This target article presents a theory of human cultural learning. Cultural learning is identified with those instances of social learning in which intersubjectivity or perspective-taking plays a vital role, both in the original learning process and in the resulting cognitive product. Cultural learning manifests itself in three forms during human ontogeny: imitative learning, instructed learning, and collaborative learning – in that order. Evidence is provided that this progression arises from the developmental ordering of the underlying social-cognitive concepts and processes involved. (...) Imitative learning relies on a concept of intentional agent and involves simple perspective-taking. Instructed learning relies on a concept of mental agent and involves alternating/coordinated perspective-taking (intersubjectivity). Collaborative learning relies on a concept of reflective agent and involves integrated perspective-taking (reflective intersubjectivity). A comparison of normal children, autistic children and wild and enculturated chimpanzees provides further evidence for these correlations between social cognition and cultural learning. Cultural learning is a uniquely human form of social learning that allows for a fidelity of transmission of behaviors and information among conspecifics not possible in other forms of social learning, thereby providing the psychological basis for cultural evolution. (shrink)

We show how an epistemology informed by cognitive science promises to shed light on an ancient problem in the philosophy of mathematics: the problem of exactness. The problem of exactness arises because geometrical knowledge is thought to concern perfect geometrical forms, whereas the embodiment of such forms in the natural world may be imperfect. There thus arises an apparent mismatch between mathematical concepts and physical reality. We propose that the problem can be solved by emphasizing the ways in which the (...) brain can transform and organize its perceptual intake. It is not necessary for a geometrical form to be perfectly instantiated in order for perception of such a form to be the basis of a geometrical concept. (shrink)

Tomasello, Kruger & Ratner relate the evolution of social cognition – the understanding of others' minds – to the evolution of culture. Tomasello et al. conceive of the accumulation of culture as the product of cultural learning, a kind of learning dependent upon recognizing others' intentionality. They distinguish three levels of this recognition: of intention (what isxtrying to do), of beliefs (what doesxthink aboutp), and of beliefs about beliefs (what doesxthinkythinks aboutp). They then tie these levels to three discrete forms (...) of cultural learning – imitative, instructed, and collaborative – which children become capable of when they are 9 months, 4 years, and 6 years old respectively, at least in Western culture where relevant data are available. (shrink)

In order to begin to cultivate safe learning communities, serious social problems that manifest themselves in school settings and threaten its constituents need to be addressed. One such problem is bullying. Bullying is a type of peer aggression defined as unrelenting, willful and malicious physical or psychological abuse that results in physical or psychological harm to the victim, the bully and the bystander. Approximately 160,000 students stay home from school each day because they are afraid of being bullied, and an (...) estimated half a million students nationwide are marked absent every 30 days because of bullying. Thus, bullying clouds the school setting with fear and anxiety, which adversely affects a student’s ability to learn. (shrink)

Tomasello, Kruger & Ratner make the very interesting and valid point that the transmission of culture must depend on understanding others' minds. Culture is shared among a people and is passed on to progeny. The sharing of culture implies that the purpose of (and therefore the meaning behind) any given cultural element (behavioral tradition, word, or artifact) is understood. Because meaning or purpose emanates from minds, something about others' minds must be understood in order to truly learn some element of (...) a culture. It thus makes sense that cultural learning should depend on social-cognitive skills. But what exactly is cultural learning?There are two rival interpretations of the term cultural learning. In the first, one would define a given type of cultural learning by the type of social-cognitive skill it entails. For example, imitative learning would be defined as any learning of a cultural element in which another's goals or intentions are taken into account. This definition of cultural learning, however, would force Tomasello et al.'s argument into a circle: Imitative learning relies on this social-cognitive skill because imitative learning is defined as learning that relies on this social-cognitive skill. Such a circular definition does not do their argument justice. (shrink)

The teacher’s role in the university classroom has traditionally been to present the syllabus to listening students. In Norway new rules have been introduced for the activity in this classroom. The overarching goal for the teaching is to organize a learning situation that makes the students active learners. The article deals with the teacher as a researcher, and focuses on how innovative actions can be implemented by the teacher and studied from a researcher point of view. The text presents cultural (...) historical activity theory (CHAT) as both the theoretical framework for the organized actions in the classroom and as an approach for studying the classroom processes. The article gives an overview over a material that can be gathered in a classroom characterized by student activity. It ends by reflections on how development in one classroom can be transferred to other classrooms.  . (shrink)

Consciousness and experience, William G. Lycan. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996. ISBN 0–262–12197–2 (hc)Mind as motion: explorations in the dynamics of cognition, Robert Port & Timothy Van Gelder (Eds). Cambridge, MA: MIT/Bradford, 1995. ISBN 0–262–16150–8Perception, Kathleen Akins (Ed.). New York: Oxford University Press, 1996. ISBN 0–19–508461 (hbk); 0–19–508462–4 (pbk)Context and consciousness, B. Nardi (Ed.). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996. ISBN: 0–262–14058–6Catching ourselves in the act, Horst Hendriks‐Jansen. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996. ISBN 0–262–08246–2The search for mind. A new foundation for (...) cognitive science, Sean O'Nuallain. Norwood, NJ: Ablex, 1995Mindblindness: an essay on autism and theory of mind, Simon Baron‐Cohen. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995. ISBN 0–262–02384–9. (shrink)

Contextualization is a widely-discussed topic in the field of linguistics. Although it is generally agreed that contextualization is a dynamic process of interaction among the heterogeneous contextual factors, one still lacks a coherent explanation of how the interactions enable a language user to construct a meaningful text/utterance. From an Activity Theory perspective, language use can be termed as a rule-governed activity. The activity itself is the context of a subject’s decision-making, and contextualization is nothing but the actualization process of a (...) language use activity. During the process, the subject strategizes her/his linguistic choice to build the textual outcome in light of the hierarchical text functions, namely, the conventionalized and situational functions of prospective text, which respectively embody the social-cultural and situational factors constraining her/his actions, and the conventional function of textual tools, a foremost factor conditioning her/his operation. When there are contradictions among these functions, the subject needs to prioritize the one at a higher stratum. This can be exemplified by three typical cases of language use: translation, pseudo-translation and self-translation. (shrink)

In their critique of connectionist models Fodor and Pylyshyn (1988) dismiss such models as not being cognitive or psychological. Evaluating Fodor and Pylyshyn's critique requires examining what is required in characterizating models as 'cognitive'. The present discussion examines the various senses of this term. It argues the answer to the title question seems to vary with these different senses. Indeed, by one sense of the term, neither representa-tionalism nor connectionism is cognitive. General ramifications of such an appraisal are discussed and (...) alternative avenues for cognitive research are suggested. (shrink)

Tomasello, Kruger & Ratner deserve congratulations for their well-reasoned ideas on the development of cultural learning. Their arguments are generally convincing, perhaps because their distinctions and developmental relations among types of cultural learning and agency mirror concepts of my own.

This paper provides a glimpse of some different theoretical frameworks and empirical methods in the author's search for theories and practices that might improve the utility and usability of computer artifacts. The essay touches on some problematic aspects of currently accepted theories and techniques in the cognitive sciences, especially in their application to the field of human-computer interaction, and mentions some alternative conceptions based on a cultural-historical approach. The intent is to widen the nature of the debate about appropriate frameworks (...) for discussing human activities especially when we discuss design activities in the context of computer systems development. The paper concludes with some suggestions for more fruitful research directions that involve the active participation of those for whom the research is ostensibly being done, and a greater emphasis on understanding how artifact design and use are inextricably intertwined. (shrink)