Vertreter non-egalitaristischer Konzeptionen der Bildungsgerechtigkeit ersetzen das klassische egalitaristische Votum für Gleichheit als intrinsischen Wert durch die Begründung von Schwellenkonzeptionen, die über Adäquatheits- und Suffizienzbedingungen angeben sollen, was als Kriterium für die Identifikation illegitimer Bildungsungleichheiten zu gelten hat und was nicht. Alle Ungleichheiten oberhalb einer fixierten Schwelle sind aus non-egalitaristischer Sicht normativ nicht von Belang. Dieser Fokus auf Mindestbedingungen, die gegeben sein müssen, damit Akteure in liberal-demokratischen Gesellschaften politisch partizipieren und ein gedeihliches Leben führen können, steht nicht nur in einem (...) gewissen Passungsverhältnis zu aktuellen bildungspolitischen Entwicklungen, sondern scheint auch einige der Probleme angemessener lösen zu können, mit denen egalitaristische Konzeptionen der Bildungsgerechtigkeit üblicherweise konfrontiert werden. Die gerechtigkeitstheoretische Begründung von Schwellenkonzeptionen wird häufig durch demokratietheoretische Argumentationen flankiert, die davon ausgehen, dass die propagierten Mindeststandards zugleich die intergenerationale Tradierung der normativen Grundlagen liberaler Demokratien sicherstellen und die Voraussetzungen demokratischer Legitimität konstituieren, indem sie allgemeine Fähigkeiten und Tugenden fördern, auf die eine Zustimmung zu konsensfähigen Prinzipien der Gerechtigkeit und der fairen Kooperation angewiesen ist. In dem Beitrag werden zunächst die wichtigsten non-egalitaristischen Kritiken an egalitaristischen Konzeptionen der Bildungsgerechtigkeit vorgestellt. Daran anschließend werden einige der Schwachstellen und Fallstricke diskutiert, die mit suffizienzorientierten Verständnissen der Bildungsgerechtigkeit und ihren demokratietheoretischen Begründungen verbunden sind. Ziel des Beitrags ist es nicht eine ausformulierte egalitaristische Alternative zu non-egalitaristischen Konzeptionen der Bildungsgerechtigkeit vorzustellen, sondern nachzuweisen, dass Doktrinen der Suffizienz noch keine ausreichenden Kriterien liefern, um mit verbleibenden Bildungsungleichheiten angemessen umzugehen. (shrink)

The basic principle of educational equality is that each child should receive an equally good education. This sounds appealing, but is rather vague and needs substantial working out. Also, educational equality faces all the objections to equality per se, plus others specific to its subject matter. Together these have eroded confidence in the viability of equality as an educational ideal. This article argues that equality of educational opportunity is not the best way of understanding educational equality. It focuses on Brighouse (...) and Swift's well worked out meritocratic conception and finds it irretrievably flawed; they should, instead, have pursued a radical conception they only mention. This conception is used as a starting point for developing a luck egalitarian conception, pluralistic and complex in nature. It is argued that such a conception accounts for the appeal of equality of opportunity, fits with other values in education and meets many of the objections. Thus, equality is reasserted as what morally matters most in education. (shrink)

Autonomy as a personal ideal presupposes a conception of the self who owns and rules in a life that exemplifies the ideal. Philosophical discussion of autonomy continues to be injuenced by the thesis that the governing core of the self resides in our capacities for disengaged rational reflection, even when the thesis is not explicitly avowed. This conception of autonomy is shown to be inadequate because it alienates us from what matters in our lives. An alternative conception of autonomy is (...) presented that accords a substantial role to rejection and choice within an autonomous life without falling preq, to the charge of alienation. Some divergent implications of the two rival conceptions of autonomy for an understanding of liberal education are examined. Finally, the question of the value of autonomy from a social perspective is briefly discussed. (shrink)

The principle of educational equality is important for the plausibility of egalitarianism. I argue against John Wilson's recent attempts to show that two particular versions of the principle are incoherent, and I rebut his argument that even if it were coherent it would be wrong to endorse it. Two other objections to this version of the principle are considered and shown not to be decisive. The principle governing the distribution of educational resources that Wilson advocates is also rejected.

Current debates regarding justice in university admissions most often approach the question of access to university from a technical, policy-focussed perspective. Despite the attention that access to university receives in the press and policy literature, ethical discussion tends to focus on technical matters such as who should pay for university or which schemes of selection are allowable, not the question of who should go to university in the first place. We address the question of university admissions—the question of who should (...) go to university—from an ethical perspective. We find that most discussions draw on a generic conception of what the university is good for that is too thin to provide deliberative guidance and hold that a full account of the ethics of admissions needs to take into account the distinctive good that the university provides—knowledge and understanding. This view, we hold, does not imply that measures should not be taken to widen access to university; however, the basis for such measures should be grounded in that distinctive good in the first instance. (shrink)

Current debates regarding justice in university admissions most often approach the question of access to university from a technical, policy-focussed perspective. Despite the attention that access to university receives in the press and policy literature, ethical discussion tends to focus on technical matters such as who should pay for university or which schemes of selection are allowable, not the question of who should go to university in the first place. We address the question of university admissions—the question of who should (...) go to university—from an ethical perspective. We find that most discussions draw on a generic conception of what the university is good for that is too thin to provide deliberative guidance and hold that a full account of the ethics of admissions needs to take into account the distinctive good that the university provides—knowledge and understanding. This view, we hold, does not imply that measures should not be taken to widen access to university; however, the basis for such measures should be grounded in that distinctive good in the first instance. (shrink)