- Intuitive Expertise in Moral Judgments.Joachim Horvath & Alex Wiegmann - 2022 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 100 (2):342-359.details
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Do framing effects make moral intuitions unreliable?Joanna Demaree-Cotton - 2016 - Philosophical Psychology 29 (1):1-22.details
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Philosophical Intuitions Are Surprisingly Stable Across both Demographic Groups and Situations.Joshua Knobe - 2021 - Filozofia Nauki 29 (2):11-76.details
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Let’s not get ahead of ourselves: we have no idea if moral reasoning causes moral progress.Paul Rehren & Charlie Blunden - 2024 - Philosophical Explorations 27 (3):351-369.details
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Intuitive expertise and intuitions about knowledge.Joachim Horvath & Alex Wiegmann - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (10):2701-2726.details
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The Means/Side-Effect Distinction in Moral Cognition: A Meta-Analysis.Adam Feltz & Joshua May - 2017 - Cognition 166 (C):314-327.details
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The Influence of Situational Factors in Sacrificial Dilemmas on Utilitarian Moral Judgments.Michael Klenk - 2022 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 13 (3):593-625.details
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The rise of moral cognition.Joshua D. Greene - 2015 - Cognition 135 (C):39-42.details
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Moral framing effects within subjects.Paul Rehren & Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 2021 - Philosophical Psychology 34 (5):611-636.details
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(1 other version)Manipulating Morality: Third‐Party Intentions Alter Moral Judgments by Changing Causal Reasoning.Jonathan Phillips & Alex Shaw - 2014 - Cognitive Science 38 (8):1320-1347.details
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Reduced empathic concern leads to utilitarian moral judgments in trait alexithymia.Indrajeet Patil & Giorgia Silani - 2014 - Frontiers in Psychology 5.details
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Are Intuitions About Moral Relevance Susceptible to Framing Effects?James Andow - 2017 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 9 (1):115-141.details
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Ordering effects, updating effects, and the specter of global skepticism.Zachary Horne & Jonathan Livengood - 2017 - Synthese 194 (4):1189-1218.details
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How causal structure, causal strength, and foreseeability affect moral judgments.Neele Engelmann & Michael R. Waldmann - 2022 - Cognition 226 (C):105167.details
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A Single Counterexample Leads to Moral Belief Revision.Zachary Horne, Derek Powell & John Hummel - 2015 - Cognitive Science 39 (8):1950-1964.details
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Intuitions about cases as evidence (for how we should think).James Andow - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.details
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(1 other version)Manipulating Morality: Third-Party Intentions Alter Moral Judgments by Changing Causal Reasoning.Jonathan Phillips & Alex Shaw - 2015 - Cognitive Science 39 (6):1320-1347.details
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How do philosophers and nonphilosophers think about philosophy? And does personality make a difference?James Andow - 2022 - Synthese 200 (2).details
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Sacrificing objects instead of persons: Order effects without emotional engagement.Emilian Mihailov, Ivar R. Hannikainen & Alex Wiegmann - 2025 - Philosophical Psychology 38 (2):579-598.details
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How to weigh lives. A computational model of moral judgment in multiple-outcome structures.Neele Engelmann & Michael R. Waldmann - 2022 - Cognition 218 (C):104910.details
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Intuitions about moral relevance—Good news for moral intuitionism.Hossein Dabbagh - 2021 - Philosophical Psychology 34 (7):1047-1072.details
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The Oxford Handbook of Causal Reasoning.Michael Waldmann (ed.) - 2017 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.details
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Distinguishing Between Three Versions of the Doctrine of Double Effect Hypothesis in Moral Psychology.Simon Fitzpatrick - 2014 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 5 (4):505-525.details
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An investigation of the use of linguistic probes “by” and “in order to” in assessing moral grammar.Hanne M. Watkins & Simon M. Laham - 2016 - Thinking and Reasoning 22 (1):16-30.details
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