Climate change assessments rely upon scenarios of socioeconomic developments to conceptualize alternative outcomes for global greenhouse gas emissions. These are used in conjunction with climate models to make projections of future climate. Specifically, the estimations of greenhouse gas emissions based on socioeconomic scenarios constrain climate models in their outcomes of temperatures, precipitation, etc. Traditionally, the fundamental logic of the socioeconomic scenarios—that is, the logic that makes them plausible—is developed and prioritized using methods that are very subjective. This introduces a fundamental (...) challenge for climate change assessment: The veracity of projections of future climate currently rests on subjective ground. We elaborate on these subjective aspects of scenarios in climate change research. We then consider an alternative method for developing scenarios, a systems dynamics approach called ‘Cross-Impact Balance’ (CIB) analysis. We discuss notions of ‘objective’ and ‘objectivity’ as criteria for distinguishing appropriate scenario methods for climate change research. We distinguish seven distinct meanings of ‘objective,’ and demonstrate that CIB analysis is more objective than traditional subjective approaches. However, we also consider criticisms concerning which of the seven meanings of ‘objective’ are appropriate for scenario work. Finally, we arrive at conclusions regarding which meanings of ‘objective’ and ‘objectivity’ are relevant for climate change research. Because scientific assessments uncover knowledge relevant to the responses of a real, independently existing climate system, this requires scenario methodologies employed in such studies to also uphold the seven meanings of ‘objective’ and ‘objectivity.’. (shrink)

We provide a critical assessment of the National Science Foundation's “broader impacts criterion” for peer review, which has met with resistance from the scientific community and been characterized as unlikely to have much positive effect due to poor implementation and adherence to the linear model heuristic for innovation. In our view, the weakness of NSF's approach owes less to these issues than to the misguided assumption that the peer review process can be used to leverage more societal value from research. (...) This idea, although undoubtedly well-meaning, is fundamentally flawed. Retooling or refining the Broader Impacts Criterion does not alter the fact that conventional peer review, based on specialized scientific and technical expertise, is not up to the task of ensuring adequate judgements about social impact. We consider some possible alternative approaches to providing greater social impact in science and include in our assessment past and current efforts at NSF and throughout the federal research establishment that address, in some cases having addressed for decades, the intentions and goals of the Broader Impacts Criterion, albeit using alternate mechanisms. We conclude that institution-building and explicit and targeted policy-making are more useful and democratically legitimate approaches to ensuring broad social impacts. (shrink)

Current environmental problems and technological risks are a challenge for a new institutional arrangement of the value spheres of Science, Politics and Morality. Distinguished authors from different European countries and America provide a cross-disciplinary perspective on the problems of political decision making under the conditions of scientific uncertainty. cases from biotechnology and the environmental sciences are discussed. The papers collected for this volume address the following themes: (i) controversies about risks and political decision making; (ii) concepts of science for policy; (...) (iii) the use of social science in the policy making process; (iv) ethical problems with developments in science and technology; (v) public and state interests in the development and control of technology. (shrink)

The epistemologically distant nature of many of today's environmental risks greatly problematises conventional risk analyses that emphasise objectivity, materiality, factual specificity and certainty. Such analyses fail to problematise issues of ontology and epistemology, assuming a reality that is readily 'readable' and a corresponding knowledge of that reality that is asocial, objective and certain. Under the weight of modern, invisible, manufactured environmental risks, however, these assumptions begin to crack, revealing their tenuous nature. As this paper argues, statements of risk are ultimately (...) social products that come to us by way of translation. They are statements not of what is but of knowledge expressed in probabilistic terms, and are thus thoroughly social in nature, for it is we – through our actions and social networks – that imbue them with meaning. One way we do this is through our social relations of trust. And it is this relationship – between trust and risk – that this paper seeks to detail both conceptually and empirically. While one could look toward any number of case studies to develop the conceptual details of this project, this paper focuses on the relatively recent case of mad cow disease to have been reported within the United States. Here, we have an epistemologically distant, and thus hotly contested, 'object', which has been the source of much risk debate; a debate that is also, in part, the effect of a deeper erosion of trust, particularly toward those managing our meat supply. (shrink)

