and consistent model ofboth cognitive and organic evolution. Whereasthe classical view sees the two evolutionrather dichotomously. (shrink)

Discussions about the appropriate way of assessing and managing new or emerging technologies—like nanomaterials—expose the problematic relationship between scientific knowledge production and regulatory decision-making. On one hand, there is a strong demand for scientific expertise to support decisions, especially by analyzing risks and hazards when uncertainties are prevalent and society’s stakes are high. On the other hand, science is criticized for its authoritative claim to objectivity and for keeping the inherent uncertainty, ambiguity, and selectivity of scientific observation latent. Requests for (...) more transparency in science can lead to revealing, to risk managers and the public, the indeterminacy in knowledge production processes. This has consequences for the prevalence of scientific knowledge in decision-making, because it increases uncertainty on both sides of the breach between science and decisions: scientists lose confidence regarding the scientifically tested knowledge which they pass on, and risk managers lose confidence regarding their decisions based on this knowledge. Nonetheless, the concept of “probabilistic risk assessment” remains an important heuristic for dealing with potential future events. This paper addresses questions of the function of scientific risk assessment in organized risk management. The main argument in this paper is that knowledge alone no longer functions as a mechanism for absorbing uncertainty. Accordingly, the interaction between science and decisions must enable a temporarily stable commitment to manage new threats like products and applications coming from the field of nanoscience and nanomaterials. (shrink)

Several contemporary interpretations of quantum mechanics use the concept of information as a tool for addressing and explaining the quantum world. In the article, I focus on Zeilinger-Brukner's informational foundations of quantum theory. I propose that with a phenomenological approach—which, unlike most of the contemporary interpretations of quantum mechanics, exceeds the mere dichotomy between realism and anti-realism—we can address the epistemological questions re-opened by IFQT and the parts of the interpretation that are recognized as problematic by its critics. After the (...) phenomenological supplementation IFQT can provide both, ontic and epistemic answer to the question "Why quantum?" As we apply Husserl's concept of the world as our common objective ground to the IFQT explanation, we can make a justifiable step away from the solipsism/subjectivism, which is, according to the critics, the main problem of IFQT. Thus, I propose in conclusion, a phenomenological approach to quantum physics can offer a background for the much needed dialog between realists and anti-realists as well as for a comprehensive contemporary interpretation of the quantum world. (shrink)

Quantum theory has provoked intense discussions about its interpretation since its pioneer days. One of the few scientists who have been continuously engaged in this development from both physical and philosophical perspectives is Carl Friedrich von Weizsaecker. The questions he posed were and are inspiring for many, including the authors of this contribution. Weizsaecker developed Bohr's view of quantum theory as a theory of knowledge. We show that such an epistemic perspective can be consistently complemented by Einstein's ontically oriented position.

The existence of quantum correlates of consciousness (QCC) is doubtful from a scientific perspective. But even if their existence were verified, philosophical problems would remain. On the other hand, there could be more to QCC than meets the sceptic's eye: • QCC might be useful or even necessary for a better understanding of conscious experience or quantum physics or both. The main reasons for this are: the measurement problem (the nature of observation, the mysterious collapse of the wave function, etc.), (...) ostensibly shared features of quantum phenomena and conscious phenomena (e.g., complementarity, nonspatiality, acausality, spontaneity, and holism) and connections (ontology, causation, and knowledge), the qualia problem (subjectivity, explanatory gap etc.). But there are many problems, especially questions regarding realism and the nature and role of conscious observers; • QCC are conceptually challenging, because there are definitory problems and some crucial ontological and epistemological shortcomings. It is instructive to compare them with recent proposals for understanding neural correlates of consciousness (NCC). QCC are not sufficient for a quantum theory of mind, nor might they be necessary except perhaps in a very broad sense; • QCC are also empirically challenging. Nevertheless, QCC could be relevant and important for the mindbody problem: QCC might reveal features that are necessary at least for behavioral manifestations of human consciousness. But QCC are compatible with very different proposals for a solution of the mind-body problem. This seems to be both advantageous and detrimental. QCC restrict accounts of nomological identity. The discovery of QCC cannot establish a naturalistic theory of mind alone. But there are also problems with QCC in the framework of other ontologies. (shrink)

After a brief review of ontic and epistemic descriptions, and of subjective, logical and statistical interpretations of probability, we summarize the traditional axiomatization of calculus of probability in terms of Boolean algebras and its set-theoretical realization in terms of Kolmogorov probability spaces. Since the axioms of mathematical probability theory say nothing about the conceptual meaning of “randomness” one considers probability as property of the generating conditions of a process so that one can relate randomness with predictability (or retrodictability). In the (...) measure-theoretical codification of stochastic processes genuine chance processes can be defined rigorously as so-called regular processes which do not allow a long-term prediction. We stress that stochastic processes are equivalence classes of individual point functions so that they do not refer to individual processes but only to an ensemble of statistically equivalent individual processes. Less popular but conceptually more important than statistical descriptions are individual descriptions which refer to individual chaotic processes. First, we review the individual description based on the generalized harmonic analysis by Norbert Wiener. It allows the definition of individual purely chaotic processes which can be interpreted as trajectories of regular statistical stochastic processes. Another individual description refers to algorithmic procedures which connect the intrinsic randomness of a finite sequence with the complexity of the shortest program necessary to produce the sequence. Finally, we ask why there can be laws of chance. We argue that random events fulfill the laws of chance if and only if they can be reduced to (possibly hidden) deterministic events. This mathematical result may elucidate the fact that not all nonpredictable events can be grasped by the methods of mathematical probability theory. (shrink)