Scientists often find difficulty in engaging in formal public debate about transcientific social issues. Although science is a highly disputatious institution, public argumentation amongst scientists follows very different conventional practices from those that rule in political and legal arenas. Amongst other differentiating features, scientific disputes are typically conducted in writing rather than orally, they are not sharply polarised or formally adversarial, they are seldom addressed to a specific proposition, and they do not reach decisive closure. As a result, the rhetorical (...) style that scientists learn from participation in such practises is not well adapted to the established format of socio-political 'debate'. For scientists to contribute effectively to such debates, they must learn new ways of making their particular type of knowledge convincing in unfamiliar intellectual and social contexts. (shrink)

"Consacrée dans des intitulés de cours, mobilisée dans les nomenclatures des organismes internationaux, prometteuse de débroussaillages très vites décevants ou de synthèses faussement structurantes, l'appellation objectivante communication internationale ne présente aucune valeur scientifique, sinon en tant qu'objet de recherche. Pour autant, la référence produit des effets de sens, qu'il est urgent de mettre en perspective, tant elle prête le jeu à des constructions discursives à géométrie variable, en fonction des intérêts croisés et souvent masqués d'acteurs de plus en plus nombreux (...) à l'échelle planétaire, et des espaces politico-culturels de diffusion de ces productions tactiques. La première option de repérage éclairant passe par le fil conducteur d'une discipline, académiquement reconnue. Précisément, la constitution depuis la France des sciences de l'information-communication en 1978 ouvre à un corpus d'approches théoriques et de questionnements épistémologiques déjà signifiant, même ainsi territorialisé. Prenant acte, -- quel que soit le continent cette fois -- des productions et des collaborations scientifiques transfrontières multiples et parfois concurrentes, l'interrogation croisée révèle des inflexions épistémologiques, théoriques, conceptuelles et méthodologiques justificatives d'un état, provisoire, de la recherche. Alors, la Communication-monde, esquissée par Armand Mattelart et érigée dans l'ouvrage au rang de concept structurant, permet de lire les enjeux communicationnels planétaires à l'aube du troisième millénaire, jusqu'à provoquer le décentrement contre les risques permanents d'ethnocentrisme de la pensée."-- Fourni par l'éditeur. (shrink)

Self-driving cars promise solutions to some of the hazards of human driving but there are important questions about the safety of these new technologies. This paper takes a qualitative social science approach to the question ‘how safe is safe enough?’ Drawing on 50 interviews with people developing and researching self-driving cars, I describe two dominant narratives of safety. The first, safety-in-numbers, sees safety as a self-evident property of the technology and offers metrics in an attempt to reassure the public. The (...) second approach, safety-by-design, starts with the challenge of safety assurance and sees the technology as intrinsically problematic. The first approach is concerned only with performance—what a self-driving system does. The second is also concerned with why systems do what they do and how they should be tested. Using insights from workshops with members of the public, I introduce a further concern that will define trustworthy self-driving cars: the intended and perceived purposes of a system. Engineers’ safety assurances will have their credibility tested in public. ‘How safe is safe enough?’ prompts further questions: ‘safe enough for what?’ and ‘safe enough for whom?’. (shrink)

This paper addresses, and seeks to correct, some frequent misunderstandings concerning the claim that science is socially constructed. It describes several features of scientific inquiry that have been usefully illuminated by constructivist studies of science, including the mundane or tacit skills involved in research, the social relationships in scientific laboratories, the causes of scientific controversy, and the interconnection of science and culture. Social construction, the paper argues, should be seen not as an alternative to but an enhancement of scientists’ own (...) professional understanding of how science is done. The richer, more finely textured accounts of scientific practice that the constructivist approach provides are potentially of great relevance to public policy. (shrink)

This paper characterizes the crisis of expertise, especially as it manifested during the covid-19 pandemic, as a crisis of trust in regulatory science. The temporal structure of the facts produced by regulatory science differs from Kuhnian “normal science,” while they also contain profound distributional implications. As a result, they suffer from a set of congenital problems that provoke mistrust in a way that normal science facts do not. While “expertise” is often offered as an answer to these problems, the paper (...) shows that it is a symptom of the malaise, reflecting a situation where it is no longer clear how to decide between competing claims to authority as experts. The current mistrust in experts and regulatory science during the pandemic, therefore, is part of a longer and systemic crisis of expertise provoked and sustained by multiple factors. The paper then offers an unsystematic set of rules of method to observe when addressing the thorny issues involving trust and mistrust: 1) trust is not a subjective attitude that can be measured by a survey; 2) mistrust is not the opposite of trust; 3) trust is a social skill involving a set of ethnomethods for distinguishing between responsible and “blind” trust; 4) attention to temporal framing is key to these methods; 5) disruption of this temporal framing – as routinely happens with regulatory facts, and especially during the pandemic – destroys trust. (shrink)

Science is an activity of the human intellect and as such has ethical implications that should be reviewed and taken into account. Although science and ethics have conventionally been considered different, it is herewith proposed that they are essentially similar. The proposal set henceforth is to create a new ethics rooted in science: scientific ethics. Science has firm axiological foundations and searches for truth and knowledge. Hence, science cannot be value neutral. Looking at standard scientific principles, it is possible to (...) construct a scientific ethic, which can be applied to all sciences. These intellectual standards include the search for truth, human dignity and respect for life. Through these it is thence achievable to draft a foundation of a ethics based purely on science and applicable beyond the confines of science. A few applications of these will be presented. Scientific ethics can have vast applications in other fields even in non scientific ones. (shrink)

Brak transparentności procesów decyzyjnych typowy dla demokracji liberalnych oraz związany z nim kryzys zaufania obywateli wobec instytucji politycznych to jedne z głównych przyczyn sukcesów odnoszonych przez stronników demokracji nieliberalnej. Zdaniem krytyków liberalizmu zbyt wiele decyzji współcześnie delegowanych jest do ciał nienadzorowanych demokratycznie. Zwolennicy koncepcji demokracji deliberacyjnej formułują różne remedia na tę sytuację. Nie czynią tego jednak stronnicy najpopularniejszej obecnie z wersji demokracji deliberacyjnej – podejścia systemowego do deliberacji. Autor artykułu twierdzi, że podejście to może legitymizować „niedemokratyczny liberalizm” – jedną z (...) przyczyn kryzysu demokracji liberalnej. Celem artykułu jest prezentacja i ocena stosunku zwolenników podejścia systemowego do roli odgrywanej w procesie politycznym przez nienadzorowane demokratycznie gremia eksperckie. (shrink)

Post-Normal Science as a theory links epistemology and governance. It not only focuses on problem situations where facts are uncertain, values in dispute, stakes high and decisions urgent, but also tries to develop epistemic approaches that allow for sound scientific answers. The following article addresses major epistemological challenges within a typical ‘‘wicked-problem situation’’, i.e., risk assessment of emerging technologies. Such challenges include epistemological problems intrinsic to the task of proving the absence of risk, problems related to the multi-sited production of (...) evidence and the multitude of epistemic cultures involved, the incompatibility of the various implicit objectives and the complex actor-constellations, that shape not only the way scientific knowledge is translated into action, but also which kind of knowledge is produced and which experts are listened to. To illustrate and discuss these characteristics, the article draws on an empirical study of risk research in the fields of agri-biotechnology and telecommunication technology in Germany. It concludes that although some aspects of PNS are already part of current epistemic practices in these fields, a state of ‘‘functional post-normality’’ depends upon a meaningful co-evolution between post-normal science and post-normal governance that has not yet been achieved. (shrink)

This study investigates how uncertainty works in science policy debates by considering an unusual case: one in which uncertainty-based arguments for delay come from the scientific community, rather than industry actors. The case I present is the central use of value-added modeling in the evaluation of individual teachers, a controversial trend in education reform. In order to understand how policy actors might counter inconvenient statements of uncertainty from experts, I analyze speeches from Education Secretary Arne Duncan, a committed and influential (...) advocate of VAM. I identify a three-part rhetorical tactic, the “Overcaution Allegation,” and describe its persuasive potential to legitimize policies that elicit caution from the scientific community because they are built on uncertain science. (shrink)

This paper describes the main features and goals of the speculative work in modern sciences that has greatly accelerated since World War II due to the exponential increase in computing power and newly available theoretical and conceptual tools. It points to the long historical strand of speculative philosophical work in symbiosis with the sciences, suggests the reasons for its unexpected neglect in contemporary professional philosophy of science, why it should be a major approach, and why such pursuit is not inevitable. (...) Finally, the paper outlines potential topics, fields, and tools for such collaborative work and argues it is likelier to be more fruitful today than at any point in the past hundred years. (shrink)

ABSTRACTExpertise has come under attack not least since the Brexit vote in the UK and Donald Trump’s election as President of the United States. In this contribution, I will provide some conceptual clarification and suggest a new topology of expertise. I will also examine the historical roots of this challenge to expertise and its social context using a comparative lens. I will ask what it could mean to speak of the rightful place of expertise. I will try to provide an (...) answer by looking more closely at different types of expertise. Expertise, it seems, has been used as an umbrella term for a variety of different knowledge-related activities. I will show that the role of the expert has to be differentiated from the role of the scientist, but also from the role of the specialist. Specialists have different tasks in comparison to experts which need to be emphasized. My argument will draw on the social and historical context of the critique of expertise, and discuss the challenge to the social sciences, espec... (shrink)

Regulating technologies, innovations and risks is an activity that, as much as scientific research needs proofs and evidence. It is the site of development of a distinct kind of science, regulatory science. This special issue addresses the question of the standards of knowledge governing how we test, assess and monitor technologies and their effects. This topic is relevant and timely in the light of problematics of regulation of innovation, regulatory failure and capture. Given the enormous decisions and stakes regulatory science (...) commends, it becomes crucial to ask where its standards come from and gain credibility, but also what valuations of technology and appreciations of their risks or benefits do they embed, and who controls them? This paper introduces the four contributions comprising the special issue, and outlines a perspective from which to question the construction of regulatory science or, in the terminology adopted here, the authorization and standardization of regulatory knowledge, particularly the role of networks of scientific experts therein. (shrink)

Translation abstractSummary: Control versus Complexity: Approaches to the Carbon Dioxide Problem at IIASA. In the 1970s and 1980s the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) hosted several research projects, workshops and conferences in order to discuss the implications of rising carbon dioxide concentrations in the Earth's atmosphere. A number of distinguished scholars, some of whom later became prominent protagonists within the United Nations’ Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and sustainability communities more generally, participated in these debates. Since those (...) at IIASA did not engage in obviously related fields such as geophysics or climatology, there is a need to explain how, and via which contexts the issue entered the institute's agenda. This article examines this historical context and contrasts two competing paradigms that emerged at IIASA in order to assess and respond to the carbon dioxide question: The first approach was related to the organisation's research projects on the future of energy systems, which drew on physics, engineering, economics and applied system dynamical modeling; the second approach drew earlier research into ecological management and complex dynamical systems theory, and argued for the use of multiple methods to assess the carbon dioxide question. The first approach invoked ideas of techno‐economical control mechanisms, the second resulted in a more embedded framing of climate change as one of a larger complex of issues relating to sustainable development. Based on resources from IIASA's research repositories and institutional archive, this study retraces these competing discourse framings and outlines the specific research and modeling strategies, policies, and cultural and technological imaginaries related to them. (shrink)

The dynamic constraint relaxation theory predicts crucial roles of the initial diversity and evaluation in creative problem-solving. We reported the experimental evidence supporting these predictions, using an insight problem. The experiments showed that the degrees of making different types of trials and the appropriate evaluation were closely related to individual differences in insight problem-solving, and that evaluation became more appropriate by making the problem-solving goal explicit. The review of the research in related fields showed that these experimental findings were in (...) congruent with the evidence obtained from different types of creative activities. (shrink)

When the journal Minerva was founded in 1962, science and higher educational issues were high on the agenda, lending impetus to the interdisciplinary field of “Science Studies” qua “Science Policy Studies.” As government expenditures for promoting various branches of science increased dramatically on both sides of the East-West Cold War divide, some common issues regarding research management also emerged and with it an interest in closer academic interaction in the areas of history and policy of science. Through a close reading (...) of many early issues of Minerva but also of its later competitor journal Science Studies (now called Social Studies of Science) the paper traces the initial optimism of an academically based Science Studies dialogue across the Cold War divide and the creation in 1971 of the International Commission for Science Policy Studies as a bridging forum, one that Minerva strangely chose to ignore. In this light, attention is drawn to aspects of the often forgotten history of Science Studies in the former Soviet Union and the Eastern European block. Reviewed also are several early discussions that are still relevant today: e.g., regarding differing concepts of Big Science, science and democracy, autonomy in higher education and what conditions are necessary to sustain academic freedom and scientific integrity (some of Edward Shils’ primary concerns). Finally, it is noted how the question of quantitative methods to measure scientific productivity lay at the heart of a “Science of Science” movement of the 1960s has re-emerged in a new form integral to the notion of a “Science of Science Policy.”. (shrink)

Among others, the term problem plays a major role in the various attempts to characterize interdisciplinarity or transdisciplinarity, as used synonymously in this paper. Interdisciplinarity is regarded as problem solving among science, technology and society and as problem orientation beyond disciplinary constraints. The point of departure of this paper is that the discourse and practice of ID have problems with the problem. The objective here is to shed some light on the vague notion of problem in order to advocate a (...) specific type of interdisciplinarity: problem-oriented interdisciplinarity. The outline is as follows: Taking an ex negativo approach, I will show what problem-oriented ID does not mean. Using references to well-established distinctions in philosophy of science, I will show three other types of ID that should not be placed under the umbrella term problem-oriented ID : object-oriented ID, theory-oriented ID, and method-oriented ID. Different philosophical thought traditions can be related to these distinguishable meanings. I will then clarify the notion of problem by looking at three systematic elements: an undesired state, a desired state, and the barriers in getting from the one to the other. These three elements include three related kinds of knowledge: systems, target, and transformation knowledge. This paper elaborates further methodological and epistemological elements of problem-oriented ID. It concludes by stressing that problem-oriented ID is the most needed as well as the most challenging type of ID. (shrink)

Recent criticisms of traditional understandings of risk, responsibility and the division of labour between science and politics build on the idea of the co-produced character of the natural and social orders, making a case for less ambitious and more inclusive policy processes, where questions of values and goals may be addressed together with questions of facts and means, causal liabilities and principled responsibilities. Within the neo-liberal political economy, however, the contingency of the world is depicted as a source of unprecedented (...) opportunities for human craftsmanship, rather than of possibly unmanageable surprises. Gene technologies offer a vantage point for reflecting on the consequences of the drift from discovery to invention as a master frame in the appraisal of human intermingling with the world. Biotech patenting regulations carve out a sovereign agency which, by crafting nature, also crafts the distinction between the manufactured and non-manufactured world. Difficulties in ascribing responsibility stem as a consequence. It is likely that politics and economy can be democratized and responsibilities rearranged not by ‘democratizing’ knowledge production, but rather the reverse. (shrink)

In recent years, students of science policy in the Federal Republic of Germany have looked with increasing interest to the innovations of the 1960s. Key concepts such as democratization, participation, and planning mark the political and socio-cultural discourse of the time. For over two decades, the Studiengruppe für Systemforschung (Study Group for Systems Research – SfS) in Heidelberg gave a fresh impetus to policy advice. This essay continues our reflections on its history, traces its origins and development, and reflects on (...) its achievements. (shrink)

This paper puts forward a theoretical framework for the analysis of expertise and experts in contemporary societies. It argues that while prevailing approaches have come to see expertise in various forms and functions, they tend to neglect the broader historical and societal context, and importantly the relational aspect of expertise. This will be discussed with regard to influential theoretical frameworks, such as laboratory studies, regulatory science, lay expertise, post-normal science, and honest brokers. An alternative framework of expertise is introduced, showing (...) the limitations of existing frameworks and emphasizing one crucial element of all expertise, which is their role in guiding action. (shrink)

The author draws on the policy analysis literature to delineate the linkage between conceptualization of risk and the formulation and proposed solution of risk-related policy problems. Two concepts of risk are identified: a concept of risk as a physically given attribute of hazardous technologies and a concept of risk as a socially constructed attribute. The argument is advanced that the social construction of risk provides a firm, theoretical basis for the design of policy. The discussion links the perception, manage ment, (...) and communication of risk to the more fundamental issue of the nature and role of science and technology. (shrink)

This paper addresses, and seeks to correct, some frequent misunderstandings concerning the claim that science is socially constructed. It describes several features of scientific inquiry that have been usefully illuminated by constructivist studies of science, including the mundane or tacit skills involved in research, the social relationships in scientific laboratories, the causes of scientific controversy, and the interconnection of science and culture. Social construction, the paper argues, should be seen not as an alternative to but an enhancement of scientists’ own (...) professional understanding of how science is done. The richer, more finely textured accounts of scientific practice that the constructivist approach provides are potentially of great relevance to public policy. (shrink)

People's vision of world phenomena is still based on the traditional mechanistic concept, which implies that process outcomes can be fully predicted and controlled. The new scientific concept that our world is characterized by complex, self-organizing processes, is so far acknowledged by few insiders. Mass media, advertising companies and information programmes tend to emphasize the success of technology, which significantly contributes to support and spread that mechanistic concept. This situation heavily impacts the management of the environment both in terms of (...) its technical–scientific approach and in terms of its stewardship. Instead of being solved, environmental problems are frequently shifted through time and space, and eventually magnified. Moreover, among the technicians involved in environmental assessments, as well as decision-makers and the general public, the connections regarding technical–scientific issues, ethical values and policy decisions are often not adequately considered. It's time for a public debate on an alternative vision of real-world phenomena and on its actual implications. The hope is that a valid dialogue between existing polarized views on science, technology and the environment may lead to more positive collaboration between science and environmental stewardship, where every single citizen feels committed. (shrink)

Increasingly our society relies upon government regulatory agencies to protect its people, its institutions and its environment from the negative impacts of new technologies. These agencies are saddled with the task of deciding among strongly conflicting viewpoints represented by a wide range of interest groups and “value communities” within the society. When regulatory decisions are made some interests and values are protected while others are curtailed.

A large number of legal rules create an obligation to prevent, repair or otherwise mitigate damage to human health or the environment. Many of these rules require that a legally relevant causal relation between human behaviour and the damage at issue is established, and in the establishment of causal relations of this kind scientific information is often pressed into service. This thesis examines this specifically legal use of scientific information. It shows that many legally relevant causal relations cannot be established (...) in this way. It also shows that the legal strategy for dealing with epistemic difficulties by relaxing the standard of proof is of limited value in tackling this problem. Consequently, the legal rules focused upon are less efficient tools for combating damage to human health and the environment than their appearances suggest. Other legal means to achieve this aim should therefore be considered. The thesis begins by presenting a framework which can be used to solve some important problems with communication and the division of labour that arise when scientific information is used to answer legal questions. This framework recognizes both epistemological and ontological differences between law and science. The latter are differences between the kinds of entity which are relevant in distinct theoretical contexts; the former, by contrast, are differences between applicable standards of proof. In subsequent parts of the thesis this framework shapes the discussion of the question: To what extent can legally relevant causal relations, involving legally significant entities, be established through the application of scientific information about other, scientifically relevant entities and legal standards of proof. The thesis concludes with a discussion of some of the ways in which the legal regulation could, potentially, be adapted, so as to counteract damage to human health and the environment more efficiently. (shrink)

This is a response to an article by Wade Allison in which he argues that we should accept drastically higher doses of ionizing radiation than what we currently do. He employs four arguments in defence of his position: comparisons with background radiation, the positive experiences of radiotherapy, the presence of biological defence mechanisms against radiation, and a concession by Swedish authorities that their approach to reindeer meat after the Chernobyl fallout was unnecessarily strict. It is shown that each of the (...) four arguments is fallacious. In conclusion, the traditional weighing of risks against benefits in radiation protection is defended. (shrink)

The field of quantified risk assessment is a new field, only about 20 years old, and already it is considered to be in a crisis. As Funtowicz and J.R. Ravetz (1985) put it:The concept of risk in terms of probability has proved to be so elusive, and statistical inference so problematic, that many experts in the field have recently either lost hope of finding a scientific solution or lost faith in Risk Analysis as a tool for decisionmaking. (p.219)Thus the ‘art’ (...) of the assessment of risks… is at an impasse. The early hopes that it could be reduced to a science are frustrated. …[O]thers are tending to introduce the ‘human’ and ‘cultural’ factors. The question now becomes, to what extent should these predominate? Would it be to the reduction or exclusion of the ‘scientific’ aspects? For, …if the perceived phenomena of ‘risks’ are interpreted as lacking all objective content or being merely a small part of some total cultural configuration, then there is no basis for dialogue between opposed positions on such problems, (pp.220-221). (shrink)